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FOREWORD
In the United States, judicial biography has long
been popular in the field of public law.1

The quantity

and quality of American judicial biography is held in high
o
regard in other parts of the world.
The biographical
approach has both limitations and advantages.

Its great

est limitation is that it is concerned with the particular
rather than the general.

However much information a judi

cial biography may yield about a particular judge, it
tells one nothing about judges as a whole.

If the judi

cial biographer infers a relationship between the
subject’s background and his approach to the law, that
relationship cannot be transferred to the judicial process
generally.

There remains the possibility that the judge

For example, see Edward S. Corwin, John Marshall and
the Constitution (New Haven* Yale University Press, 1919);
Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Constitution
(Cambridge* Harvard University Press, 1938)? Alpheus T.
Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone* Pillar of the Law (New York*
The Viking Press, 1956); J. Woodford Howard,Jr.
Mr. Justice Murphy* A Political Biography (Princeton*
Princeton University Press, 1968).
2See Clifford L. Pannam, "Judicial Biography— A Pre
liminary Obstacle," University of Queensland Law Journal.
IV (1961), 57-72. The author laments the dearth of
judicial biography in Australian legal and political
literature and expresses the hope that the condition will
be remedied.
*

•

•
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who is the subject of the biography represents a unique or
a rare case in the judicial process.

Because of this

inability to generalize, judicial biography is not popular
with behaviorally oriented political scientists.
As Peltason has pointed out, judicial biography tends
to be more popular with the "historical-philosophicallegal school."

Advantages of the biographical approach

are that it can be used as a medium of instruction for
those who do not normally read judicial opinions; it
serves as a framework for the study of ideas; and it
places judicial decisions in historical context.

Moreover,

political scientists who are not inclined toward the
writing of judicial biographies sometimes find them useful
2
as sources of data.
Between 1951 and 1954, numerous doctoral disserta
tions in public law were biographical in character— over
twenty-five per cent.^

Individual judges continue to be

T£ven studies which are broader in scope than biog
raphies cannot always yield generalizations. Because of
the complexity of the appointment process, Eisenstein was
unable to make generalizations about the appointment of
United States Attorneys. See James Eisenstein, "Counsel
for the United States; An Empirical Analysis of the
Office of United States Attorney" (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Yale University, 1968), pp. II 32-33.
2
See J. W. Peltason, "Supreme Court Biography and the
Study of Public Law," Essays on the American Constitution;
A Commemorative Volume in Honor of Alnheus T. Mason,
ed. Gottfried Dietze (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.; PrenticeHall, 1964), pp. 215-219.
3Ibid.. 215-216.
iv

the subjects of numerous dissertations.

During the

period from i 960 through 1969* the vast majority of
biographies, case studies, and studies of judicial phi
losophy have focused on Justices of the Supreme Court }1
only two have taken lower federal court judges for
W a l t e r Philip Kremm, "Justice Holmes on Constitu
tionality and Evidence of His Influence Upon the Vinson
Court, 19^6-^9" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Uni
versity of North Carolina, 1961); Stephen Robert Mitchell,
"Mr. Justice Horace Gray" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Wisconsin, 1961); James Jerome Bolner,
"Mr. Chief Justice Vinsons His Politics and His Constitu
tional Law" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Virginia, 1962); Joseph Richard Morice, "Justice Stephen J.
Field and the Fourteenth Amendments A Re-Evaluation"
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pittsburgh,
1962); Robert Hammon Birkby, "Justice Wiley B. Rutledge
and Individual Liberties" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Princeton University, 1963); William Davis Eaton, "Douglas
Dissentss An Interpretation of Judicial Philosophy"
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
California, Berkeley, 1963); David Franklin Hughes,
"Salmon P. Chases Chief Justice" (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Princeton University, 1963); Morgan
Daniel Dowd, "Justice Joseph Storys A Study of the
Contributions of a Jeffersonian Judge to the Development
of American Constitutional Law" (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Massachusetts, 196*0; James
Paul McClellan, "Joseph Story and the American Constitu
tion" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia, 196*0;
Roy Lee Meek, "Justices Douglas and Blacks Political
Liberalism and Judicial Activism"
(unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Oregon, 196*0; Robert Edward
Newton, "Judicial Self-Restraint in the Opinions of
Felix Frankfurter in Non-Civil Liberties Cases Concerning
Federal Constitutional Limitations on State Powers of
Government" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Catholic
University of America, 1965)s Harold Marvin Hollingsworth,
"The Confirmation of Judicial Review Under Taney and
Chase" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Tennessee, 1966); Dorothy Buckton James, "Judicial
Philosophy and Accession to the Court * The Cases of
Justices Jackson and Douglas" (unpublished Ph.D. disser
tation, Columbia University, 1966); Justine Staib Mann,
"The Political and Constitutional Thought of John
v

their subjects .1

But the federal judges of the District

Courts, the Courts of Appeals, and the specialized
courts merit greater attention than they have received.
As Judge Carl McGowan has pointed out, the effectiveness
of the Supreme Court "depends in some considerable
degree upon the supporting structure of inferior federal
p
courts . . . ."
In spite of the greater visibility of
Archibald Campbell" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Alabama, 1966); Luther Wayne Odom, "Justice
Holmes, the Fourteenth Amendment and the Reasonable Man
Standard" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Texas, 1966); Brother E. Adrian Leonard, F.S.C., "Mr.
Justice Roberts and the Constitutional Revolution of 1937"
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Notre Dame,
1967); Leonard Boyne Rosenberg, "The Political Thought of
William Patterson" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New
School for Social Research, 1967); Eva Redfield Rubin,
"The Judicial Apprenticeship of Arthur J. Goldberg, 19621965" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The Johns Hopkins
University, 1967); Paul King Pollock, "Judicial Liber
tarianism and Judicial Responsibilities; The Case of
Justice William 0. Douglas" (unpublished Ph.D. disserta
tion, Cornell University, 1968); Janice B. Snook, "Judi
cial Philosophy and Judicial Behavior; The Case of Mr.
Justice Cardozo" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univer
sity of Maryland, 1969).
^William C. Burris, "John J. Parker and Supreme
Court Policy; A Case Study in Judicial Control"
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of North
Carolina, 1965); Robert Arthur Carp, "The Function,
Impact, and Political Relevance of the Federal District
Courts; A Case Study" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Iowa, 1969). The subject of the latter
dissertation is Judge William Francis Riley, who served
on the Southern District of Iowa.
2
The Organization of Judicial Power in the United
States (Evanston. 111.; Northwestern University Press,
I 969T 7 p. 1^. See also Walter F. Murphy, "Lower Court
Checks on Supreme Court Power," American Political Science
Review. LIII (December, 1959), 1017-1031; Richard J.
Richardson and Kenneth N. Vines, The Politics of the
vi

Supreme Court Justices, it is these lower court judges
who dispose of the overwhelming majority of cases arising
in the federal judicial system.

In 1968, the Courts of

Appeals terminated 8,264 cases, and the District Courts
terminated 98,365 cases.^

Obviously, the Supreme Court

is able to review relatively few of the cases decided by
lower court judges.
This dissertation focuses on a lower court judge,
It is a judicial biography of Judge J. Skelly Wright, who
is currently on the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit.

Since Peltason has

rightly cautioned against the development of a "scholarly
one-upmanship" in which the lives of obscure judges are
2
researched, it is appropriate to ask, "Why Judge Wright?"
J. Skelly Wright is hardly disqualified by obscurity.
He has been at the center of the controversy over school
segregation.

His handling of the segregation issue is

Federal Courts (Bostom

Little, Brown and Company, 1970).

^U.S., Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, Annual Report of the Director. 1968, pp. 97 , 1052
Peltason, p. 216.
^See Hobson v. Hansen. 269 F.Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967),
in which he h e l d d e facto segregation in the District of
Columbia unconstitutional. That decision evoked caustic
comment from_Carl Hansen, former Superintendent of Schools
in the District, in his Danger in Washington! The Story
of My Twenty Years in the Public Schools in the Nation's
Capital (West Nyack. N.Y.i Parker Publishing Company,
1968). Segregation controversies were not new to Judge
•

•
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the only part of his lengthy public career to receive a
significant amount of scholarly attention .1

And yet

Judge Wright has decided a wide range of constitutional
issues during his more than twenty years on the federal
bench as a District Judge and as a Court of Appeals
Judge.

This dissertation examines those issues and

Judge Wright’s approach to them.
Wright’s legal career has been even more diverse than
service at two levels of the federal judiciary.

He has

also served as an Assistant United States Attorney
and participated in the prosecution of the "Louisiana
Wright, for it was he who began the desegregation of
public schools in Louisiana while he was a Federal Dis
trict Judge in the Eastern District of Louisiana.
^ o r commentary on Wright's role in the desegrega
tion of Louisiana's public schools, see J. W. Peltason,
Fifty-Eight Lonely Men* Southern Federal Judges and
School Desegregation (New York* Harcourt, Brace and
World, 1961)? Edward L. Pinney and Robert S. Friedman,
Political Leadership and the School Desegregation Crisis
in Louisiana. Eagleton Institute Cases in Practical
Politics, Case 31 (N.P.* McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1963);
Earlean M. McCarrick, "Desegregation and the Judiciary*
The Role of the Federal District Court in Educational
Desegregation in Louisiana," Journal of Public L a w . XVI
(1967), 107-1275 Morton Inger, Politics and Reality in
an American City* The New Orleans School Crisis of i 960
(New York* Center for Urban Education, 1969). Inger is
critical of Peltason's study insofar as it relates to
desegregation in New Orleans. See Inger, p. 4-7. For
commentary on Wright's District of Columbia desegrega
tion decision, see Alexander M. Bickel, "Skelly Wright’s
Sweeping Decision," The New Republic. July 8, 1967,
pp. 11-12 .

• • •

v m

Scandals."

He resigned his position as Assistant United

States Attorney to go into private practice in
Washington, D. C., during which time he argued two cases
before the Supreme Court of the United S t a t e s I n

19*1-8,

he returned to government service as United States
Attorney for the Eastern District of Louisiana and
served in that position until he was elevated to the
federal bench.

His experiences as prosecuting and

defense attorney undoubtedly helped to shape his judicial
approach.
Since Judge Wright probably has many productive
years ahead of him, the author did not have the benefit
of his papers.

Without access to draft opinions, there

is no way of knowing whether the Judge might have been
less certain about the proper disposition of some cases
than his published opinions indicate.

This obstacle,

however, has not prevented the writing of biographies of
Supreme Court Justices while they lived, and it has not
proved insurmountable in this case.

If there is

^Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. ^59
(19^7); Johnson v. United Sta'tes, 333 U.S. 10 (19*1-8).
According to Erwin N. Griswold, lawyers in private prac
tice rarely argue more than one case before the Supreme
Court. He was undoubtedly referring to lawyers not
located in Washington. See his "Practice Before the
Supreme Court of the United States," Federal Bar Journal.
XXIX (Summer, 1970), 150.

consistency in the Judge’s opinions, one may assume
that he has resolved whatever initial doubts there might
have been.^
Judge Wright's reported opinions are available in
the Federal Supplement and the Federal Reporter. Second
Series.

His constitutional opinions have been examined

through mid-1970— more specifically, through Volume ^29»
Federal Reporter, Second Series.

Constitutional cases

in which he participated but did not write opinions
were also examined.

Newspapers, Senate Judiciary Sub

committee hearings, and the Congressional Record are
among the sources that have been used.
off-the-bench writings are numerous.

The Judge's
Interviews with

associates and members of the Judge's family provided
other sources of information.
Following the procedure used by Leo Katcher for his
p
biography of Earl Warren, the author informed Judge Wright
of the proposed biography, and he indicated that he had no
objections to it.

Persons who were interviewed were told

■^For a discussion of this problem, see Howard, M r .
Justice Murphy, p. ^84-. Also see his "On the Fluidity
of Judicial Choice," American Political Science Review,
LXII (March, 1968), p. 50. The problem is not unique
to studies of the judicial process. Students of legis
lative roll-call voting experience a similar problem and
resolve it in much the same way. See Judson L. James,
American Political Parties> Potential and Performance
(New York 1 Pegasus, 1969), pp. 152-153.
^Earl Warren 1 A Political Biography (New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1967).

that Judge Wright was aware of what was being done and
were shown his letter, if they indicated a desire to see
it.

The interviews were unstructured.

Unlike Katcher,

who did not interview Warren, the author requested and
received an interview with Judge Wright.
Following Woodford Howard’s approach, this study
emphasizes public career more than private life.

It

relies on Wright’s own words when possible "in order to
flesh out the character," as Howard ptxt it, and provides
the reader with a basis for making independent judgments.'1'
Garraty has suggested that biographies should be
chronological in form for the simple reason that a per2
son's life unfolds chronologically.
This study follows
Garraty's suggestion, but with a modification.

Although

it treats the two phases of Wright's judicial career
separately, within each phase of his career the study is
concerned with his approach to constitutional issues;
therefore, it departs from pure chronology and is organ
ized around constitutional issues.

Each issue, however,

is considered chronologically in order to illustrate any
^Howard, Mr. Justice Murphy. pp. vii-viii. Arthur L.
Goodhart also considered that "As a general rule it is
best to leave a judge to speak for himself both inside and
out of court." Quoted in John P. Reid, "Irresponsible and
Unimaginative; The Lawyer and the Historian as Judicial
Biographer," Law Library Journal. LVII (May, 196*0, 135.
2
John A. Garraty, The Nature of Biography (New York;
Alfred A. Knopf, 1957), p. 257xi

changes in Judge Wright's constitutional approach over
time.

Where background information was necessary, the

author followed the acceptable procedure of drawing upon
sound secondary sources.^
The thesis of this study is that J. Skelly Wright
has adopted the values of political liberalism and has
been a policy-oriented judge.

The term "liberalism” is

used here in a manner similar to the way it is used in
quantitative studies.

A liberal judge is one who tends

to be for the governmental agency in regulation of
business cases; tends to favor the constitutional claims
of individuals who raise civil rights issues in either
criminal or noncriminal contexts; tends to favor ten
ants as opposed to landlords; and tends to favor the
2
federal government in disputes with the states.
Walter
Murphy's definition of a policy-oriented judge is
adopted here.

The term describes a judge "who is aware of

h l o i d . . p. 214.
2
See Sheldon Goldman, "Politics, Judges, and the
Administration of Justice; The Background, Recruitment,
and Decisional Tendencies of the Judges on the United
States Courts of Appeals, 1961-4" (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Harvard University, 1965)» PP* 37-38.
Goldman designates a "liberal" position in considerably
more categories of cases than those mentioned above, but
they are not applicable here because they are nonconsti
tutional. Also, because of the nature of Goldman's study,
he is concerned only with the way a judge votes. This
study goes beyond Wright's voting position.

xii

I

the impact which judicial decisions can have on public
policy, realizes the leeway for discretion which his
office permits, and is willing to take advantage of this
power and leeway to further particular policy aims."1
This dissertation attempts to illustrate Wright's
liberalism and policy-orientation within the context of
a judicial biography— a judicial biography of an eminent
and controversial jurist on what has been termed the
p
nation's second most important court.

W a l t e r P. Murphy, Elements of Judicial Strategy
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 4.
2
See James E. Clayton, "The Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia," Constitutional Law in the
Political Process, ed. John R. Schmidhauser (Chicago:
Rand McNally & Co., 1963), p. 133.
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ABSTRACT
The dissertation is a judicial biography of Judge
J. Skelly Wright.

It is based primarily on newspaper

sources, Judge Wright's judicial opinions and off-thebench writings, and personal interviews with the Judge's
associates, members of the Wright family, and Judge Wright
himself.

The thesis of the dissertation is that Judge

J. Skelly Wright has adopted the values of political
liberalism and has been what Walter Murphy has called a
"policy-oriented" judge; that is, a judge "who is aware of
the impact which judicial decisions can have on public
policy, realizes the leeway for discretion which his
office permits, and is willing to take advantage of this
power and leeway to further particular policy aims."'1"
Since the dissertation is a biography, its organiza
tion is basically chronological.

The first chapter deals

with Wright's background and pre-judicial career.

It

suggests that his liberal outlook has sprung from his
working-class background, his pre-judicial experiences in
the United States Attorney's office, and his defense of
W a l t e r F. Murphy, Elements of Judicial Strategy
(Chicagoi University of Chicago Press, 1 9 ^ ) , p.
xvi

civil rights before the Supreme Court while in private
practice.

The next five chapters examine the substance

of Judge Wright's constitutional law as a District Judge,
his elevation to the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, and the substance of his constitutional
law while on the latter court.

The dissertation examines

Wright's approach to economic regulation, the Bill of
Rights, and voting rights.

It also examines the segrega

tion controversies in which he has been involved, both in
Louisiana and in the District of Columbia.

The discussion

of his constitutional law is interspersed with illustra
tions of how Wright has attempted to influence policy*
openly reluctant application of law with which he dis
agrees coupled with pleas that the law be reconsidered;
eloquent opinions in support of policy with which he
agrees; suggesting in his opinions arguments which counsel
might test in future litigation; use of the Court of
Appeals' supervisory power; attempting to influence public
opinion through off-the-bench activity.
The dissertation concludes with an evaluation of
Judge Wright's more than twenty years of judicial service.
His service is evaluated from the standpoint of technical
competence, his interpretation of the judicial function,
and the values he has promoted.

Using the success of his

opinions in surviving appeals and professional respect as
criteria, the dissertation concludes that Judge Wight has
xvii

indeed been technically competent.

The dissertation also

makes the normative judgment that Judge Wright's policyoriented interpretation of the judicial function is a
valid one and that the values he has promoted are consis
tent with democratic theory.

xviii

CHAPTER I
THE ROAD TO A FEDERAL DISTRICT
JUDGESHIP
The Early Years
James Skelly Wright, b o m January 1^, 1911, and
destined thirty-eight years later to put on the robe of
a Federal District Judge, did not emerge from the economic
and social elite of his native New Orleans.

If one looks

to paternal occupation, as Schmidhauser did in his study
of Supreme Court Justices,'*'one finds that James Edward
Wright, the father of the future judge, was a plumber
by trade,

James E. Wright had only an elementary school

education, but he steadily provided for his large family.
There were eight children b o m to the Wrights.

James

Skelly, known to family and friends as Skelly, was the
third.2
Skelly was Mrs. Wright's maiden name, and it was
from the Skelly side of the family that Skelly got the
■*\John R. Schmidhauser, The Supreme Court: Its
Politics. Personalities. and^rocedures (New York: Holt
Rinehart and Winston, 1 9 & 0 V PP. 31-33.
2
Personal interviews: James Edward Wright, Jr.,
New Orleans, La., September 2, 1970, and Edward F. Wright,
New Orleans, La., May 1^, 1973.

2
political connections that were important in his early
career.

Mrs. Wright came from a politically active

family.

Her father, Jim Skelly, was a member of the

Louisiana House of Representatives.

Her brother,

Joseph Patrick Skelly, served as Commissioner of Prop
erty on the New Orleans Commission Counsel and was one
of the leaders in the Regular Democratic Organization,
the political machine that controlled New Orleans
politics.

Although Mr. Wright stuck to his plumbing

and was not active in politics, Mrs. Wright was always
politically active.

She served on the Parkway Com

mission, the Playground Commission, and was a Democratic
ward leader in the Twelfth Ward, where the Wrights
lived.1
Their home was on Camp Street near Napoleon
Avenue, which was "a neighborhood of working people."

p

Skelly and the other Wright children attended the neigh
borhood public school.

Their mother, in addition to her

political activity, was active in the Mothers' Club of
the school and played Santa Claus for the children each
year.-^ After elementary school, Skelly went on to Warren
Easton High, a public school for boys, and, according
•hibid.

2J. Skelly Wright, quoted in William E. Giles,
"Integration Storm— Judge Wright: In the Center of New
Orleans Controversy," The Wall Street Journal
(November 16, i 960), p. 16.
•^Interview:

James E. Wright, Jr.

3
to his older brother, always got good grades without much
effort.^"

While at Warren Easton, he was elected a City

Commissioner for Boys' Day, the only "elected office"
for which he ever ran.
When his high school days were over, Skelly attended
Loyola University on a scholarship, where he majored in
philosophy.^

He was also involved in school activities,

serving as business manager of the school newspaper,
chairman of the dance committee, and editor of the year
book.

Obviously not lacking in social skills, the

personable young man became national president of his
fraternity, Alpha Delta Gamma.

His graduation in 1931

did not end his association with Loyola.
law school at that institution.

He enrolled in

His legal education,

however, was obtained mainly in night classes because he
had a daytime job as a teacher at Fortier High, a public
school for boys.

At Fortier, he taught algebra and

English history and had the distinction of winning a
new hat by being elected most popular teacher.

Among

his students were his own younger brother, Jim, and,
when he substituted for an English teacher, Russell Long,
who would later be elected United States Senator from
■^Interview: Edward F. Wright.
2
Personal interview with the Hon. J. Skelly Wright,
Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, Washington, D. C., July 12,
1973.
"Interview:

Edward F. Wright.

Louisiana.'1' Wright continued to teach even after his
graduation from law school in 193^.
During these early years, Skelly Wright was always
interested in politics but was never active in even a
minor capacity.

In view of the political orientation of

his family, one might have expected at least some politi
cal activity, and yet it did not happen.

Although his

older brother, Eddie, sometimes took Mrs. Wright to the
polls and to political meetings, Skelly was not involved
2
even to that extent.
As a boy, however, he was close to
the Skelly family, often staying with them at their house
in Long Beach, Mississippi.-^

His first political appoint

ment was due to the backing of his uncle, Joe Skelly.
In 1937 • there were some vacancies in the United
States Attorney's office.

Although Assistant United

States Attorneys are formally appointed by the Attorney
General, at that time appointments in the Eastern Dis
trict of Louisiana were effectively made by United
States Senator Allen J. Ellender.

Commissioner Skelly

recommended his nephew to Senator Ellender, and Wright
L
got the appointment.
■^Interview: James E. Wright, Jr.
2
Interviews: Edward F. Wright, Hon. J. Skelly
Wright.
■^Personal interviews with Mrs. Margaret Hotard and
Mrs. Joseph P. Skelly, New Orleans, La., August 29, 1970.
Jk
Interview: Hon. J. Skelly Wright.

5
The new Assistant United States Attorney, fresh from
the high school classroom, had a rather inauspicious
beginning, losing the first case he ever tried.^ Unde
terred by a disappointing start, he was an ambitious
young man who often spent his spare time reading the
2
United States Code Annotated.
Wright worked hard and
performed well in the job.-^
to the narcotics docket.

Initially, he was assigned

He had a place to sleep at the

office, and when he was working on a case, he would
£l

sometimes be there for days at a time.

One narcotics

case which he successfully prosecuted in 1938 involved
the alleged racketeer, Carlos M a r c e l l o . A s a result of
the narcotics conviction, Marcello would later be
ordered deported from the United States, and Wright, as
a District Judge, would uphold the constitutionality of
£
the deportation order.
1Ibid.
2
Personal interview with Kathleen Ruddell, May 21,
1971* Miss Ruddell was secretary to Rene Viosca, United
States Attorney for the Eastern District of Louisiana.
-'Rene Viosca, his former superior, retained a highly
favorable impression of the quality of Wright's service.
Personal interview with the Hon. Rene A. Viosca, Judge
(retired), Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans,
July 20, 1971.
k
Interviews Edward F. Wright.
^James E. Wright, Jr., letter of September 10, 1970
to the author.
£
See United States ex rel. Marcello v. Ahrens.
113 F.Supp. 22 (E.D. La. 1953)i aff'd sub nom.
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Narcotics prosecutions, of course, were not the
extent of Wright's service as Assistant United States
Attorney.

He assisted United States Attorney Rene Viosca

in prosecuting the case of United States v. Classic.1

The

case involved election fraud in the Democratic primary
for the United States House of Representatives and was
prosecuted under the Civil Rights Act of 1870.

When the

District Judge decided that Congress' power over elec
tions did not extend to primaries, the Government took
the case to the Supreme Court on direct appeal, and the
Court reversed the decision, asserting that the primary
was an integral part of the election process.

Indi

rectly, the Classic decision had a fatal effect on white
3
primaries.v
In reviewing Wright's years as Assistant United
States Attorney, it is impossible to overlook the
"Louisiana Scandals," the prosecution of members of Huey
Long's organization after the death of the "Kingfish."
During the most intense periods of activity, the United
Marcello v. Bonds. 3^9 U.S. 302 (1955)*
135 F.Supp. 66 (E.D. La. 19^0).
^United States v. Classic. 313 U.S. 299 (19^1).
^ln Smith v. Allwright. 321 U.S. 6 k 9 (19^*0» the
Court extended the principle that primaries are an
integral part of the election process and held that the
Fifteenth Amendment prohibited states from denying par
ticipation in primaries on the basis of race.

States Attorney's office worked night and day.

Week

ends were especially busy because indictments were pre
sented to the grand jury on Monday.

The United States

Attorney's staff was a closely knit group.

Members of

the staff came from opposing political factions, some
were even helping to prosecute friends and acquaintances,
and yet they worked well together.

During this time,

Wright, like the other Assistants, was kept busy per
forming such tasks as helping to draft indictments and
taking witnesses before the grand jury.1

Wright himself

has said*
The high point of my service as Assistant U. S.
Attorney was during the Louisiana Scandals. It
was a time of high excitement— for prosecutors,
anyway. I guess for defendants, too. For a young
man still in his twenties, I was, more or less,
thrust into a relatively important position, where
I was able to learn about people as well as law.2
The Louisiana Scandals prosecutions went on almost until
World War II.
Wright became involved in war-related activity
even before the United States formally entered the War
when the United States seized Axis vessels in American
ports in the spring of 19^1.

Two Italian ships, the

Ada 0 . and the Monfiore, were then docked at Chalmette,
Louisiana.

Shortly before they were seized, their crews,

■^Interview*
2
Interview*

Kathleen Ruddell.
Hon. J. Skelly Wright.
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acting on instructions from Rome, damaged the machinery
and left the ships to obstruct the harbor.

Consequently,

the United States Attorney’s office took action against
them.

Assistant United States Attorney Wright charged

the officers and crewmen with conspiracy to commit
sabotage, and the grand jury returned indictments.

The

emotional climate was such that convictions were
inevitable.^
In December of 1941, Wright exchanged his position
as Assistant United States Attorney for that of
Lieutenant, j. g . , in the United States Coast Guard.
Initially, he did communications work in Louisiana, but
eventually he got sea duty and was assigned to the
Coast Guart cutter Thetis.

On his first day on board,

the Thetis, while on an escort run, sank a German sub
marine off the coast of Florida.

Approximately eighteen

months later he was transferred to England, where he
served on the legal staff of Admiral Stark.

While in

England, in 1945. he married Helen Patton, a native of
Washington, D. C.

She was then employed by the Govern

ment and was assigned to London in connection with the
■^Interviews* Hon. J. Skelly Wright, Kathleen
Ruddellj New York Times. March 31i 19^1, p. 1? TimesPicavune. March 31. 19*H. p. 1, and April 5, 1941, p. 2.
On Roosevelt’s policy toward Axis ships, see William L.
Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Undeclared W a r :
1940-1941 (New York? Harper & Brothers, 1953)* pp. 424428.
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Lend-Lease Program.

When Wright, hy that time a Lieu

tenant Commander, was discharged from the Coast Guard
in November of 19^5* he and Mrs. Wright returned to
New Orleans, where he resumed his position as Assistant
United States Attorney.

They were there, however, only

until May of 19^6, when Wright resigned his position in
order to go into private practice in Washington, D. C.1
Skelly Wright's Washington law practice was rela
tively brief, lasting less than two years.

It occurred

during the immediate post-war period; therefore, many
wartime rules and regulations were still in effect and
giving rise to a plethora of legal questions— questions
relating to such matters as wage and price controls,
rationing of commodities, and recovery of excess profits.
Among Wright's clients were a shipbuilder and a steam
ship company, both based in New Orleans, and a Louisiana2
based oil interest. Most of his clients, in fact, were
Interviewst Edward F. Wright, James E. Wright, Jr.;
Times-Picavune. October 16, 19^9* p. 1; State-Times
(Baton Rouge, Louisiana), August 31* I960, pp. 1A, 12A
(hereafter cited as State-Times); U. S. Senate, Subcom
mittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, "Hearings,
Nomination of J. Skelly Wright to be U.S. Circuit Judge
for the District of Columbia Circuit," (February 28, 1962),
p. 11.
(Stenographic transcript in files of Senate
Judiciary Committee.) Hereafter cited as Senate Judiciary
Subcommittee, "Hearings, Nomination to D. C. Circuit."
o
John L. Ingoldsby, Jr., letter of December 28, 1970,
to the author. Mr. Ingoldsby, a Washington attorney, is
a former law partner of Judge Wright.
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Louisiana interests that were having problems with the
Federal Government.

By his assessment, he was operating

at a relatively low level of importance.^
Although he did not have a prominent place in the
legal establishment, his Washington location provided
the opportunity for him to approach, as an advocate, the
very pinnacle of the American legal structure, the
Supreme Court.

As a public service, without fee, he

espoused the cause of Willie Francis, a seventeen year
old black male, whom Louisiana intented to electrocute
for murder.

It was to be the State's second attempt, the

first having aborted due to the mechanical failure of a
2
portable electric chair.
In his brief and supplemental
brief to the Supreme Court,bright argued that a second
attempt at electrocuting Francis would be a denial of
equal protection of the law, since other condemned murder
ers sit in the chair only once, and that it would also
constitute double jeopardy, violating the due process
^"Interviews

Hon. J. Skelly Wright.

^The facts of the Francis case are set out in
detail in E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr., Death and the
Supreme Court (New Yorks Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961),
pp. 90-128.
-'The source for the following references to
attorneys* briefs is Louisiana ex rel. Francis v.
Resweber, 329 U.S. 374 (1947). U.S. Supreme Court Briefs
and Records (Microfilm), October Term 1956, Roll 8 ,
Vol. 329, filmed by the University of Chicago Library.
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clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

At an earlier stage

in the legal struggle over Willie Francis' life,
Bertrand De Blanc, the attorney who handled his appeal
to the Louisiana Supreme Court, unsuccessfully argued
that another execution attempt would violate the State
constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punishment.
Wright picked up the reference to cruel and unusual pun
ishment and tied it to the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantee of due process of law.

John L. Ingoldsby, Jr.,

who was Wright's law partner, has saids
I think that he started off by not believing that
the theory had any merit and that it was nothing
more than a desperation move because nothing else
could be thought of, but by the time he appeared
to argue it in the Supreme Court, he had convinced
himself that actually a "cruel and unusual punish
ment" was involved, or was threatened .1
The brief itself amounted to a two-pronged attack.
Wright attacked the fairness of Francis' trial, noting
that it had taken only eight days to try, convict, and
sentence him.

Francis' appointed trial lawyer had

introduced no evidence in his client's behalf, nor had
he appealed the conviction or moved for a new trial.
Precisely what happened at the trial was unknown because
there was not even a stenographic record.

These charges

were cogently answered, however, in the State's opposing
brief.

The State replied that no evidence had been

■^Ingoldsby letter.
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introduced in Francis' behalf because there was none.
Defense counsel had no obligation to manufacture any.
He did not move for a new trial or appeal because there
were no grounds.

As for the lack of a stenographic

transcript, that was the case in thousands of Louisiana
criminal trials because under the Louisiana Constitution
there could be no appeal on the facts.
Wright's other line of attack was aimed at the second
attempt to execute Francis.

It contained a judicious

mixture of intellectual and emotional appeal.

Wright

did not argue that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated
the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment or the
cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amend
ment.

He considered that Willie Francis' case went

beyond any theory of incorporation.

The double jeopardy

and cruel and unusual punishment involved in the Francis
case contravened fundamental principles of liberty and
justice, which were protected by the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The issue, as he framed it,

was whether an individual had a right to an instant and
humane death at the hands of the State, or whether the
State might prolong his physical or mental suffering,
either intentionally or through a blunder.

If the

individual did indeed have a right to an instant and
humane execution, then the fact that it was prolonged
through error rather than malice was irrelevant, since

the individual's suffering was the same in either case.
Wright was well aware that the psychological make-up of
Supreme Court Justices includes the emotions, so he
described the first attempt to electrocute Francis.'1' He
said, in an unabashed appeal to the emotions t
The petitioner jumped. The chair moved. His lips
puckered and swelled. What effect that current of
electricity had on this man's mind or upon his soul
no one will ever know. No one on this earth can
tell how close to the hereafter Willie Francis
actually was at the time that current of electri
city was applied to his body. No living being can
appreciate the suffering, the torture, both physical
and mental, that Willie Francis has already under
gone. No other living being has been so close to
death and through no fault of his own brought back
into this life so that the State of Louisiana may
give a repeat performance .2
While there is little doubt that the condemned man
underwent mental suffering, it was not so clear that he
underwent physical suffering.

Whereas Wright argued

that Francis received electric current and experienced
More recently, he described it in a documentary on
capital punishment produced by Truman Capote but which
the television networks considered too controversial to
telecast at a time when cases challenging the constitu
tionality of capital punishment were pending before the
Supreme Court. See Dwight Whitney, "I Want It on the
Air!" T V Guide. XVIII (July 4, 1970), pp. 5-9.
2
Appellant’s brief at 8 , Louisiana ex rel.
Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 374 (1947). U.S. Supreme
Court Briefs and Records (microfilm), October term
1946, Roll 8 , Vol. 329» filmed by the University of
Chicago Library.
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physical pain, the State denied that any current had
reached him.
witnesses.

Both sides had supporting affidavits from
But uncertainty about the facts did not

affect Wright’s oral argument.

On November 18, 1946,

he stood before the nine Justices and argued his case
well.

Some of the Justices questioned him at length,

and he responded with competence and conviction.^
The decision was not rendered until January 13,
1947, the day before Wright's thirty-sixth birthday.
The result was that he lost his first Supreme Court case
by a close vote of five to four, and ultimately Willie
Francis lost his life.

Justices Reed, Vinson, Black,

and Jackson rejected the double jeopardy argument because
they considered the case no different in principle from
retrying an individual due to an error of law and
2
governed by Palko v. Connecticut.
Cruel and unusual
punishment was not threatened because the State was not
employing cruel methods of execution.

As for the mental

anguish, that was present in any death sentence.

There

was no denial of equal protection of the law because
Francis was not singled out for the treatment he
received; it was an accident.

The charges of an unfair

trial were simply unsupported by the record.

The re

maining vote against Francis and Wright was cast by
"^Ingoldsby letter. Mr. Ingoldsby was present in
Court during the argument.

2302 U.S. 319 (1937).
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Justice Frankfurter, who did not believe a second attempt
to execute the petitioner would violate standards of
civilized decency.1
Wright's only other appearance before the Supreme
Court occurred in December, 19^7.

It was a search and

seizure case and, unlike the majority of cases he handled,
did not originate in Louisiana.

The case originated as

a narcotics prosecution in the Western District of
Washington and reached the Supreme Court when the
defendant, a hotel proprietor, challenged the validity
of the search through which the evidence against her was
obtained.
The Government's position was that the search was
incident to a valid arrest.

The arresting officers

asserted that they could smell opium when they entered
the hotel hallway and that the odor came from the petition
er’s apartment.

Without obtaining an arrest warrant or a

search warrant, they knocked on the petitioner's door.
When she answered their knock, a police detective tes
tified that he said, "I want you to consider yourself
under arrest because we are going to search the room."
The Government argued that since the search was
incident to a valid arrest, a search warrant was not
required.

Although the officer told the woman that she

•^Louisiana ex rel Francis v. Resweber. 329 U.S. 374
(1947). The four dissenters, Justices Burton, Douglas,
Murphy, and Rutledge, would have remanded the matter to
resolve the question of whether Francis got any current.

was under arrest because he was going to search the room,
the Government contended that it was simply his inartful
way of informing her that she was under arrest and that
he did not consider the legal implication of his choice
of words.

Wright's answer was that there had been ample

time to get a warrant.

Since the officers did not do so,

the search was unlawful, and the fruits of the search
inadmissible as evidence.

Nor could the search be jus

tified as incident to a valid arrest.

While arrests with

out warrants were permissible in some circumstances,
Wright argued that standards were more stringent when a
person's home was involved.’1'
This time the decision was in favor of Wright’s
client by a margin of five to four.

The opinion of the

Court by Justice Jackson noted that the only reason for
failing to get a search warrant was inconvenience and
slight delay.

That was not sufficient to justify the

search of a permanent residence when flight was
unlikely.

He agreed that the search had been incident

to an arrest, but not a valid arrest.

The officers had

no probable cause to make an arrest until they entered
the apartment and saw that the defendant was the only
person present; however, without a warrant, the entry
itself was unlawful.

"Thus,” said Jackson, "the

“^Johnson v. United States. 333 U.S. 10 (19^8),
U.S. Supreme Court Briefs and Records (Microfilm),
October Term 19^7» Roll 1, Vol. 333f filmed by the
University of Chicago Library.
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Government is obliged to justify the arrest by the search
and at the same time to justify the search by the arrest.
This will not do."'*'

The result of the decision was that

the Department of Justice had to change its manual of
instructions for United States Attorneys throughout the
p

country in regard to searches and seizures.
Shortly thereafter, Wright returned to the Eastern
District of Louisiana and himself became a United States
Attorney.

The vacancy arose in early 19*1-8, when Herbert

Christenberry was appointed to the federal bench.

Since

President Truman was not expected to win reelection in
November, there were few candidates for what appeared to
be a job without a future.

For a combination of nostal

gic and practical reasons, Wright decided that he would
like to have the job for a short time.

Before he left

New Orleans, he had been First Assistant and thought he
would like to take the next step.

On the practical side,

he thought it would help his Washington practice, to
which he had every intention of returning.

Since he had

primarily represented New Orleans interests, a short
period of service as United States Attorney would give
him an opportunity to renew old contacts and establish
1Johnson v. United States. 333 U.S. 10, 16-17

(19^8 ).

2Ingoldsby letter.
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new ones.

Consequently, he informed Senator Ellender of

his interest in the position, and he got it.'L
While Wright was United States Attorney, he bacame
involved, in a gingerly fashion, in the investigation of
attacks on the civil rights of blacks, particularly
voting rights.

At the time, there was not much that he

could do because juries would not convict and grand
juries would not indict.

But he presented the cases to

the grand jury, more as a matter of education for the
jurors than with the expectation that the law would take
its course.

He had grown up in a segregated society,

but his years in the Coast Guard had exposed him to
racial practices in other parts of the United States,
as well as in other countries.

His military service and

his exposure to cases involving attacks on the civil
rights of blacks all played a part in the lengthy and
generally indeterminate process by which his own racial
attitudes were transformed.
For the most part, however, his short term as
United States Attorney was uneventful.
cribed it as "undistinguished."

Wright has des

He had assistants who

were willing and eager to work, and he let them .3

In a

case involving the sale of bonds for the construction
of the New Orleans Union Passenger Terminal, he did
interview*

2Ibid.

Hon. J. Skelly Wright.

3Ibid.
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manage to generate some animosity towards himself which
resurfaced at the time of his appointment to the hench.
Judicial Nomination and Confirmation
When Harry S. Truman confounded the experts and won
the 19^8 presidential election, it was not immediately
apparent that the turn of events would benefit Wright.
He still wanted to return to Washington and had indica
ted as much to Senator Allen J. Ellender and other
political leaders.

He withheld his resignation while

they searched for a successor.
A replacement for Wright was not immediately forth
coming, and while the search went on, a vacancy devel
oped on the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

The

vacancy resulted from the death of Judge Elmo Pearce Lee,
a Louisianian.

It was expected that he would be replaced

by another Louisianian; therefore, Louisiana's Senators
submitted a list of acceptable replacements to the
Department of Justice.
J. Skelly Wright.

The list included the name of

The nomination, however, went to a

man whose name was not submitted by the Senators.

On

October 1 5 1 19^9* the Senate received the nomination of
Judge Wayne G. Borah of the Eastern District of
-hlbid.
^Times-Picayune. October 16, 19^9» p. 1.
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Louisiana for elevation to the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit.

Skelly Wright was nominated to replace

him as Judge for the Eastern District of Louisiana.^
Both nominations were recommended by the American
Bar Association, but Judge Borah's party affiliation
made his nomination something of a surprise.

He was

a Republican who had received his judicial appointment
from Calvin Coolidge in 1928. 2 Such an "out-party"
nomination represented a deviation from the normal prac
tice of making judicial appointments from the President's
party . J

But there are usually political reasons for such

deviations, and so there was in this instance.
Louisiana's Senators had not supported Truman in
19^8, but rather had supported the Dixicrat candidacy
of Strom Thurmond, and thus found themselves without
much influence on the administration.

Wright had not

campaigned for Thurmond and had made no enemies in the
^ . S . , Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.,
1 9 % , XCV, Part 2, 14706.
2
Times-Picavune. October 16, 1 9 % , p. I t New Orleans
Item. October 17» 1 9 % » p. 5* hereafter cited as Item.
3
-'See Joel B. Grossman, Lawyers and Judges: The ABA
and the Politics of Judicial" Selection (New York» John
Wiley and Sons, 1965)» pp. 30-31; Jack W. Peltason,
Federal Courts in the Political Process (New Yorks
Random House, 1955). pp. 31-32} Hugh Scott, "The Selec
tion of Federal Judges: The Independent Commission
Approach," Judicial Selection and Tenure: Selected
Readings, ed. Glenn R. Winters (Chicago: American
Judicature Society, 1967), pp. 16%165.
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administration.

He informed people he knew in the

Justice Department of his interest in the vacant judgeship^and was seriously considered for the position.
age, however, was an impediment.

His

He was then thirty-

eight years old* which was considered young for an
2
appellate judge.
While in Washington for a Judicial Conference, Judge
Joseph Hutcheson, then Chief Judge of the Fifth Circuit,
recommended to Attorney General Howard McGrath that in
view of Judge Borah’s years of distinguished service on
the District "bench he be promoted to the Fifth Circuit,
Court of Appeals.

Judge Hutcheson’s recommendation was

acceptable for a number of reasons, not the least of
which was that it gave the administration an opportunity
to ignore the recommendations of Louisiana's Senators.
The appointment of Judge Borah also permitted the admin
istration to make a bipartisan gesture without actually
increasing the number of Republicans on the bench.

His

"^Normally, an individual with any hope of a Federal
judicial appointment must make at least this minimal
effort in his own behalf of announcing his availability.
See Grossman, pp. k Z, 205; Harold W. Chase, "Federal
Judges; The Appointing Process," Minnesota Law Review.
LI (December, 1966), 205-207. For an exception, see
Robert Arthur Carp, "The Function, Impact, and Political
Relevance of the Federal District Courts: A Case Study,"
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Iowa,
1969)t PP. 39-^2.
interview;

Hon. J. Skelly Wright.
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elevation to the Fifth Circuit created a vacancy on the
District Court which was filled "by a Democrat— J. Skelly
Wright.1

The United States Senators from Louisiana

acquiesced in the arrangement, and, in a matter of days,
2
the Senate routinely confirmed Borah's nomination.
Wright's nomination was not handled so expeditiously.
Congress adjourned before the Senate took action on
several of Truman's judicial nominations, with Skelly
Wright's among those that were deferred.-^
Content with a recess appointment.^

He had to be

That appointment made

him the youngest Federal Judge in the United States in
1 9 ^ 9 .5

Not until March of the following year did the Senate
take up the question of Wright's confirmation.
inee had an impressive array of endorsements:

The nom
Senators

1Ibid.
?
Item. October 17» 19^9» p. 5; U.S., Congressional
Record. 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 19^9» XCV, Part 18,
p. D718.
% e w York Times. October 18, 19^9» p. 30*
II

U.S. Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on the
Judiciary, "Hearings, Nomination of Hon. J. Skelly Wright
to be U.S. District Judge for the Eastern District of
Louisiana," (March 1, 1950), unnumbered page between p. 1
and p. 2.
(Stenographic transcript in files of Senate
Judiciary Committee.; Hereafter cited as Senate Judi
ciary Subcommittee, "Hearings, Wright Nomination to
E.D. La."
^State-Times, August 3I 1 i 960, p. 1A.
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Ellender and Long; all the Congressmen representing the
Eastern District of Louisiana; the American Bar Associ
ation; the Federal Bar Association; the Louisiana Bar
Association; the New Orleans Bar Association; the Baton
Rouge Bar Association; the Law Schools of Louisiana State
University, Tulane University, and Loyola University; the
Chief Justice of the Louisiana Supreme Court; and indiv
idual lawyers.

Although many of his supporters would

later forsake him, at the time the Senate considered his
nomination to the District Court, only a single voice
was raised in opposition.'1'
Wright's confirmation was opposed by one Maurice R.
Woulfe, a New Orleans attorney.

He said that Wright,

while serving as United States Attorney, had persecuted
him by causing him to be indicted for conspiracy to
commit offenses against the United States in connection
with his suit to prevent the marketing of bonds for the
New Orleans Union Passenger Terminal.

He argued that

the Grand Jury that returned the indictment was under
Wright's influence.

The subcommittee did not place much

credence in Mr. Woulfe's charges, and Senator McCarran,
the chairman of the subcommittee, expressed the opinion
that Woulfe's quarrel should be with the grand jury and
not with Wright .2
■^Senate Judiciary Subcommittee, "Hearing, Wright
Nomination to E.D. La.," p. 2.

2Ibid., pp. 2-^2 .
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Judge Wright was present at the hearing and was
given an opportunity to answer the charges leveled
against him.

He did this by reading a report which he

made to the Department of Justice in August of 19^9.
In his report, he noted that the City of New Orleans
and the railroads had been acting pursuant to an order
of the Interstate Commerce Commission in constructing
the terminal and that Woulfe conspired to prevent free
and fair competition among those desiring to bid on the
bonds in violation of Title 15, Section 20 of the United
States Code.'*'
When, on the day before the bids were to be opened,
a suit was filed raising issues that had already been
fully litigated, the Mayor, the City Attorney, and the
attorney for the Union Station Terminal Board called on
Wright and showed him a telegram from a New York bond
attorney which reads

"Suggest you consider indictment

under Title 15 Section 20 USCA on grounds action brought
for sole purpose of preventing bidding on bonds of
common carrier."

Wright said he agreed to do it but

gave Woulfe and others involved an opportunity to
explain their position to the grand jury.

Most of the

other plaintiffs testified that they had been duped by
Woulfe into signing what they thought was only a petition

1Ibid., pp. 53-5*1'.
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regarding the location of overpasses and underpasses.
They withdrew from the suit when they found out what they
had really signed.'1'
According to Wright's version, the grand jury was
so incensed by what it heard that it immediately voted
for the indictment even though he had counseled delay.
Rather than persecuting Woulfe, he had actually been a
restraining influence, since one member of the Justice
Department had suggested broadening the indictment, and
the General Counsel of the Interstate Commerce Commission
hoped for a successful prosecution.

Eventually, however,

the indictment was nol prossed when Woulfe's suit was
withdrawn.
The hearing concluded when, after a short recess
during which he consulted with his lawyer, Woulfe with
drew his objection to Wright.-^ Three days later, the
Judiciary Committee voted in executive session to report
it

favorably on the nomination.

On March 8, 1950, Wright

was confirmed as District Judge for the Eastern District
of Louisiana.-*
^ b i d .. pp. 55-57.

2Ibid.. pp. 57-60 .

^Ibid., pp. 6^-66.
k
U.S., Congressional Record. 81st Cong., 2nd Sess.,
1950, XCVI, Part 20, p. D142.
c
U.S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess.,
1950, XCVI, Part 3, p. 3034.
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When Skelly Wright received his judicial appoint
ment, he brought with him to the federal bench the influ
ences of his earlier years.

His working class origin, his

student years during the Great Depression; his advocacy of
civil rights cases before the Supreme Court, and his
exposure while in the United States Attorney's office to
attacks on civil rights all coalesced to produce a lasting
concern for the "have-nots" of society.

As a judge, he

could give expression to that concern through the pol
icies he promoted in both the civil rights and the econo
mic spheres.

CHAPTER II
FEDERAL DISTRICT JUDGE:

ECONOMIC REGULATION

As a Federal District Judge, Skelly Wright presided
over a number of controversies involving economic regu
lation by various governmental units.

By their very

nature, such regulations work to the greater advantage
of some interests than others.

The "losers” in other

public policy arenas often try to have adverse decisions
reversed by ther federal judiciary.

But Wright generally

approved of governmental regulation of the economy, con
sidering it necessary to prevent chaos that would hurt
all parts of society.

He usually exercised his dis

cretion to support the decisions of other policy-makers,
and the trend of the law simplified his task.

Insofar

as economic matters were concerned, the Supreme Court
had adopted what was essentially a legitimizing role
since 1937» and Wright followed the lead of the Supreme
Court.
When there is little ambiguity in Supreme Court
pronouncements, a policy-oriented judge must comply with
Supreme Court policy, even that which is contrary to his
own preferences, or risk reversal and consequent damage
2?
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to his professional reputation.

Should a policy-oriented

judge fall into professional disrepute, his ability to
influence public policy would be seriously impaired.
Judge Wright attempted to solve this dilemma by using
his judicial opinions to express vehement disagreement
with public policy he deemed objectional, even while he
upheld its constitutionality.

He used his opinions to

bolster the authority of the governmental unit being
challenged— national, state, or local— when he had no
objection to that governmental unit's policy.
Defender of Economic Regulation
The regulation of transportation by state and local
government was an area in which Judge Wright consis
tently bolstered the authority of the policy-making
agency.

During his first year on the bench, he was

called upon to adjudicate a dispute in which the plain
tiff sought protection in the Contract Clause of the
Federal Constitution against an exercise of police power
by local government.

The plaintiff was a railroad that

leased a railroad station from the City of New Orleans.
The railroad interpreted its lease as conferring a right
to grant a parking monopoly to Yellow Cabs and sought an
injunction against the use of the parking area by other
cab companies.

A City ordinance, however, permitted all

taxi cabs to park outside the station to pick up and
^Illinois Central R. C o . v. City of New Orleans.
89 F. Supp. 768 (E.D. La. 1950).
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discharge passengers.

Since the United States Constitu

tion prohibits the impairment of contracts, it was up to
Wright to determine whether the ordinance impaired the
contract of lease between the City and the railroad.
Had the monopoly prevailed, one of its consequences
would have been the denial of taxi service to the rail
road's black patrons.

Public accomodation laws did not

exist, and Yellow Cabs were "white" cabs.

Wright pre

vented this denial of service by supporting the City's
right to exercise its police power.

He looked to the

specific terms of the lease and found that the City had
reserved its police power over the station.

Whatever

else the police power might include, it
includes the right and obligation of keeping public
streets and areas adjacent thereto free and open
to lawful competition between taxicabs. It is also
part of the police power of the city to make avail
able to incoming passengers at railroad stations
adequate transportation, including taxicabs .1
Another railroad was party to a case in the Baton
Rouge Division of Louisiana's Eastern District, and
Wright exercised his discretion by refusing to take juro
isdiction, thus supporting the decision of a state admin
istrative agency.

The railroad had discontinued passenger

service between Slidell, Louisiana and New Orleans without
the permission of the Interstate Commerce Commission or

1Ibid., 771.
2Gulf. M. & 0. R. C o . v. Louisiana Public Service
Comm'n, 120 F.Supp. 250 (E.D. La. 195^).
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the Louisiana Public Service Commission.

The latter

agency ordered the service restored.
The railroad sought an injunction restraining the
Public Service Commission from enforcing its order.

It

was their argument that enforcement of the order would
result in deprivation of railroad property without due
process of law.

The railroad, however, had abandoned

four and a half miles of track in New Orleans without the
authorization of the Interstate Commerce Commission, which
the law required it to have.

"Certainly the railroad's

position in a court of equity is a very unhappy one,"
remarked Wright.

"It is praying for a federal injunction

while standing in violation of a federal statute ."1

Since

the railroad had the facilities to perform the services
in question, the Public Service Commission had authority
to make such decisions regarding intrastate commerce.

If

the Commission's decision in any way infringed upon fed
eral rights, those rights should be defended in the state
2
courts.
The Judge showed no inclination to undercut the
institutions of state government, either administrative
or judicial.

The Federal District Court "though having

jurisdiction, must refuse to exercise it as a matter of
equitable discretion," said Wright.-*

1Ibid., 253.
2
Ibid. As his authority, he cited Alabama Public
Service Comm'n v. Southern Ry. C o ., 3^1 U.S. 3*H (I951).
h 20 F.Supp. 250, 252.

Undoubtedly the federal courts did have jurisdiction
when constitutional questions were raised, and state
experimentation in solving problems created by the
increasing mobility of Americans often raised such con
stitutional questions.

Judge Wright's court was the

forum in which such legislation was placed under judicial
scrutiny.

The laws were the Louisiana Watercraft Statute ,1

which was modelled on the Louisiana Nonresident Motorist
Statute of 1928, and the Nonresident Motorist Statute as
amended in 1956.

In dealing with these laws, the Judge

proved to be responsive to state needs and disinclined to
hamper the state with legal doctrines which may once have
had some basis in fact but which the passage of time had
transformed into legal fictions.
The Watercraft Statute made nonresident operators
of vessels in Louisiana waters subject to suit in state
courts should the vessels be involved in accidents or
collisions while within the State.

In upholding the con

stitutionality of nonresident motorist statutes, the
United States Supreme Court had read into a nonresident's
use of a state's highways an implied consent to suit in
the courts of that state.

The Court reasoned that a

state would not have permitted nonresidents to use its
highways in the absence of such consent.

This line of

^According to Wright, this was the first law of its
kind in the United States. See Tardiff v. Bank Line.
127 F.Supp. 9^5* 9^6 (E.D. La. 1 9 5 ^

32
reasoning was necessary because once the nonresidents went
home, they were no longer personally within the jurisdic
tion of the courts of other states, and in 1878, the
Supreme Court, in Pennoyer v. Neff,~Hiad required that a
state court have personal jurisdiction over the parties to
a suit before legal action could be taken in that state's
courts.

Building upon Supreme Court reasoning in nonres

ident motorist cases, the Watercraft Statute equated the
operation of a vessel by nonresidents within Louisiana
waters with appointment of the Louisiana Secretary of
State as attorney for service of process regarding any
suit brought against the nonresidents in Louisiana courts.
The Secretary of State would then notify the nonresidents
of the suit against them.
p
In Tardiff v. Bank Line, a British corporation was
being sued under the terms of the Watercraft Statute.

The

Bank Line admitted the constitutionality of the Nonresi
dent Motorist Statute but attacked the constitutionality
of the Watercraft Statute by attempting to distinguish it
from nonresident motorist statutes.

Nonresident motorist

statutes were said to derive their force from a state's
power to bar nonresidents from its highways.

Bank Line

denied, however, that one could infer any consent to being
sued in state courts from the operation of a watercraft
195 U.S. 714 (1878).
2127 F.Supp. 9^5 (E.D. La. 195*0.

33
in the state's waters, since no state can exclude non
residents from its navigable waters.

This was said to be

precluded by the constitutional grant of legislative
power over foreign and interstate commerce to Congress'1'
and the extension of the judicial power of the United
2
States to all admiralty cases.
In Judge Wright's estimate, these constitutional
provisions did not stand in the way of a state's reason
able exercise of its police power over its waterways.
The real question was whether process might be served on
nonresidents through the Secretary of State because they
were no longer present in the State.
answered affirmatively.

This Wright

If the defendant had sufficient

contact with the State, traditional notions of fair play
were not violated.-^
Wright denied that there was any real distinction
between the Nonresident Motorist Statute and the Water
craft Statute.

It was, he said, a mere fiction that a

state could exclude nonresidents from its highways.

He

expressed the view that the Supreme Court had only taken
that position so that it could sustain state nonresident
motorist statutes without having to overrule Pennover v.
Neff.
^Art. I, Sec. 3.
3127 F.Supp. 9^5» 9*1-7.
/l

Ibid.

2Art. Ill, Sec. 2, cl. 1.
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The question resurfaced when the Louisiana Legisla
ture amended its Nonresident Motorist Statute in 1956 and
made it applicable to insurance companies covering non
resident motorists.

The constitutionality of the amend

ment was questioned in Judge Wright's court by an
insurance company which did not do business in Louisiana
but which had written liability insurance for a nonresi
dent of Louisiana who became involved in a traffic accident while in the State.
The Judge's opinion reflects his continuing belief
that law should be responsive to social change.

He began*

This case involves another attempt via state
statute further to whittle down the once revered
doctrine of Pennoyer v. Neff . . . .
Like most
similar attempts, it succeeds because the consider
ations which gave rise to the personal jurisdiction
doctrine of Pennoyer v. Neff are no longer valid.
Rather than physical presence in the state, all that was
necessary was "minimal contacts plus 'reasonableness,'
o
'justice,' and 'fair play.'"
In support of this, Wright
quoted from an opinion in which Justice Frankfurter
brushed aside the doctrine of implied consent as the basis
of state court jurisdiction in such cases.

It was not

consent to be sued that justified legislation of this type
^Pugh v. Oklahoma Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. C o .,
159 F.Supp. 155 (E.D. La. 1956).
2Ibid.. 155-156.
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but rather "the inroad which the automobile has made on
the decision of Pennoyer v. Neff . . .

as it has on so

many aspects of our social scene.
Since the automobile insurer in the case then before
the court did not do business in Louisiana, Wright was
left with the question of whether there was sufficient
contact with the State to warrant state jurisdiction.

He

decided that the contact was sufficient because the test
is qualitative not quantitative.

In unequivocally

defending the legitimacy of the State's action, he saidi
If the defendant insurer harbored any doubt in the
matter, it should have excluded Louisiana from the
coverage of its policy. Having agreed to cover
Louisiana risks, it cannot deny Louisiana courts
the right to determine its liability on claims
arising from accidents occurring in this state. . . .
The interest of the state in the safety of her high
ways, the care and hospitalization of persons injured
thereon, the availability within the state of wit
nesses to the accident, the provision in the statute
for actual notice to the non-resident insurer by
registered mail, all combine to make certain that
the maintenance of the suit within the state does
not offend "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice."2
Olberding v. Illinois Central R. C o .. 3^6 U.S. 338,
3^0 (1953) quoted at Ibid.. 156. n. 1. Preceding Wright
and Frankfurter by many years, Justice Brandeis said,
"And in view of the speed of the automobile and the habits
of men, we cannot say that the legislature of New Jersey
was unreasonable in believing that ability to establish by
legal proceedings within the state, any financial liabil
ity of nonresident owners, was essential to public
safety." Kane v. New Jersey. 2^2 U.S. 160, I67 (1916).
2159 F.Supp. 155, 159.
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Wright’s decision was clearly motivated by recog
nition of the state's interest in the welfare of its
people rather than by a policy orientation hostile to
insurance companies.

In a later case,^he permitted an

insurance company that would have been subject to numer
ous suits in Louisiana courts arising out of the same
accident to remove the case to the Federal District Court
under that court's diversity of citizenship jurisdiction
and utilize a civil procedure called interpleader whereby
all claimants were required to make their claims in one
suit.

It was not a case of following an unambiguous

Supreme Court pronouncement because there was no prece
dent in the federal courts for granting interpleader in
such a situation.

The case was hardly visible to the

general public, but it provides evidence of Wright's
competence as a judge.

The Pan American Fire & Casualty

Company v. Revere opinion is cited in one of the leading
reference works on federal procedure as a very careful
• • .3
opinion
J
~h?an American Fire & Cas. C o . v. Revere.
188 F.Supp. 474 (E.D. La. i 960).

2Ibid.. 482.
^See William W. Barron and Alexander Holtzoff,
Federal Practice and Procedure With Forms t Rules Edition.
Revised by Charles Alan Wright (St. Paul* West Publishing Co., 1961), Vol. II, Rule 22, Sec. 55It p. 229,
n. 9 .2 .
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Numerous controversies relative to transportation
were decided in Judge Wright's court, but it was not the
only area in which he supported State economic decisions.
He firmly supported the Louisiana Supreme Court's author
ity to decide who held title to valuable oil land.'*'

A

disappointed litigant attempted to have a decision of
the State Supreme Court reviewed in the Federal District
Court, while denying that "review" was its object.

It

took the position that the District Court should exer
cise its diversity jurisdiction and permanently enjoin
enforcement of the State Supreme Court's judgment because
that court had acted in violation of the Louisiana Con
stitution and laws, thereby denying the litigant property
in violation of the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Federal Constitution.

This was an argu

ment which Wright found totally unacceptable.

He

observed that the case was
not based upon allegations of lack of notice, or
hearing, or perjury, or other fraud in the state
court proceedings. Plaintiff here simply alleges
that the Supreme Court of Louisiana has misapplied
the Louisiana law in reaching its result. If this
is not seeking a review of a state court decision
it represents a distinction without a difference .2
He acknowledged that under some circumstances, the idea
of sitting in judgment on another court could be
Manufacturers Record Publishing C o . v. Lauer.
169 F.Supp. 234 (E.D. La. 1959).

2Ibid., 237.
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appealing.

"But," he added, "absent a compelling juris

dictional basis, it is a temptation which should be
resisted ."1

And he did resist, just as he did when state

legislators and administrators engaged in economic
regulation.
Considering Wright's support for state policy makers
in economic matters, one would hardly expect him to be
less sympathetic to the national government in anti-trust
prosecutions, nor was he.

When a group of insurance

agencies formed the New Orleans Insurance Exchange and
attempted to control the market by boycotting insurance
companies that sold through nonmembers of the Exchange,
the United States Attorney took action against them.

The

members of the Exchange found Judge Wright not at all
persuaded by their arguments that their boycott did not
unreasonably restrain trade and that they were not engaged
in interstate commerce.

He merely cited the Supreme

Court's holding in United States v. Southeastern Under
writers Association^that insurance across state lines is
interstate commerce.

Even though the challenged activity

was local, it affected interstate commerce and so was
k
subject to regulation.
Since the members of the Exchange

^ b i d . , 2**0.
2
United States v. New Orleans Insurance Exchange.
1^8 F.Supp. 915 (E.D. La. 1957).
3322 U.S. 5 ^

^ 8

(19W.

F.Supp. 915. 921-922.
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policed one another to see that the boycott was main
tained, Wright considered th group
in reality a private super-governmental agency
which prescribes rules for the regulation and
restraint of interstate commerce, provides extra
judicial tribunals for determination and punish
ment of violations, and thus trenches beyond the
power of the national and state legislatures, in
addition to violating the Serman Act.l
To Wright, federalism stood as no barrier to con
gressional regulation of the American economy or to
prosecutions for violation of Congress' regulations,
even when those -violations did not extend across state
lines.
one.

His view of the commerce clause was an expansive
Nor has his view of the commerce clause diminished.

More recently he has said:
The new reach of the commerce clause results in
part from the transfiguration of American economic
life during the past century. Innovations in
communications and transportation, incapsulated in
the concept of an ongoing, accelerating "industrial
revolution," have succeeded in nationalizing our
commercial system.2
This is not to suggest that considerations of federalism
meant nothing to Wright.

Federalism meant that the states

were free, under their police power, to regulate the
economy within their political boundaries.

As his deci

sions illustrate, he lent strong support to exercises of
police power by the State of Louisiana.

1Ikid-» 920.
2

"Federal Courts and the Nature and Quality of State
Law," Wavne Law Review. XIII (Winter, 1967), 330.

*K)

Critic of Limitations on Competition
In marked contrast with his general support for
policy makers in economic matters was Judge Wright's
vigorous condemnation of governmental decisions which
had the effect of limiting competition and placing a
burden on the "little man."

As a policy-oriented judge,

he used his discretion to hamper public policy that
limited competition.

He was not always free to obstruct

the objectionable policy, but even when he was not, he
was free to criticize.
The case of Seismograph Service Corporation v.
Offshore Ravdist1gave Wright an opportunity to do more
than criticize.

The real culprits were some unscrupu

lous businessmen who took advantage of an independent
inventor and secured a patent on his invention.

But

the case was also part of a broader conflict between the
courts and the Patent Office, which took place during
the 19^0*s and 1950's.2
The conflict between courts and Patent Office re
volved around the standard of patentability.

As Wright

stated the issue*
The elusive concept of patentable novelty or
invention stands at the threshhold of every patent
1135 F.Supp. 3^2 (E.D. La. 1955).
2
See Martin Shapiro, The Supreme Court and Admin
istrative Agencies (New York* The Free Press, 1968),
ch. 3» "The Supreme Court and the Patent Office."
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application. Unless it tends "to promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts" it does
not meet the standard of invention set up in
the Constitution itself. U. S. Const, art. 1,
sec. 8.1
Wright asserted that the Supreme Court had long taken
the position that the Constitution contemplates the
issuance of a patent as a reward only for discovery or
invention which adds to our knowledge and makes advances
in useful arts possible.

The purpose of granting patents

has never been to stifle creativity and competition and
create a class of speculative schemers who make no con
tribution to the advancement of useful arts.

"In spite

of the insistence on the part of the courts that this con-*
stitutional standard be met before a patent monopoly is
recognized," said Wright, "the Patent Office has contin
ued to patent ’every trifling device, every shadow of a
shade of an idea* which is presented to it."

p

In the case immediately before Judge Wright, the
Patent Office had granted a patent to Seismograph Service
on a system for determining, by the use of radio waves,
the exact location of vessels engaged in tidelands oil
exploration.

The owner of Offshore Raydist, one Hastings,

had been working on such a system for some time, and
Seismograph was able to acquire the information necessary
for securing its patent only by approaching Hastings and
1135 F.Supp. 342, 350.
2Ibid.
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leading him to believe tha;t they were interested in a
joint venture.

During the negotiations, they extracted

his knowledge.

Seismograph found out also that Hastings

needed to acquire the rights to a patent held by someone
else in order to perfect the system and was then negoti
ating to purchase those rights.

Through Seismograph's

patent counsel in Washington, one of his associates, and
an unwitting employee of the Patent Office— termed by
Wright, "a very sordid part of this case"— Seismograph
was able to learn specifically which patent rights
Hastings was attempting to acquire.

Acting independently

of Hastings, Seismograph secured the necessary rights,
patented the system, and petitioned the court for an
injunction to bar Hastings from infringing the patent.
In denying the request for the injunction, Wright's
opinion veritably bristled with moral indignation.

"And

now," he said, after scathingly summarizing the facts,
"Seismograph has the effrontery to come into a court of
equity to ask that its patents, so obtained, be used to
2
enjoin the work of the very man who gave them life." He
made it clear that any patent obtained through fraud and
dishonest dealings would not be enforced in a court of
equity.3
merits.

Each case would have to be decided on its own
Said Wright*

^ b i d .. 349.
3Ibid.. 354.

2Ibid., 355.

No single test can be applied in all cases where
improper acquisition of business information is
charged. The inventiveness of the devious mind
staggers the imagination. It is simply the dif
ference between right and wrong, honesty and
dishonesty, which is the touchstone in an issue
of this kind.
Wright declared that the patent was invalid.

In

his view, the Patent Office should never have granted it.
The process was already being used in other fields, such
as electronic engineering.

Applying a known process in

another field did not meet the constitutional standard
of invention;"2that is, it did not meet the stricter
standards of the courts as opposed to the less stringent
requirements of the Patent Office.

Wrights felicific

conclusion was that enforcement of the constitutional
standard would reinstitute competition between the liti
gants, right the wrong done to Hastings, and free the oil
industry and the general public from "the tender mercies
of a monopolist."-^
Wright*s preference for competition was not merely
an idiosyncrasy.

Since the late nineteenth century, the

1Ibid., 353-35^.

2Ibid., 352- 353.

^Ibid.. 356. Seismograph appealed the decision on
grounds that Jkdge Wright had exhibited prejudice
against the company. The Court of Appeals, however,
affirmed the decision. In language no less cutting than
Wright's, Judge Rives accused the plaintiff of "erroneous
concepts of fair play in business morals and ethics" and
of being guilty of "deception, knavery, and misrepresen
tation." Seismograph Service Corp. v. Offshore Ravdist.
263 F.2d 5, 21 (5th Cir. 1956).
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law has promoted competition in this country to a greater
extent than it has in Europe, although it can hardly be
said that the United States economy approximates the
model of laissez-faire prescribed by Adam Smith.

In 1890,

Congress enacted the Sherman Antitrust Act.^which outlawed
contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint
of interstate and foreign commerce.

This was followed
2
some years later by the Clayton Act, which prohibited any
price discrimination which might have the effect of
diminishing competition.

With the exception of the

1920*s, the courts fostered competition and looked upon
price-fixing with hostility.

During the Great Depres

sion of the 1930's, business survival assumed greater
importance than competition, and Congress acted to per
mit states to fix prices through state "fair trade" laws.-^
Like others of its kind, the Louisiana Fair Trade
Act permitted producers and retailers to enter into con
tracts under which the producers retained the right to

126 Stat. 209.
238 Stat. 730, chap. 323 (191^).
^For discussions of the extent of concentration in
various segments of the American economy, see Walter
Adams, ed., The Structure of American Industry» Some
Case Studies. 3d ed. t (New Yorki The Macmillan Co..
1 9 6 1 ) . For a discussion of American antitrust law from
the enactment of the Sherman Antitrust Act of I 890 to
the congressional sanction of state fair trade laws, see
Eugene V. Rostow, Planning for Freedom 1 The Public Law
of American Capitalism (New Haven; Yale University
Press, 1959), pp. 275-291.
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set minimum prices at which their products could be sold.
In the 1950's, the Fair Trade Act was attacked by
Schwegmann Brothers, a chain of super markets in the
New Orleans metropolitan area.

Schwegmann had met with

some success when the Supreme Court decided that those
parts of state fair trade laws applying to ninsigners of
fair trade contracts were not exempt from the provisions
of the Sherman Antitrust Act.1

This decision was typical

of the courts* lack of sympathy for fair trade acts as
compared with Congress, which is more accessible to
retail lobbies.

In order to exempt fair trade acts, even

as they applied to nonsigners of fair trade contracts,
from the provisions of the Sherman Act, Congress passed

p

the McGuire Act, thus nullifying Schwegmann*s earlier
victory in Court.
Nevertheless, Schwegmann continued to sell pro
ducts at less than fair trade prices.

Eli Lilly &

Company, a manufacturer of drugs, sought an injunction
in the Federal District Court enjoining Schwegmann from
selling Lilly's products below the fair trade minimum.^
Schwegmann Bros, v. Calvert Distillers Corp.,
3^1 U.S. 38*T (1951).
^66 Stat. 631 (1952).

See also Rostow, p. 291.

% l i Lilly & C o . v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super
Markets. 109 F.Supp. 269 (E.D. La. 195*0. Lilly was
represented by the law firm of John M. Harlan, whom
Eisenhower would appoint to the Supreme Court. John
Minor Wisdom, subsequently appointed to the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, represented Schwegmann.
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Schwegmann's response was to attack the constitutionality
of both the McGuire Act and the Louisiana Pair Trade Act.
In Wright, Schwegmann found a Judge who was oriented
toward the consumer and was, therefore, sympathetic to
his, Schwegmann's, position.

Wright referred to the

defendant as an efficient merchant who permitted the
public to reap some of the benefits of that efficiency
in the form of lower prices.1

But the Judge's personal

sympathies did not control his disposition of the case.
He felt constrained by the law, and so he rejected
the defendant's arguments.
and he followed it.

Precedent was clear to him,

In 1939 1 "the Supreme Court had

decided that fair trade acts were constitutional in Old
Dearborn Distilling C o . v. Seagram Distillers Corpora2
tion.
According to the rationale of the Supreme Court,
manufacturers did not sell their trade-marks, brand
names, or the good will attached to them when they sold
their products to retailers.

Fair trade laws were said

to be appropriate means for enabling the manufacturer
to protect the good will attached to his trade-mark.
Such laws did not violate due process or permit private
interests to exercise legislative power.

According to

the Court, private interests were merely protecting what
was theirs.^
^ b i d .. 270.
3109 F.Supp. 269, 271.

2299 U.S. 183.
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Having disposed of the question of the constitution
ality of the laws, Wright was still left with the question
of whether the plaintiff's petition for an injunction
against Schwegmann should he granted.

This was dependent

upon a showing that continued violation of the Fair Trade
Act would result in irreparable injury to Eli Lilly &
Company.

Although it would appear that Schwegmann's

cheaper prices would result in a greater quantity of Lil
ly's products being sold, that company produced affidavits
in evidence to show that other retailers would take
Lilly's products off their shelves rather than compete
with Schwegmann*s lower prices.

They would sell the

products of Lilly's competitors— products on which they
could make higher profits under fair trade agreements.
Wright reluctantly concluded that "as long as state fair
trade laws are safe from constitutional attack, the manu
facturer is not safe from the wrath of the retailer," and
issued the injunction.^
Wright did not have to be omniscient to know that
his decision would be appealed.

Schwegmann had already

experienced some success in Supreme Court litigation.

It

was a near certainty that he would carry his fight against
the state fair Trade Act up the judicial ladder.

Conse

quently, Wright, a policy-oriented judge, produced an
^[bid.. 272.
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opinion liberally salted with footnotes containing
material which might be used by a higher court, should
it decide to reverse his decision.
His opinion certainly did not reflect neutrality.
He noted that Schwegmann was not selling Lilly's products
at a loss to attract customers.

Schwegmann was making

ten to fifteen per cent profit.

Selling at the fair

trade price would have produced a profit of thirty-five
to forty per cent.

Wright pointed out that although

fair trade acts were rationalized with the argument that
they were a means by which a manufacturer could protect
the good will attached to his trademark, it was actually
retail dealers, not manufacturers, who had been lobbying for legislation of this type.

He even went so far

as to cite a British command paper on the favorable
economic effects of price competition.-^
It is reasonable to assume that lower court judges
try to avoid rendering decisions that would be reversed
by a higher court, since a reversal amounts to a
public statement that the judge was incorrect, and
■^Ibid., 270, n. 6. In a statement to the press
after the adverse decision in the District Court, John
Schwegmann, Jr. stated that in some cases he would be
forced to make a profit in excess of fifty per cent. He
called it "profiteering at the expense of the sick."
Times-Picayune (January 1^, 195*0* p. 3.
2109 F.Supp. 269, 270, n. 7 .
3Ibid., 271, n. 11.
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judges share the common human characteristic of aversion
to public reprimand.

In the Eli Lilly case, the sanc

tion of reversal by a higher court undoubtedly affected
Wright's decision.

But through the opinion in which he

explained the decision, Wright succeeded in structuring
the issue in such a way that reversal on the proper
grounds would mean not that he was wrong, but that he
was correct.
In the Eli Lilly case, Wright almost pleaded to be
reversed.

He indicated that it might be time to

re-examine critically the economic implications of
fair trade legislation.

In his words:

Perhaps after twenty years of experience under
fair trade acts, the Supreme Court may conclude
that the real purpose of these acts is not to
protect the good will of the manufacturer, and
that price-fixing under these acts is not an
appropriate means to that perfectly legitimate
end, but is in fact an end in itself. In other
words, it may well be found that the real purpose
of fair trade legislation is to protect the
retailer from competition with another retailer
who, because of his efficient merchandising
methods, is able to reduce his distributive
costs and consequently his retail prices. That
is a matter, however, which addresses itself to
the Supreme Court.2
Schwegmann, as expected, announced that he would appeal.-*
•falter F. Murphy, Elements of Judicial Strategy.
p. 10^.
2109 F.Supp. 269, 271-272.
-^Times-Picavune. January 1^, 1953» p. 3.
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A three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed Wright's decision, hut not unanimously.1
Judge Edwin Holmes, the dissenter, relied heavily on
Wright's opinion hut was less concerned with precedent
than with the hurden placed on the consumer hy fair trade
legislation.

Like Wright, he referred to Schwegmann as
p
an efficient retailer.
The majority, however, agreed

that Old Dearborn was still controlling and that any
changes in its status could emanate only from the Supreme
Court.-'

The Supreme Court itself declined the invitation
L
to re-examine the issue, and Wright got less satisfac

tion than usual from one of his decisions surviving
appeals.

An economic policy of healthy competition would

have heen more satisfying.
But when competition is healthy and when it is
destructive often depends upon one's vantage point.

To

the small dairies in the state, the Louisiana Orderly
Milk Marketing Act of 1958, which closely regulated the
dairy industry and permitted the Agriculture Commission
to set minimum prices with the approval of two-thirds of
the producers, was considered legislation to prevent chaos
Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Markets v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 205 F .2d 788 (1953).
2Ibid.. 793.

3Ibid.. 792.

Se r t . denied 3^6 U.S. 856 (1953); reh. denied
3^6 U.S. 905 (1953).
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in the industry and prevent business failures on the part
of small dairies.

But Wright’s policy orientation was

toward the interests of the unorganized consumer, which
made the arguments of the large processors and distribu
tors who attacked the Orderly Milk Marketing Act appeal
ing.

They argued that the Act impeded healthy competi

tion, causing consumers to pay higher prices, and.
depriving them, the large producers, of property without
due process of law.

As with the Fair Trade Act, the issue

of the delegation of legislative power to private inter
ests was also raised.

The large producers sought to

have a three-judge District Court declare the Act uncon
stitutional. 1
In an opinion in which he was joined by Judges
Wisdom and Christenberry, Wright declined to overturn
the legislation, but neither did he sustain it.

Since

similar litigation was in the state courts, the Federal
District Court would wait until Louisiana's highest trip
bunal had interpreted the Act.
The court struck a small
blow for competition by granting a temporary injunction
enjoining enforcement of the Act until the State courts
could decide the issue on the merits.

The injunction

was justified on grounds that it would prevent irrepa
rable damage to the plaintiffs while the matter was
•^Borden C o . v. McCrorv. 169 F.Supp. 197
(E.D. La. 1959).
2Ibid., 199.
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being litigated in the State courts.

Under State law,

enforcement could not have been enjoined pending appeals;
therefore, Wright and his colleagues acted.1
But the kinds of action taken by Judge Wright when
dealing with price-fixing did not include the assignment
of constitutional status to the policy of price competi
tion that he favored.

He did not have the law on his

side as he did when dealing with the Patent Office.

It

was established law that State governments might fix
prices and might also permit private interests to parti
cipate.

It was constitutional public policy but, in

Wright's opinion, unwise policy which would place on the
consumer the burden of higher prices.
This does not mean that his only alternative was
passive acquiescence.

It does mean that he was con

strained by his judicial role to resort to less spec
tacular forms of judicial activity than declaring acts
unconstitutional.

His preference for an economic policy

fostering lower consumer prices was expressed by attack
ing the premise on which price-fixing in the form of
fair trade acts had been based— that they were a means
by which manufacturers could protect the reputation of
their products.

He pointed out that they were really

devices by which retailers raised their prices to arti
ficially high levels.
1Ibid.

He was, in effect, sending out
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a message to his judicial superiors on the Supreme Court
requesting that they redefine the bounds within which
he, as a lower court judge, was required to work."*"
When newly enacted state legislation would have
decreased price competition in the dairy industry, there
was the temporary injunction to maintain the status quo
pending state court interpretation of the statute.
Although Wright and his colleagues disavowed any such
intention, there was, of course, a possibility that state
court interpretation would be influenced by federal
judges* attitudes toward price-fixing.

But the possibil

ity was not realized.-^
In his economic decisions as a District Judge,
Wright found one overriding principle grounded in the
Constitution:

That all levels of government might legit

imately regulate the economy.

Federalism meant that

state and local government might enforce economic
M a r t i n Shapiro has discussed Supreme Court activity
in terras of messages directed to lower court judges,
administrators, and lawyers in The Supreme Court and Admin
istrative Agencies (New York: The Free Press, 1968). 6bviously, messages may also move in the opposite direction.
2169 F.Supp. 197, 199.
■^The act was upheld in Schwegmann Bros. Giant. Super
markets v. McCrorv. 112 So.2d 606 (1959). Oddly enough,
some years later the State Supreme Court found the pricefixing provisions of the Liquor Control Act unconstitu
tional. It was called an "ignoble flight from competi
tion," which was not related to "the general health,
morals, or welfare of the people." Reynolds v. Louisiana
Board of Alcoholic Beverage Control. 185 So.2d 79^,
812 (1966).
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regulations within their political boundaries.

The

concept of federalism, however, stood as no barrier to
the national governments prosecution of activity which
was entirely local, if that activity affected interstate
commerce.

As the following chapter illustrates, fed

eralism was even less a barrier to the judicial protec
tion of civil rights.

CHAPTER III
FEDERAL DISTRICT JUDGE:

CIVIL RIGHTS

While J. Skelly Wright gained professional stature
through his disposition of cases involving economic regu
lation, he became visible to a larger public through his
civil rights decisions.

This chapter examines his com

mitment to the values of fairness in criminal procedure
and equal access to the ballot, as well as his growing
commitment to rarial equality in schools and public
facilities.
Criminal Procedure
When Skelly Wright took his seat on the Federal
District bench, his position required him to decide
considerably fewer constitutional cases involving
questions of criminal procedure than would face him
later in the District of Columbia Circuit.

But some

such cases were brought before him, and his early career
gave him a balanced background from which to judge these
constitutional claims.
While his experience in arguing appeals before the
Supreme Court made him sensitive to the procedural
rights of defendants, his prosecutorial background made
55
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him aware that not all constitutional claims raised by
criminal defendants were valid ones.

He defined the

judicial role as that of guardian of constitutional
guaranteesi but he weighed each case on its merits.

He

could set aside the sentence of a young man who, with
out assistance of counsel and before an information was
drawn up against him, had agreed to plead guilty to a
crime.

There had been a violation of the defendant's

"constitutional right to be represented by counsel at
every stage in the proceeding . . . .

But Wright could

also reject the due process claims of two convicted
rapists when only one of several witnesses later changed
his story.

Said Wright*

This court has, in effect, retried the petitioners
for the offense of which they have been convicted.
While it must be owned that the conviction of a
Negro of rape of a white female in this state
should be subjected to the severest scrutiny, on
the basis of the record made here, this court
cannot say that„these petitioners were denied due
process of law.
His rejection of some constitutional claims hardly
reflected insensitivity to matters of criminal procedure.
He was, in fact* highly critical of existing practice
and constitutional interpretation regarding interroga
tion, confessions, and the right to counsel, though his
•^United States v. Wilson, 133 F.Supp. 66^, 665
(E.D. La. 1955).
2Labat v. Sigler. 162 F.Supp. 57^» 576
(E.D. La. 1958).

position as a lower court judge denied him the degree of
freedom in making new law that Supreme Court Justices
have.

When a black man convicted in the state courts

of murder sought to relitigate certain issues in habeas
corpus proceedings, Wright was constrained by the state
of the law to decide against him.'*'

The conviction was

based upon an allegedly coerced confession made without
assistance of counsel while being held in custody pending
investigation of some robberies.

The defendant did not

obtain counsel until the court appointed a lawyer to
defend him— a lawyer whom Wright described as "a good
one."
At the trial, the judge heard testimony from the
defendant and the police officer who was said to have
coerced him.

The judge ruled that the confession was

not the product of coercion and was admissible.

Wright

permitted the ruling to stand, but it was clear that he
was not at all satisfied with the law which he had to
apply.

His opinion was as critical of the Supreme

Court as of the police.

Said Wrighti

•^United States ex rel. Goins v. Sigler. 162 F.Supp.
256 (E.D. La. 1958) aff’d, 272 F.2d 1^8 (Sth Cir. 1959).
This was the second hearing on the matter. The first
hearing was oral; there were no written responses. At
its conclusion, Judge Wright dismissed the petition for
habeas corpus and vacated the stay of execution. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ordered
a new hearing with written responses.
250 F.2d 128 (1957).
The new hearing did not change the result.
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Unquestionably, Goins did not receive all
the constitutional protection a court sworn to
uphold the Constitution would have liked him to
have received. He should have had a lawyer sooner
than he did. He should not have been subjected,
while in custody, to examination by police at odd
hours of the night. In spite of the fact that
definite progress is being made in the protection
of constitutional rights, much is vet to be
accomplished. Police do not insist on having a
lawyer represent an accused from the moment of
his arrest and some persons accused of crime
unfortunately have no way of obtaining counsel
until the court appoints one to represent them.
In the interim, violation of constitutional rights
remains an ever present possibility. . . . Here
petitioner's failure to obtain counsel earlier
cannot be attributed to the State of Louisiana. . . .
The state court transcript shows he had a fair trial
and a vigorous defense. . . . He has had due process
of law under the Fourteenth Amendment as that clause
is currently being interpreted.1 (Emphasis added).
Obviously, Wright would not be lax in protecting
the procedural rights to be defined by the "Warren
Court."

When he became a Circuit Judge and a much greater

proportion of his work involved constitutional questions
related to criminal procedure, he often spoke out
against procedures leading to unequal swearing contests
between defendants and police over the circumstances
surrounding confessions.
Voting Rights
As with criminal procedure, Wright's exposure to
voting rights cases began early in his judicial career.

1l62 F.Supp. 256, 260.

\
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His initial response to racial discrimination in the
registration of voters was a brief, eight-paragraph
opinion in which he simply noted that the complaining
blacks possessed all the qualifications to vote under
Louisiana law, and he enjoined the offending registrar
from further refusing to register eligible blacks.1

The

registrar publicly stated that he would abide by the
decision.
Several years later, in the turmoil following the
desegregation decisions, Citizens Council members and
the Registrar of Voters collaborated to purge the rolls
of eighty-five per cent of the blacks registered to vote
in Washington Parish.

The United States sought injunc

tive relief for them under the Civil Rights Act of
-a

1957.

The defendants admitted that they were acting

under color of state law, but they took the position
that the section in question was unconstitutional because
it could be interpreted as permitting the United States
to take action against private individuals and thus
iL

exceeded the reach of the Fifteenth Amendment.
1Desui v. Thomas, 93 F.Supp. 129 (E.D. La. 1950)*
2Era -Leader (Franklinton, La.), July 27, 1950, p. 1.
\z

U.S •C.A., sec. 1971 (c).

^United States v. McElveen. 177 F.Supp. 355
(E.D. La. 1959).
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Wright found this so lacking in merit that he would
have simply dismissed it without saying more if it were
not for the fact that another District Court had accep
ted such an argument and held the same section unconsti
tutional.1

That court’s decision was, of course, not

binding on Judge Wright, and he exercised his discretion
2
by refusing to follow it.
He noted that although the
statute did not use the specific words "under color of
. law," it used words having the same meaning.

He did not

stop there; he took the opportunity to lecture the
defendants:
In a democratic society there is no greater
offense than illegally depriving a citizen of his
right to vote. Such discrimination strikes at the
very foundation of constitutional government.
This offense is compounded when, as alleged here,
it is committed under the guise of enforcing the
law. The United States has made the solemn charge
that these defendants have committed such an
offense. Instead of challenging the constitution
ality of the Civil Rights Act of 1957* these
defendants should be searching their souls to see
if this charge is well f o u n d e d . 3
The Judge found that the charge was indeed well
founded.

He ordered the stricken names replaced on

U n i t e d States v. Raines, 172 F.Supp. 552
(M.D. Ga. 1959).
2
It was ultimately reversed by the Supreme Court.
United States v. Raines. 3^2 U.S. 59 (19^0).
h ? ? F.Supp. 355. 360.
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the voting rolls.

Persons whose names were stricken

were not required to reregister.1
The disfranchisement scheme had been a form of
retaliation against civil rights activity and court
decisions aimed at erasing racial barriers in various
public facilities, particularly the schools.

Judge

Skelly Wright was one of the leading actors in the
desegregation controversy.
The Desegregation Controversy
Wright's part in the desegregation controversy pre
ceded the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of
2
Education.
Only six months after the Senate confirmed
his nomination as District Judge, a black took legal
action to gain admission to the law school of Louisiana
State University.-^

Since the case preceded Brown,

Judges and opposing counsel operated within the con
fines of the "separate but equal" doctrine.

But that

doctrine ceased to be very confining when the Supreme
U n i t e d States v. McElveen. 180 F.Supp. 10
(E.D. La. i960), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Thomas,
362 U.S. 59 (I960).
2347 U.S. 483 (1954).
% o m i n g Advocate. September 14, 1950, p. 1;
Times-Picavune. September 14, 1950, p. 36. The black
litigant was represented by local counsel, A. P. Tureaud,
as well as by Thurgood Marshall, then general counsel for
the NAACP.
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Court, in Sweatt v. P a i n t e r , c a s e which also dealt
with legal education, looked beyond the comparison of
physical facilities and took intangibles, such as the
reputation of schools, into consideration.
Still, "separate but equal" remained the rule, and
Roy Wilson's attorneys did not challenge it.

Nor did

they attack the admission policies of the University as
a whole, stating at pretrial conference that their suit
applied to the Law School only.

In court argument

revolved around the Sweatt case with the attorney for
the University attempting to distinguish the two cases.
He pointed out that the State of Louisiana provided legal
education for blacks at the Law School of Southern
University.

It was an established institution, not one

hastily constructed, as in the Sweatt case, simply to
avoid having to admit a Negro applicant to the state
university.

Thurgood Marshall, counsel for Wilson,

responded that Southern, although available to blacks,
was inferior to the Law School of Louisiana State Uni
versity.

He argued that the physical facilities were

inferior and that none of the Southern law professors
1339 U.S. 629 (1950).
^imes-Picayune. September 30, 1950, p. 11; Morning
Advocate, September 30, 1950, p. 1, and October 8, 1950,
p. 1.
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advanced degrees or the previous teaching experience of
law professors at Louisiana State University.1
Judge Wright, the junior memher of the three-judge
2
court, wrote the unanimous opinion.
It was a very dif
ferent kind of opinion from those he would write later.
It consisted almost entirely of a listing of findings
of fact and conclusions of law.

He did not question

that the State had acted in good faith, but among the
findings was the fact that Southern Law School, although
not the product of a desperation effort to keep from
having to admit Wilson to Louisiana State University, was
only three years old, while the law school at Louisiana
State had been in operation since 1906.

The plant of the

latter school greatly exceeded the plant value of
Southern.

When Southern’s law school was established,

the State Board of Education declared that it was inten
ded to meet the highest possible standards.

"However,”

observed Wright, "the policy of the State Board of
Education has not in this comparatively short period of
time been effectuated and the Law School of Southern
University does not afford to plaintiff educational
advantages equal or substantially equal to those that he
^Morning Advocate. September 30, 1950» p. 1; TimesPicavune. September 30, 1950, p. 11.
W i l s o n v. Board of Supervisors. 92 F.Supp. 986
(E.D. La. 1950).
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he would receive if admitted to the Department of Law
of the Louisiana State University and Agricultural and
Mechanical College."1

The court held that the equal pro

tection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required that
Wilson he admitted to the law school of Louisiana State
University.2
The opinion provides no evidence that Wright dis
approved of the "separate but equal" doctrine.

He

applied it without a hint of criticism, although on other
occasions he did not hesitate to express disapproval of
the law which his position required him to apply.

One

may speculate as to why Wright did not exhibit the same
degree of resistance to the "separate but equal" doctrine
as he did to the Fair Trade Act (see preceding chapter),
for example.
A number of possibilities suggest themselves.

One

significant factor is that the Wilson case occurred
during Wright's "freshman" year on the bench and, as a
new judge, he may have been reluctant to provoke con
troversy, especially since the plaintiff did not question
"separate but equal."

There is also the fact that in the

Wilson case he was not writing only for himself as he was
in the "Fair Trade" case.

In Wilson, he had to take into

consideration the views of the other two members of the
1I M d . , 987.
2Ibid., 988.
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other two members of the court.

Another possibility

(and, in fact, Judge Wright's own explanation1 ) is that
he got what he considered a just result and so felt no
need to question established constitutional doctrine.
And, finally, there is the possibility that the opinion
contains no evidence of disapproval of "separate but
equal" simply because Wright did not disapprove of it
and only assigned constitutional status to the value of
desegregation after the Supreme Court did.
If that was the case, it would not be long before
the Supreme Court would reject "separate but equal".
Louisiana officials, however, were unprepared.

In

commenting on impending Supreme Court action, the
Governor of Louisiana indicated that the State would
be unaffected by the decision.

He said that the State

had provided "adequate" facilities for Negroes, given
equal salaries to Negro teachers, and greatly improved
the Negro schools.2
Segregation cases continued to be litigated within
the context of "separate but equal."

The rule was binding

on federal judges until the Supreme Court decided other
wise, and the Supreme Court had not yet acted when
A. P. Tureaud, Jr. sued in Wright's court claiming that
interview: Hon. J. Skelly Wright.
2
Times-Picayune. June 9» 1953» p. 18.
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he was denied admission because of his race to the sixyear arts and sciences and law program^at Louisiana
State University.

As in the Wilson case, Wright found

that Southern University and Louisiana State University
were not substantially equal.

He held that "in con

formity with the equal protection clause of the Four
teenth Amendment, that the plaintiff and all others sim
ilarly qualified and situated are entitled to educational
advantages and opportunities available within the state,
at the same time, upon the same terms and substantially
equal to those which the state provides and makes availp
able to other residents and citizens of the state."
What followed Wright's decision in Tureaud v. Board
of Supervisors, in 1953» vividly illustrates how the
ambiguities of law often allow different alternatives to
lower court judges.

Before the Supreme Court rendered

its decision in Brown, Wright's Tureaud decision was
reversed by a three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit, Judge Richard Rives dissenting.-^
■^In this program, a student spends three years in
the College of Arts and Sciences and three years in Law
School, with the first year of Law School serving to
complete requirements for an arts and sciences degree.
p
Tureaud v. Board of Supervisors. 116 F.Supp. 2*1-8,
251 (E.D. La. 19537
-^Board of Supervisors v. Tureaud, 207 F.2d 807
(5th Cir. 1953).
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The basis for the reversal was not that Wright had erred
in his finding of inequality, but that he had exceeded
his jurisdiction by acting alone rather than convening a
three-judge court as the law requires when the constitu
tionality of a state statute or state constitutional
provision is at issue .^

Judge Rives not only expressed

his disagreement with the majority but was lavish in his
praise of Judge Wright for "commendably . . . shoulder/ing7 "the responsibility imposed upon him by law."2
Rives denied that the constitutionality of any of
Louisiana'a statutes or constitutional provisions was
involved, and so there was no need for a three-judge
court.

The Louisiana Constitution required "separate

free public schools."

Rives assumed that meant "separate

but equal," leaving Wright with only the factual deter
mination of whether the schools were equal.

He said:

The learned district judge, himself a distinguished
Louisiana lawyer, assumed that the State Constitu
tion would be given that reasonable construction
of which it was susceptible so as not to be viola
tive of the Federal Constitution. I think the
district judge was right.3
The matter did not end there; it went to the Supreme
Court.

In a brief per curiam opinion rendered one week

1Ibid., 809.
2Ibid., 810.
3Ibid., 812.
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after the first Brown decision, the Court said:
The petitions for writs of certiorari are
granted. The judgments are vacated and the cases
are remanded for consideration in the light of
the Segregation Cases decided May 1?, 195^»
Brown v. Board of Education . . . and conditions
that now prevail . 1
The final four words of that per curiam opinion provided
fuel for continuing the obstruction of Wright's decision.
The Fifth Circuit Court sent instructions to Wright
which were simply a paraphrase of the Supreme Court's
per curiam opinion.

Without further hearings, Wright

again enjoined the Board of Supervisors of Louisiana
State University, and the Board of Supervisors again
appealed.

The appeal was heard by Judges Rives and

Cameron of the Fifth Circuit and Judge Dawkins of the
Western District of Louisiana.

Writing for himself and

Judge Dawkins, Rives said that Wright's decision was
affirmed.

The fact that it had been based upon "separate

but equal" did not invalidate the result, even though the
Supreme Court had since rejected "separate but equal."
The Brown decision itself was the precedent.
involved more than Oliver Brown's appeal.

That case

One of the

cases included under the title Brown v. Board of Education
was an appeal from a state court decision which had
^Tureaud v. Board of Supervisors, 3^7 U.S. 971
(195*0.
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granted relief to black litigants under the "separate but
equal" doctrine.

In Brown, the Supreme Court affirmed

that decision.
Judge Cameron, in dissent, expressed the opinion
that Wright had disobeyed the mandates of the Fifth
Circuit Court and the Supreme Court in failing to hold
further hearings.

He seized upon the final words of the

Supreme Court’s per curiam opinion.

As Cameron put its

It is not conceived that the District Court could
escape the duty to consider "conditions that now
prevail" on so technical a ground as that mentioned
in the majority opinion. The order of the Supreme
Court and its mandate made it clear that it was
introducing an entirely new ingredient into the
case and was commanding that the District Court
consider evidence with respect to it. The
District Court had no jurisdiction to dispose of
the case in any manner except in strict obedience
to the2command of the Supreme Court and of this
court.
Judge Rives responded to this by taking the rather
unusual step of writing a concurring opinion, even though
he had himself written the majority opinion.

Speaking

solely for himself, he noted that the Supreme Court had
vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals (from which
Rives had dissented) and not the District Court's judg
ment.^

While it was perfectly clear to Cameron that the

Supreme Court required Wright to hold new hearings, it
1Board of Supervisors v. Tureaud. 225 F.2d ^3^
(1955). See also Blaustein and Ferguson, pp. ^8-^9.
2225 F.2d 1*3^. ^37.
3Ibid., M*6.
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was equally clear to Rives that he was not so required.
"If such facilities are actually unequal in other ways
in addition to being separate," he pointed out, "then we
judicially know, certainly in the case of a college as
distinguished from the grade public schools, that there
are no 'conditions that now prevail' which would autho
rize denying equal opportunities to all students,
regardless of race ."1
When it appeared that the matter had finally been
settled, Judge Dawkins decided to change sides.

He

went over to Cameron's side and, on rehearing, Wright
was again reversed.

Rives, apparently feeling that he

had already said it all, dissented without opinion.
Wright and Rives were finally vindicated when the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc,
reversed the most recent decision and reinstated the
previous one, adopting Rives' reasoning.^

The litiga

tion, which was begun before the first Brown decision,
was not concluded until 1956, almost a year after the
second Brown decision, when the Supreme Court denied
certiorari.

1Ibid., ^ 7 .
2Board of Supervisors v. Tureaud, 226 F.2d 71^ (1955).
^Board of Supervisors v. Tureaud. 228 F.2d 895 (1956).
Ll
Board of Supervisors v. Tureaud. 351 U.S. 92^ (1956).
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It was in that same year that a frenzy of segrega
tionist activity took place throughout the South.

In

response to the Brown decisions, the Louisiana legisla
ture, like that of numerous other Southern states, passed
a resolution of interposition.'1' The doctrine of inter
position rests upon the theory that the Federal Union
was formed by a compact among the states, and that each
state may determine for itself when the compact has been
violated.

The Supreme Court’s disposition of the Brown

cases was said to be such a violation, and the State of
Louisiana resolved to place its authority between the
Supreme Court and the people.
The legislature followed the interposition resolu
tion with a number of segregation acts which, according
to the Times-Picavune, dealt "with everything from square
p
dances to law suits."
In attempting to maintain segrega
tion in Louisiana colleges, the legislature made a
Louisiana H. R. Con. Res. No. 10 (1956), Race
Relations Law Reporter, I (August, 1956), 753-55. Seven
other states proposed interpositiont Alabama, Act No.
42 (Special Sess. 1956), Race Relations Law Reporter. I
(April, 1956), 473j Arkansas Res. of Interpos. (proposed),
Race Relations Law Reporter. I (June, 1956), 591-592;
Florida S. Con. Res. No. 17-XX (1956), Race Relations Law
Reporter. I (October, 1956), 948-953; Georgia H. R. Res.
No. 185 (I956), Race Relations Law Reporter. I (April,
1956), 438-440; Mississippi S. Con. Res. No. 125 (195©)1
Race Relations Law Reporter. I (April, 1956), 440-443;
South Carolina Interpos. Act (1956), Race Relations Law
Reporter, I (April, 1956), 443-445; Virginia S. Res. No.
137 (1956), Race Relations Law Reporter. I (April, 1956),

44.7-44.8.
2July 15, 1956, p. 23.

72
certificate of eligibility and good moral character
signed by an applicant's high school principal and the
State Superintendent of Education a requisite for admis
sion to a state institution of higher learning.

The

legislature also provided that any public school prin
cipal who signed such a certificate for a black student
would lose his job.

Wright referred to this legisla

tion as
another attempt by the Louisiana Legislature to
preserve, by law, segregation in the educational
institutions of the state. This attempt, while
more subtle than its predecessor, nevertheless
fails because the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution "nullifies sophisticated as well as
simple-minded modes of discrimination .1
Compliance with decisions ordering the desegrega
tion of institutions of higher education and other
public facilities did not come quickly or easily.
Wright did what he could to hasten the process.

But
Usually

a person who objects to an administrative decision must
^Ludlev v. Board of Supervisors. 150 F.Supp. 900,
901 (E.D. La. 19T?T.
2
Judge Wright enjoined enforcement of state laws
requiring segregation in public transportation. Davis v.
Morrison. Civil No. 6*H 8 (E.D. La. May 2 k , 1957)» Race
Relations Law Reporter. II (October, 1957)* 996 aff'd,
252 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1958). He also enjoined the
enforcement of laws denying blacks the use of New Orleans
City Park. Detiege v. New Orleans City Park Improvement
Assoc., Civil No. 2601 (E.D. La. May 27j 1957)* He joined
Judges Wisdom and Christenberry in holding unconstitu
tional a statute prohibiting interracial athletic con
tests. Dorsey v. State Athletic Commission. 168 F.Supp.
1^9 (E.D. La. 1958Ti He joined Judges Wisdom and West in
enjoining interstate bus companies from complying with a
state court order requiring segregation in their terminal
facilities. United States v. Pitcher. Civil No. 2516

exhaust administrative remedies before taking his com
plaint to the courts.

But Wright decided that it would

be useless for a black denied admission to Louisiana
State University to exhaust administrative remedies when
he already had a letter from the Registrar advising him
that it was against the Board of Supervisors' policy to
admit blacks.^

Nor did Judge Wright require that blacks

break laws requiring segregated public transportation
before the laws could be tested.

He said, "It is not the

Court's view that in our civilization it is necessary to
have incidents requiring arrests to have the rights of
2
people declared."
Decisions banning segregation in public facilities
and in state colleges were very unpopular, but the
desegregation of public schools below the college level
produced the most intense resistance.

After a three-

judge court decided that three judges were not required,-^
the desegregation of Orleans Parish public schools was
primarily under the direction of Judge Wright.

He

assigned constitutional status to the equal treatment of
(E.D. La. March 19* 1962), Race Relations Law Reporter.
VII (Spring, 1962), 223.
^Unreported. The decision was affirmed in Board
of Supervisors v. Fleming. 265 F.2d 736 (5th Cir. 1959).
2Quoted at 252 F.2d 102, 103.
Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board. 138 F.Supp.
336 (E.D. La. 1956).
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public school children, regardless of race, and vigor
ously exercised the powers of his office to promote that
policy.
Had Wright been at all inclined to frustrate the
integration of the schools, the arguments of the School
Board gave him ample opportunity, but he was not
inclined to permit technicalities to obscure the merits
of the case.'1' He was particularly impatient with the
School Board's argument that the suit should be dismissed
because the plaintiffs had not exhausted administrative
remedies.

They argued that one of the 195^ segregation

laws provided the opportunity to obtain a hearing from
the Superintendent of Schools and the School Board, if
the school assignment of any particular child was not
satisfactory.

Wright replied that the Act was invalid

because it was part of the unconstitutional scheme to
preserve segregation.

Even when considered alone, the

Act was invalid because it delegated legislative autho
rity without any standards on which to base the assign
ment of children.

He noted that the Board had, in fact,

been asked on three occasions to assign children to
^The School Board won only a minor point when
Wright agreed that the new Orleans Parish Superintendent
of Schools had not been properly made a defendant. He
added, "The objection to the balance of the amended
complaint, however, is highly technical in nature, and
even if well taken, would not result in a dismissal of
the action, but only in giving the plaintiffs time to
amend." Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board. 138 F.Supp.
337, 3^0 T O . La. 1956) .
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nonsegregated schools.

The Board had refused and

indicated that it would resist desegregation.

Wright

said*
To remit each of these minor children and the
thousands of others similarly situated to
thousands of administrative hearings before this
Board, to seek the relief to which the Supreme
Court of the United States has said they are
entitled, would be a vain and useless gesture,
unworthy of a court of equity. It would be a
travesty in which this court will not participate.
Judge Wright issued a decree which could hardly be
described as radical.

He followed the "all deliberate

speed" formula of the second Brown decision and gave
the School Board considerable leeway in determining how
to meet its constitutional responsibilities.

The decree

merely enjoined the School Board from permitting or
requiring segregation after the time required to make

1Ibid., 3^ 1 .
2
In the early stages of the controversy, he also
gave the state courts opportunity to fulfill their
responsibilities voluntarily. When a state court
illegally enjoined the NAACP from conducting activities
in Louisiana, Wright instructed the organization to use
state appellate procedure. See Lewis v. Louisiana ex rel.
Leblanc. Civil No. 1678 (E.D. La. April
1956), Race
Relations Law Reporter. I (June, 1956), 576. When the
state courts would not protect the rights of the NAACP,
the federal district court finally acted. See
Louisiana ex rel. Le Blanc v. Lewis, No. 55*899 (19th
Jud. Dist. Ct. , Parish of East Baton Rouge, La., April 2^-,
1956), Race Relations Law Reporter. I (June, 1956), 571f
Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP. (Ct. of Appeal of
La., 1st Cir., November 26, 1956). Race Relations Law
Reporter. II (February, 1957)* 185; Times-Picayune.
November 27 , 1956, p. 1; Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v.
NAACP. 181 F.Supp. 37 (E.D. La. i 960).
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arrangements for desegregation "with all deliberate
speed," as required by the Supreme Court.

But the

language of Wright's opinion provided a clue that although
he was cogniznat of the problems attendant desegregation,
he did not consider the "all deliberate speed" formula a
license for inaction.

His words were*

The problems attendant desegregation in the deep
South are considerably more serious than generally
appreciated in some sections of our country. The
problem of changing a people's mores, particularly
those with an emotional overlay, is not to be
taken lightly. It is a problem which will require
the utmost patience, understanding, generosity and
forbearance from all of us, of whatever race. But
the magnitude of the problem may not nullify the
principle. And that principle is that we are, all
of us, f r e e b o m Americans, with a right to make our
way, unfettered by sanctions imposed by man because
of the work of God.l
Wright retained jurisdiction of the matter.

The

"all deliberate speed" decree was not the end of the
desegregation controversy but only the beginning.

The

State legislature took control of the Orleans Parish
schools and gave to a legislative committee the power to
classify schools according to race.

The committee's

classification was subject to confirmation by the full
legislature.

Unlike his first Bush decision, Wright

did not write a lengthy opinion when this latest issue
was presented to him.

He noted that litigation in the

Bush controversy was long-standing and simply said that
segregation by law is a violation of the Fourteenth Amend
ment.

"Any legal artifice, however cleverly contrived,
1Ibid.
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which would circumvent this ruling, and others predi
cated on it, is unconstitutional on its face.

Such an

artifice is the statute in suit ."1
By mid-July of 1959» the Orleans Parish School
Board had taken no action towards implementing the "all
deliberate speed" decree.

Noting that the Board's only

action had been to appeal his decision,bright ordered
the Board to produce a plan and suggested, but did not
order, a grade-a-year plan.

Although the NAACP wanted

an order that would require desegregation by September,
1959» Judge Wright gave the Board until March, i 960, to
produce its plan and hopefully generate some support.
He realized that the peaceful desegregation of the
schools was not solely in the hands of the School Board.
"Our news media, our public and private leaders, our
church men, and the public generally will share the
responsibility for that decision," he said, and he
expressed confidence that they would be on the side of
law and order.^
The campaign in the Democratic gubernatorial
primary indicated that Wright's confidence was not well
^ u s h v. Orleans Parish School Board. 163 F.Supp.
702 (E.D. La. 1958).

2

The decision was affirmed in Orleans Parish School
Board v. Bush. 2^2 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1957)> cert, denied
921 (1957).
q
-^Times-Picavune. July 16, 1959» pp. 1* 3? New York
Times. July 16. 1959. p. 1^.

well placed.

Jimmie Davis, the ultimate victor at the

polls, stressed his past support for segregation and
"separate but equal."

Another leading contender was

de Lesseps S. Morrison, Mayor of New Orleans, who was
considered a "moderate" on the issue of race.

He too

extended segregationist credentials to the public.

As

evidence that he could handle the race problem, he said
that there had been no racial trouble and no integration
in New Orleans .1

The following spring, Attorney General

Jack Gremillion pledged to preserve "our Southern Way
of Life" at a convention of the Louisiana Peace Officers'
p
Association.
The School Board got no support from City
or State political leaders.

It was equally lacking in

support from the economic elite of New Orleans.-^
A week before the Board's desegregation plan was
due, Gerald Rault, special attorney for the School Board,
moved that Wright vacate his earlier orders.

In denying

the motion, Wright said:
I will tell you now publicly what I have
already told you in chambers. I am not going to
hold any member of the school board in contempt
if they do not present a plan by May 16, but if
^imes-Picavune. October 9, 1959* pp. 6 , 13.
2
Morning Advocate. April 28, i 960, p. 11.
^See Inger, Politics and Reality. See also Robert L.
Crain, The Politics of School Desegregation: Comparative
Case Studies of Community Structure and Policy-Making
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, I 969), pp. 250322.
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they do not present a plan, I will come up with
one. There will be a plan.l
He was sympathetic to the Board's lonely position, but
he would yield no further.

The School Board's conscien

tious implementation of a plan it had itself devised
would undoubtedly have been a more effective way to
desegregate the schools, but even if that were not forth
coming, Wright was determined that the

process begin.

On May 16, the Board informed Wright that it had no
desegregation plan and that only the legislature could
desegregate the schools consistent with state law.
Within a matter of hours, Judge Wright filed his own
2
plan.
The order was as follows*
It is ordered that beginning with the opening
of school in September, i 960, all public schools
in the City of New Orleans shall be desegregated in
accordance with the following Plant
A. All children entering the formerly all
white public school nearest their homes, or the
formerly all Negro public school nearest their
homes, at their option.
B. Children may be transferred from one
school to another, provided such transfers are
not based on consideration of race.3
•^Times-Picayune. May 17, i 960 , p. 3 .

2Ibid.; New York Times. May 17» I960, p. 1.
^Bush v. Orleans Parish

School Board.Civil No.
The text of the order
is printed in Race Relations Law Reporter.V (Summer,
I960), 379, and in New York Times. May 17* i960, p. 1.

3630 (E.D. La. May 16 , i 960).
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The School Board's response to Wright's order was
ambivalent.

A majority of the members recognized the

inevitability of integration and hoped to keep the
schools open.

The President of the School Board called

upon civic organizations for assistance in preparing
the public so that violence might be avoided.

But the

unpopularity of cooperating too closely with the federal
court led the School Board to create an impression of
resisting.

The Board passed a motion calling on the

Governor to interpose the sovereignty of the State
between itself and the federal court.

It was hoped

that the Governor would invoke the doctrine of inter
position during the summer so that the matter could be
settled by the time the schools opened .1
The Governor was then pledging open and segregated
schools in September, but he did not say how he would
accomplish the feat.

The Attorney General took the

matter into the state court system, and a state district
court enjoined the School Board from complying with
Judge Wright's desegregation o r d e r . T h e activity of
^imes-Picayune. June 15» I960, p. 1; June 16, i 960,
p. 2; June 21, i 960, p. 1; and June 23» I960, sec. 2,
p. 21 .
^Ibid., July 6 , i 960, p. 1; July 8 , i 960, p. 1.
^State v. Orleans Parish School Board. No. 382 ,6^ 6 ,
Docket No. 5 (Civ. Dist. Ct. for Parish of Orleans,
July 29, i960). See Times-Picavune. July 30 , i 960,
PP. 1. 3.
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the Governor and the Attorney General prompted the NAACP
to move that those officials he made defendants in the
Bush case.

Their motion was granted by Judges Rives,

Christenberry, and Wright, and a hearing was set for
August 23.^

The following day, Governor Davis took con

trol of the schools, and some white parents joined the
suit seeking an injunction to enjoin the closure of the
schools .2
Following a postponement resulting from the federal
marshal's inability to serve notice on Davis and
Gremillion, a stormy hearing took place.

During the

proceedings, Gremillion called the court a den of
iniquity and
he

a kangaroo court.His performance, which

concluded by flinging down a law book and walking

out of the courtroom, resulted only in a contempt
citation.

The three-judge court rendered a decision

unfavorable to the Attorney General and the segregation
ist cause.

In this latest phase of the Bush litigation,

the court held unconstitutional a plethora of segregation
statutes.

The Governor, the Attorney General, the State

Treasurer, and the State Superintendent of Schools were
all enjoined from enforcement of the unconstitutional
^Times-Picayune. August 17, i960, p. 1.
o
Ibid., August 18, i 960,pp. 1, 3 .
■^Ibid., August 27, i 960, pp. 1, 2; Race Relations
Law Reporter. V (Fall, i 960), 608-669.
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statutes and from further interference with the opera
tion of the schools.

The court also enjoined the Orleans

Parish Civil District Court Judge from enforcing his
injunction against the School Board.

The School Board

was ordered to comply with Judge Wright's decree.’*'
Shortly thereafter, Wright met with School Board
and NAACP attorneys.

The School Board asked for a one-

year delay in implementing the desegregation order.

The

NAACP opposed any delay at all in desegregating the
schools.

Wright took a middle course.

He indicated

that he was impressed by the good faith of the School
Board and agreed that intervention by the Governor and
the Civil District Court made orderly compliance with
the desegregation order by the time the schools opened
virtually impossible.

He, therefore, granted a delay of

nine and a half weeks, during which time the Board could
determine how many blacks desired to be transferred and
could plan their course of action with the Judge.

Accord

ing to the delay order, the schools would be integrated
p
on November 1^, i960.
The NAACP was not pleased with the delay.

Thurgood

Marshall and A. P. Tureaud attempted to have Judge Richard
~*~Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board. 18? F.Supp. k2
(E.D. La. I960), aff'd 365 U.S. 569 (1961).
2
State Times. August 31» i960, p. 1; Times-Picavune.
August 31, I960, pp. 1, 3 .
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Rives, Chief Judge of the Fifth Circuit, set aside the
delay order.

For that purpose, they phoned Rives at his

home in Montgomery, Alabama.

When Rives denied their

request, they filed no formal motion and acquiesced in
the delay.1
The School Board finally began to prepare for
integration, while at the same time attempting to hold
the number of black children admitted to predominantly
white schools to a minimum.

Since the schools would be

segregated when classes began, blacks would have to take
the initiative and request that their children be trans
ferred.

In determining which requests to grant, school

administrators considered an elaborate list of factors
taken from the Louisiana Pupil Placement Act, which was
enacted during the regular legislative session of i 960.
The Board also determined that racially integrated
o
classes would be segregated according to sex.
As a result of the elaborate transfer procedure
used by the Board, only five black children were to
attend previously all white schools, and state officials
attempted to block even that.

The Governor called the

legislature into special session (four others would
follow), and the legislature proceeded to pass an
•^Times-Picavune. September 1, i960, p. 1.
p
Ibid., September 27, i 960, p. 1; October 13 , i 960,
p. 1; Crain, pp. 2?2-279.

Interposition Act and an administration-sponsored seg
regation "package."

Some New Orleans legislators

resisted, not because they favored integration, but
because they wanted to keep the schools open and because
the segregation measures jeopardized New Orleans home
rule status.'1' Nor were legislators the only State
officials to take action.

The State Superintendent of

Schools, Shelby Jackson, declared November 1^ a state
wide holiday in order to interfere with the desegrega2
tion schedule.
There was nothing subtle about the actions of state
officials, and Judge Wright's reaction was equally
lacking in subtlety.

When New Orleanians picked up

their morning newspapers on Monday, November 1^, they
found bold-print headlines across the front paget
"U.S. Judge Enjoins Legislature."

In his office late

Sunday night, Wright had issued an injunction against
the entire legislature, the Governor, Lieutenant Gov
ernor, Attorney General, State Superintendent of Schools
and numerous other officials.

His temporary restraining

order forbade the use of sergeants-at-arms at the
integrated schools to prevent integration.

It forbade

any action taking control of the schools from the
^Times-Picavune. November
i 960, p. 1; November 5
i960, p. 1; November 8 , i 960, pp. 3 , 8 , 20; New York
Times. November 9 , i960, p. 14-.
2
Times-Picavune. November 13» i 960, p. 1.
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elected School Board, including dismissal of the local
superintendent of schools or the School Board's attorney.
The temporary restraining order also enjoined the execu
tion of Shelby Jackson's declaration of holiday or any
action "interfering with Dr circumventing the orders of
this c o u r t . J a c k s o n himself was cited for contempt of
2
court.
When on Monday the legislature passed a resolu
tion addressing the School Board out of office, Wright
enjoined the legislature for the second time within
twenty-four hours .^
On November 18, Judges Rives and Christenberry joined
Wright to conduct hearings on the constitutionality of the
Interposition Act and the "segregation package" which
followed it.

At the hearing, the attorney for the School

Board and the attorney for the NAACP agreed that inter
position had no validity.^

In the per curiam opinion

which followed, the Judges rejected the State's contention
that the legislature was beyond the federal courts'
injunctive power.

The court noted that neither the legis

lature nor any of its members had been enjoined from the
performance of legislative functions, but when they
attempt to act as administrators of local schools, they
^Times-Picavune. November 1^, i960, p. 1.

2Ibid., p. 17.
-^Ibid.. November 15# i 960, p. 1.
A
Ibid., November 19, i 960, pp.

5»
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can be restrained from implementing unconstitutional
measures.1

As for the Interposition Act, it had been

on the books in resolution form since 1956.

That the

legislature gave it statutory form in i 960 did not
change its character.

According to the courts

It neither requires nor denies. It is a mere
statement of principles, a political polemic,
which provides the predicate for the second
segregation package of i 960, the legislation
in suit. Its unconstitutional premise /that a
state legislature may overrule a Supreme Court
decision/ strikes with nullity all that it
would support.^
What the Interposition Act attempted to support
was the reenactment, with slight changes in wording, of
statutes previously held unconstitutional.

The court

considered it all part of a general scheme to deny
rights and so was unconstitutional.

When the School

Board requested another delay because of its precarious
legal and financial status, the court refused.

In the

court's view, there had been too much delay already, and
there was no evidence that further delay would do any
good . J
Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board, 188 F.Supp.
916, 922“7e.D. La. I960) aff'd, 365 U.S. 569 (1961).
2188 F.Supp. 916, 926-927.
^Ibid., 928-930. For full text of the Interposition
Act, see Ibid., 930-936. For a summary of the acts and
resolutions held unconstitutional, see "Appendix B,"
Ibid., 936-938.

The School Board's precarious financial situation
resulted from House Concurrent Resolution No. 2 of the
second special session of i 960.

The resolution advised

the banks that the Board had no authority to withdraw,
borrow, or spend money.

The State disavowed any

responsibility for the debts of the School Board, and
the City of New Orleans, which collects taxes due the
School Board, decided to withhold that money until it
was ascertained who was running the schools .1

The

legislature's position, in spite of federal court action
was that it was itself running the schools.

It trans

ferred the funds of the Orleans Parish School Board to
the legislative account and warned the banks that they
dealt with the School Board at their own risk.

Since

the School Board was in the untenable position of being
under court order to integrate while lacking the funds
with which to do so, it took its problem to Judge Wright
Initially, Wright dismissed the petition that four
New Orleans banks be enjoined from refusing to honor
School Board checks because the matter had not been
brought within the framework of the Bush case.-^

Taking

^imes-Picayune. November 17» i 960 , p. 5» sec. 3 ,
p. 2. On the financial relationship between the Orleans
Parish School Board and the City, see L. Vaughn Howard
and Robert S. Friedman, Government in Metropolitan New
Orleans. Tulane Studies in Political Science, VI
(New Orleans* Tulane University, 1959)* pp. 12*1— 125.
p
Times-Picayune. December 3 , i 960 , p. 1.
o
-u b i d .. December 6 , i960 , pp. 3 ,^.
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the cue, the Board filed the complaint as a part of the
Bush case, asking that a three-judge court enjoin the
City of New Orleans from failing to turn over taxes
levied by the Board and collected by the City and enjoin
the banks from refusing to honor School Board checks.'*'
At the subsequent hearing, Governor Davis was in court
for the first time in the long course of the litigation.
Also present was United States Attorney M. Hepburn Many,
defending the United States’ interest in maintaining
the integrity of the judicial process.

Although the

legislature had fired the School Board's attorney, the
court permitted him to stay in order to facilitate an
orderly presentation of the case.

When the hearing was

concluded, the court took under advisement the petition
to enjoin the banks, as well as petitions by the NAACP
and the United States Attorney that the court enjoin
enforcement of the legislature's latest attempt to set
2
up a new school board.
Shortly thereafter, the court issued the requested
injunctions, noting that ever since the School Board
had belatedly attempted to comply with court orders, it
had been harassed by the legislature and other state
officials.

During this harassment, it sought, through

•*~Ibid.. December 7, i960 , p. 8.
2
Ibid., December 17, i960, pp. 1, 16.
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its counsel, the aid of the court in fulfilling its
responsibilities.

By firing the School Board's attorney,

the legislature attempted to prevent the Board's seeking
court aid and thus was one of the "less sophisticated
attempts" to preserve segregation.'1'
As the desegregation controversy continued into
I96I, Shelby Jackson, the Superintendent of Schools,
continued to ignore requests of the Orleans Parish School
Board for funds, textbooks, supplies, and certification
of teachers.

As a result, United States A t t o m y

M. Hepburn Many moved that contempt charges against
Jackson be expanded.

At the contempt hearing, Wright

was not vindictive and probably hoped to avoid creating
a martyr for the segregationist cause.

Many, who has

been described as "a longtime Republican who reputedly
hated Louisiana Democrats more than he hated integrao
tion," appeared to want nothing less than a jail sentence
for Jackson.
During the proceedings, Wright asked Jackson
whether his attorney's statement that he intended to
comply with court injunctions and not interfere with
the operations of the elected School Board was correct.
Jackson replied, "I cannot legally recognize the dismissed
^Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board. 190 F.Supp.
861, 8^7lE.D. La. 19^0), aff’d 3 6 6 U.S. 212 (I96I).

2Crain, p. 288.
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Orleans parish school board because I am forbidden by
the legislature, but I am not interfering and will not
interfere."'1' His answer satisfied no one, least of all
Many, who wanted to proceed with the case.

Wright,

however, pressed Jackson for a more definite answer.
Jackson replied that he would have to comply with in
junctions of the court until they were changed.
Addressing the United States Attorney, Wright said*
Mr. Jackson has stated that he intends to
comply with the injunctions and that he will not
interfere. It is obvious that Mr. Jackson has
experienced some emotional strain. Wouldn't we
be justified in persevering in the hope that he
will be faithful? Let’s not stir the water.
What this situation needs is calmness, not agita
tion. That might be better than assuming that he
will not comply. Regardless of his actions in
the past, I am inclined to give him a chance,
even if you think it is a small chance, and I
think it is a small chance .2
Many remained dissatisfied with Jackson's answers, but
the other two members of the judicial threesome supported
Wright.

Jackson was given three weeks to purge himself

of civil contempt.^

Without officially recognizing the

School Board, he did begin to provide needed financial
k
resources for the Orleans school system.
As the 1960-61 school year drew to a close, the
NAACP attacked the School Board's pupil placement plan
^imes-Picayune. March

2Ibid.
h

1961, p. 6 .

3Ibid.

Ibid., March 8 , 1961, p. lj March 21, 1961, p. 1.
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as inconsistent with Judge Wright’s desegregation order.
The NAACP sought to have all New Orleans public schools
integrated when the schools opened the following
September.

The plan put into effect by the School Board

had not softened resistance to integration, but had
resulted in the integration of only two schools in close
proximity to one another, thereby permitting segregation
ists to concentrate their opposition.^

But Wright did not

immediately move in the direction that the NAACP desired.
The School Board had the opportunity to move forward with
desegregation on its own initiative but chose instead to
move backward.

It resolved to resegregate one of the

previously integrated schools by designating it an all
black school and transferring the white students, but
not the few black children enrolled, to other schools.
The Board's justification for the action was that it
would permit 1,350 blacks' to be taken off a platoon
system.
"equal."

In other words, "separate” was the price of
In response to a petition by the NAACP on behalf

of the black children who would be denied the right to a
desegregated education, Wright granted a temporary re
straining order, and the Board rescinded its resolution .2
A later hearing investigating the complaint that the
School Board was using complex administrative procedure
^Times-Picavune. May 9» 1961, p. 1 .

2Ibid., January 2b, 1962, p. 1.
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to limit desegregation revealed that the Board's efforts
were indeed half-hearted ones.

In his testimony, the

Superintendent of Schools for Orleans Parish admitted
that the School Board had no plans for accelerating the
pace of integration for the 1962-63 school year even
though over 5*000 black children and no white children
were being platooned on a part-time schedule .1

The

School Board attributed these conditions to lack of money,
noting that taxes to produce revenue for the schools had
been voted down in two recent elections.
If the parents of a black first grader attempted
to transfer their child out of these crowded conditions
and into a white school, they were required to file an
application for transfer.

In deciding whether to permit

the transfer, school administrators evaluated the child's
health, home environment, and score on the aptitude test
which the Pupil Placement Act required of all first grade
children, but not of children in the grades not immedi
ately affected by desegregation.

If the transfer took

place but the child did not make a satisfactory adjust
ment, the Board could transfer him back to his original
school.

The School Board justified the addition of this

procedure to Wright's desegregation plan as a measure to
Louisiana Weekly (New Orleans, La.), April 7,

1962, p. 1 .
2
See Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board. 20^ F.Supp.
568, 571 (E.D. La. 1962).
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see that the children were "intellectually and psycho
logically acceptable" in the schools to which they sought
to be transferred.
In one of his last decisions as a District Judge,
Wright rejected the rationalization proffered by the
School Board and held that the Pupil Placement Act was
unconstitutional as applied.

In Wright’s wordss

This failure to test all pupils is the constitu
tional vice in the Board's testing program. How
ever valid a pupil placement act may be on its
face, it may not be selectively applied. Moreover,
where a school system is segregated, there is no
constitutional basis whatever for using a pupil
placement law. A pupil placement law may be
validly applied in an integrated school system,
and then only where no consideration is based on
race. To assign children to a segregated school
system and then require them to pass muster under
a pupil placement law is discrimination in its
rawest form .2
But he mitigated his criticism of the School Board
somewhat by his sympathetic understanding of the plight
of its members.

He pointed out that

The School Board here occupies an unenviable
position. Its members, elected to serve without
pay, have sought conscientiously, albeit reluc
tantly, to comply with the law on order of this
court. Their reward for this service has been
economic reprisal and personal recrimination from
many of their constituents who have allowed hate
to overcome their better judgment. But the plight
of the Board cannot affect the rights of school
children whose skin color is no choice of their own.
These children have a right to accept the constitu
tional promise of equality before the,,law, an
equality we profess to all the world .-3

1Ibid., 570.
3Ibid., 571.

2Ibid., 570-571.

He knew from his own experience the kind of abuse the
members of the School Board were undergoing.

He and some

of his relatives received abusive and anonymous telephone
calls.

His home was under police protection for a time,'*'

and at one point a cross was burned on his lawn.
Judge Wright's part in the controversy over the
desegregation of the Orleans Parish School System came to
an end in April, 1962.

He amended his grade-a-year order

to require the desegregation of grades one through six
when the schools opened in September, 1962.

His amended

order prohibited the application of the Pupil Placement
Act as long as a dual school system continued to exist . ^
The Times-Picavune predicted that Wright's order would
result in an exodus of whites from the public schools,
leaving an almost total black enrollment as in the
k
District of Columbia.
The order, however, was not implemented.

When

Judge Wright left New Orleans to take his seat on the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
his successor, Judge Frank Ellis, retreated from this
■^Personal interviews:
Wright, Jr.

Mrs. Margaret Hotard; James E.

^New York Times. June 1, 1958, p. *H.
^Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board. 20^ F.Supp.
568, 57TTE.D. La. 1962).
^April 5, 1962, p. 16.

position.^

This retreat was called the School Board's

"biggest victory in the prolonged fight to preserve
segregation .2
While some fought to preserve the system of segre
gated education, others fought to dismantle it, and all
of the fighting was not over the Orleans Parish public
schools.

Four years after his order to the Orleans

Parish School Board to desegregate with all deliberate
speed, Wright conducted hearings on petitions to enjoin
the East Baton Rouge Parish School Board, the St. Helena
Parish School Board, and trade schools operated by the
State from continuing to operate on a segregated basis.^
Over the objections of blacks who wanted him to require
submission of desegregation plans by a specific date and
of whites who wanted no integration, Judge Wright issued
"all deliberate speed" orders and allowed these officials
the same opportunity to live up to their constitutional
responsibilities that he had allowed the Orleans Parish
School Board.^
^Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board, 205 F.Supp 893
(E.D. La. 1962T:
2New York Times. May 24, 1962, p. 21.
^Morning Advocate. March 15. i960, p. 1A
4
Ibid., May 25. I960, pp. 1A, 6A; Times-Picavune.
May 25, i 960, p. 1.
^Angel v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., Civil No.
1658 (E.D. L a , May 24, i 960), aff'd 287 F.2d 33 (5th Cir.
1961); Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board.
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The reaction of the St. Helena Parish School Board
was to attempt to close the schools pursuant to a refer
endum authorized by an act of the legislature.

Before

rendering a decision on the constitutionality of the
act, Judges Wisdom, Christenberry, and Wright invited
opinions from the Attorneys General of all the States
on two questions:

(1)

Would a state deprive children

of due process of law or equal protection of the laws if
it ceased to provide public education?

(2)

Would the

answer be the same if it were done on a local option
basis following a vote reflecting the consent of the
electorate?^"

The court also ordered opposing counsel to

supplement the record with additional evidence on the
act's legislative history, the private school facilities
available to both races in St. Helena Parish, the amount
and source of funds expended on education in the Parish,
and any other facts pertinent to the question of constitutionality.
Oral argument was held on August 4, 1961.

In pre

senting the State's case, Attorney General Gremillion
Civil No. 1662 (E.D. La. May 2^, i 960), aff'd 287 F.2d
380 (5th Cir. 1961); Hall v. St. Helena Parish School
Board. Civil No. 1068“ (!7d. La. May 24, I960), aff’d
287 F. 2d 376 (5th Cir. 1961).
^Times-Picayune. April 26, I96I, p. lj Ibid.,
May 19. 1961. p. 7: Ibid.. June 17, I96I, p. 6 ; New
York Times. April 28, I 96I, p. 12.
^imes-Picavune. May 2 , 1961, p. 12.
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took the position that public education was a privilege,
not a right.

Harold Greene, from the Civil Rights

Division of the Department of Justice (The United States
participated as amicus curiae.), argued that closure of
the schools in St. Helena Parish would constitute
denial of equal protection based upon race and geography.
He also urged that denial of voting rights would be
involved, since Louisiana had a literacy requirement .1
On August 30, 1961, Judges Wisdom, Christenberry,
and Wright held the school closing law unconstitutional.

p

They considered it an obvious attempt to deny constitu
tional rights to blacks, and, as long as public schools
were in operation in other parts of the State, the
legislation denied equal protection of the laws to all
citizens of St. Helena Parish.

The Judges commented on

the poverty of the Parish, which made it unlikely that
accreditable private schools could operate without state
financial support.

"It would be a miracle," they said,

if a single accreditable private school for Negroes
could be established in St. Helena within the forseeable future. To speak of this law as operating
equally is to equate equal protection with the
equality Anatole France spoke o f 1 "The law, in
its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as
the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the
streets, and to steal bread . j

1I M d . , August 5, 1961, pp. 1, 3.
2Hall v. St. Helena Parish School Board. 197 F.Supp.
6k 9 (E.D. La. 19^1).
3Ibid.. 655.
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The court made it clear that the local option
provision was irrelevant.

No political subdivision

might do what the state itself is prohibited from doing,
and a majority may not lawfully invade the constitu
tional rights of a minority even if it first holds a
referendum.

A school board could not evade the require

ments of the Brown decisions by closing the public
schools under its jurisdiction.1
A case involving a private school, Tulane Univer
sity, indicates that a fundamental change in Wright’s
attitude toward segregated education had taken place
since his uncritical acceptance of the "separate but
equal" doctrine during the pre-Brown years.

Apparently

the Brown decisions provided the needed spark.

The

determined application of those decisions in the face
of obstruction and defiance by state and local officials
then pushed him to a position in advance of the Supreme
Court.
p
The Tulane case grew out of the University's com
pliance with the provision of Paul Tulane's will that
his money be used for the education of "white young
persons."

Two blacks who had been denied admission to

Tulane because of their race charged that they had been
1Ibid., 658-659.
2
Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane University.
203 F.Supp. 855 (E.D. La. 1962).
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denied equal protection of the laws in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment.

The Fourteenth Amendment, however,

prohibits discriminatory state action; it does not reach
discrimination by private individuals or private insti
tutions .1
Tulane insisted that it was a private institution
and, therefore, immune from the requirements of the
equal protection clause.

The administrators of the

University would have been perfectly happy, however, to
have the racial restriction in Paul Tulane's will
declared unenforceable so that they might voluntarily
admit blacks.
egalitarian.

Their motives were not particularly
Some of their applications for foundation

grants had been rejected because of their admissions
policy .2
Judge Wright gave the Tulane administrators only
■5

half of what they wanted.

Citing Shelley v. Kraemer,

he held that the racial restriction in the bequest was
unenforceable in the courts, as the administrators had
hoped he would, but he did not find that Tulane was
beyond the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment, although
they had hoped he would do that too.

The University had

"^See the Civil Rights Cases. 108 U.S. 3 (1883).
2203 F.Supp. 855. 858.
h i 1* U.S. 1 (19^8).
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been originally a state institution called the University
of Louisiana.

As a result of an arrangement with the

State, the administrators of the Tulane Fund took over
the operation of the university, but, as late as 1944,
the legislature instructed the university to award
scholarships without regard to sex, indicating to Wright
that the State had not completely abandoned control.
Tulane still had a unique tax exemption, revenue from
certain land not relinquished by the State, and had the
Governor, the State Superintendent of Education, and the
Mayor of New Orleans on its governing board.'1' Wright held
that all of this indicated enough state involvement to
make the Fourteenth Amendment binding on the administra
tors of Tulane University.
Although Wright's judgment was vacated by his successor, it can be reconciled with the concept of "state
action" being developed by the Supreme Court.^

It was

what he said rather than what he held that went beyond
the existing state of the law.

Wright questioned

whether any school could be so "private" as to be immune
to the equal protection clause.
1203
2
See
Fund, 207
TeTd. La.

He viewed education as

F.Supp. 855. 859.
Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane Educ'l
F.Supp. 55^ (E.D. La. 1962)} 212 F.Supp. 674
1962).

-^See Shelley v. Kraemer. 334 U.S. 1 (1948)j Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Authority. 365 U.S. 715 (1961). See
also the white primary cases, Smith v. Allwright. 321 U.S.
649 (1944); Terry v. Adams. 3^5 U.S. 461 (1953).
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a matter of great public interest.

The magnitude of that

interest was such that the state bore responsibility for
the conduct of all educational institutions.

When the

state chose to carry out a part of its educational respon
sibilities through nongovernmental agencies, it passed on
to those agencies the constitutional prohibitions binding
on the state.

He said*

Reason and authority strongly suggest that the
Constitution never sanctions racial discrimination in
our schools and colleges, no matter how "private"
they may claim to be. But the special circumstances
of this case do not require us to go so far .1
The change in Wright's approach to the segregation
issue becomes even more apparent when the above statement
is contrasted with a statement of Justice William 0.
Douglas on the same subject.

Justice Douglas is generally

conceded to be the most liberal and activist member of the
United States Supreme Court.

He said, "If a testator

wanted to leave a school or center for the use of one race
only and in no way implicated the State in the supervi
sion, control, or management of that facility, we assume
arguendo that no constitutional difficulty would be
2
encountered."
Judge Wright had advanced beyond prevailing constitu
tional interpretation regarding racial discrimination as
he had in matters of criminal procedure.

In dealing with

1203 F.Supp. 855, 859.
2Evans v. Newton. 382 U.S. 296, 300 (1966).
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criminal procedure, he attempted to influence opinion by
openly criticizing prevailing policy from the bench.

In

dealing with voting rights, more efficacious action was
open to him.

Since equal access to the ballot was a

value to which Wright assigned constitutional status, he
rejected a decision by another court that would have
obstructed the Government's ability to protect voting
rights.

His committment to the value of racial equality

in schools and public facilities grew with the law, but
at a faster rate.

He began by accepting the "separate

but equal" doctrine uncritically, although always applying
it in favor of complaining blacks.

After the Supreme

Court rejected "separate but equal," Wright gave state
and local officials the opportunity to fulfill their con
stitutional responsibilities voluntarily but refused to
accept defiance wrapped in the rhetoric of state sover
eignty.

To further the policy of desegregation, he went

so far as to issue injunctions against the entire State
legislature.

When his role in the controversy came to

an end, his interpretation of the equal protection require
ments of the Fourteenth Amendment had advanced beyond that
of the Supreme Court.

The political support and political

opposition which he generated directly affected the course
of his judicial career.

CHAPTER IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND CONTROVERSIES
OVER RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
Because of the manner in which he exercised the
discretion of his office to promote the value of racial
equality during the desegregation controversy in Louisiana,
J . Skelly Wright became a standard with which to compare
other members or prospective members of the federal judi
ciary.

The closer a judge approached the "Wright model,"

the easier became the work of Justice Department lawyers
in the Civil Rights Division.'*'

The further a nominee to

the federal bench departed from the "Wright model,” the
more likely he was to win the approval of Senator James
Eastland of Mississippi, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee.

Eastland asked Judge Frank Ellis, who

succeeded to Wright's District Judgeship, whether he
^In referring to Judge Ben C. Dawkins, Jr. of the
Western District of Louisiana, a Civil Rights Division
lawyer said, "We knew we didn't have a Skelly Wright or
a Frank Johnson." Quoted in Charles V. Hamilton,
"Southern Judges and Negro Voting Rightss The Judicial
Approach to Controversial Social Problems." Wisconsin Law
Review. CMLVI (Winter, 1965). 88 .
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l(ty
intended to pattern himself after Wright.

The same ques

tion had been put to Judge Robert Ainsworth at the hearing
on his nomination.'1'
Those who disapproved of the manner in which Wright
discharged his duties during the desegregation contro
versy in Louisiana used all the political leverage at
their disposal to prevent his elevation to the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

Because the Court of

Appeals for the Fifth Circuit hears appeals from the
District Courts in the states of the deep South, appoint
ment to that court would have considerably broadened
Wright's influence over desegregation policy.

He was

elevated instead to the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit.

In the District of Columbia, he

continued to act against racial discrimination, although
he did so as much through his off-the-bench activity as
through his decisions.

The blocked promotion to the

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit did not completely
remove Wright from racial discrimination cases, but they
were far less numerous in the District of Columbia Circuit
than in the Fifth Circuit.
"Hi.S. Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on the
Judiciary, "Hearing, Nomination of Frank B. Ellis to
be U.S. District Judge for the Eastern District of
Louisiana," (February 23* 1962), p. 7.
(Stenographic
transcript in files of Senate Judiciary Committee.)

io(5
The Politics of Promotion
The possibility that Wright's career would suffer
from his conscientious application of the principles of
the Brown decisions first became evident two years
before he was actually appointed to a higher court.

The

occasion was a debate on voting rights in the United
States Senate.

During the course of debate, Senator

Joseph Clark of Pennsylvania quoted from one of Wright’s
opinions, and Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois noted
that it had been affirmed by the Supreme Court.

Senator

Eastland of Mississippi remarked that one could not win
arguments by quoting candidates, and "Judge Wright wants
to be a Supreme Court Justice."1

Senator Douglas provoked

laughter in the Senate chamber when he facetiously
inquired whether that meant that the Senator from
Louisiana (Russell Long) and the Senator from Mississippi
(Eastland) had endorsed Wright.

Eastland answered that

his position on the Judiciary Committee prevented him
from commenting further except to say that Wright would
be treated fairly if nominated.

Douglas retorted, "All

I can say is that if he is appointed to the Supreme
Bench, then, in view of the present composition of the
Judiciary Committee, he is going to have a very rough
time."2
■hj.S., Congressional Record. 86th Cong., 2nd Sess.,
I960, CVI, Part 5, 5590.
2Ibid.
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Senator Clark was not yet ready to let the matter
drop.

He wanted proof that Wright was secretly a can

didate for a Supreme Court seat.

Eastland told Clark

that the proof would come if the nomination were made.
Until then, he made the statement on his "word as a
Senator."

Eastland did not stop there, however, but said

that some of Judge Wright's rulings were proof of his can
didacy.1
The Judge’s political opponents were even more numer
ous in the Louisiana legislature.

At one point, Repre

sentative W. K. Brown of Grant Parish said on the floor of
the House, "You are no God, Skelly Wright.
even a competent judge, Skelly Wright.

You are not

You are a traitor

to this state."2
When rumors again circulated that Wright was in line
for a promotion, this time to the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit,^members of the legislature attempted
to retaliate against him by opposing any promotion.^
Representative Wellborn Jack of Caddo Parish, described
as "a center of white supremacist opinion within the
legislature,"^led the attack against Wright.
^ b i d .. 5591.
2
Times-Picayune. November 16, i 960, p. 1.
3Ibid.. March 3 , 196I, p. 1.
k
State-Times. May 1 9 , I 96I, p. 9A.
3Pinney and Friedman, p. 12.

He blamed
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the Judge for everything from disregarding state sover
eignty to Shelby Jackson's asthma.

Jack said of the

resolution being debated in the Houses
When we pass this resolution, he won't have
a snowball's chance in Hell of getting promoted.
And I don't want our senators to say he should be
promoted to get him out of the way of doing harm.
He's the judge, the jury, the executioner—
the people in Washington are his bosses. Federal
Judges are supposed to be dignified.1
Jack did not speak for all members of the legisla
ture.

Judge Wright's expressions of antipathy toward

price-fixing had won a friend for him in the State House
of Representatives.

Representative John Schwegmann, J r . ,

of Jefferson Parish, who claimed to be as much a segre
gationist as anyone in the House, called attention to
his numerous appearances in Wright's court.

"I honestly

believe the judge makes the decisions as he sees the law
is written," he said.
"I have no animosity against the
o
judge."
But most members of the legislature did not
share Schwegmann's attitude.
While opposition in the State legislature alone
could not hurt Judge Wright's chances for advancement,
the opposition of the United States Senators from
Louisiana could be very damaging.

Senator Russell

Long, Wright's former student, was up for reelection in
•^State-Times. May 19, 1961, p. 9A.

2Ibid.
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1962 and so became accessible to the Judge's opponents.
Long was said to have warned the Kennedy Administration
that he would declare a Wright nomination to the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals personally obnoxious.

While

the Senator did not explicitly confirm the rumor, he did
say that he had worked had for the Administration and
expected to be consulted on appointments affecting his
state, and he unequivocally said, "I am not supporting
Skelly Wright."1
Allen J. Ellender, the senior Senator from
Louisiana, who was not then up for reelection, merely
went through the motions of opposing Wright.

He pre

sented the Senate with a memorial from the State legis
lature urging "the U.S. Senators from Louisiana to
oppose the confirmation by the U.S. Senate of the nom
ination of Judge J. Skelly Wright to fill any Federal
office or position of trust, including that of judge of
the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth
p
Circuit . . . ."
Ellender did not call special atten
tion to the petition.

He presented it at the same time

that he presented several others from the legislature.-^
^ e w York Times, June 1, 1961, p. 22.

2

Quoted in U.S., Congressional Record. 87th Cong.,
1st Sess., 1961, CVIX, Part 7, p. 9^01.
-Tbid. Other petitions called for imposition
of a duty on shrimp, the investment of revenue from the
tidelands off Louisiana's shores, and a commendation to
the State of Alabama for its defense of states' rights.
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While Louisiana's Senators opposed, with varying
degrees of intensity, any promotion for Wright, the
Judge was not without prestigeous sources of support.
Belying the myth that judges play only a passive role
in the appointment process, it has been reported that
Judges Tuttle and Wisdom advised Burke Marshall of the
Justice Department that Wright would he an excellent
choice to join them on the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit and that to deny him the promotion would
seem to he a punishment for his decisions.1

Although

the Judges did not state the case publicly, the New
York Times did when it editorialized that if Wright did
not get the appointment, it would he "a clear case of a
courageous judge being denied advancement for outp
rageous political reasons."
Yale University awarded
Wright an honorary Doctor of Laws degree at the same
time that it bestowed a similar award on Supreme Court
Justice Felix Frankfurter.-^

The following day, fifteen

Yale law professors expressed their support for Wright
in the fight over his promotion.

They said that they

did not support Wright because he rendered decisions
^ e e Victor Navasky, Kennedy Justice (New Yorkt
Atheneum, 1971), pp. 272-273.
2New York Times. June 3, 1961, p. 22.
3Ibid.. June 13, 1961, p. 38.
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that they liked hut because he had "a total aggregate of
judicial achievement” during his eleven years on the
bench.^
But one intensely motivated United States Senator
often carries more political weight than two circuit
judges, fifteen Yale law professors, and the New York
Times. especially when the Administration is not inclined
to put up a fight.

The Kennedy Administration studiously

avoided alienating important Southern Senators over
p
judicial appointments, and the nomination of Wright to
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit at a time when
Senator Long faced an election would certainly have been
displeasing to the Senator.

It did not become necessary

for Long to invoke the privilege of senatorial courtesy
because Wright did not receive the nomination to the
Fifth Circuit Court.
Although the Administration hoped to avoid antago
nizing important Senators, capitulation to segregationist
interests was no part of the Administration’s plans.
Denial of promotion to Wright would have been tantamount
to capitulation.

As a result, the seat on the Fifth Cir

cuit remained vacant for a time,^and, in early December
-Hrbid. . June 1^, 1961, p. 18.

2

See Navasky, ch. 5t "Southern Justice:
and the General," pp. 2^ 3 -276.

The Judges

•^The liberally oriented New Republic had considered
the nomination of anyone but Wright to the Fifth Circuit

Ill
of 1961, Deputy Attorney General Byron White approached
Wright with the offer of a seat on the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit.

Senatorial courtesy

could not be used to block appointment to that court, but
it appeared that such an appointment would remove Wright
from constitutional controversies involving racial dis
crimination.

After a few days of hesitation, he informed

White that he would accept, and on December 15» 1961,
President Kennedy announced Wright's nomination.

He would

fill a vacancy created by the retirement of Judge
E. Barrett Prettyman from the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit.1
When the nomination was announced, there was some
speculation that the Senate Judiciary Committee might make
2
the hearings on the nomination difficult for Wright.
The
anticipated difficulties, however, did not materialize.
Apparently Wright's political opponents were glad to get
him out of Louisiana and the Fifth Circuit and decided
against trying to obstruct this promotion.-'
Court as "unthinkable" and advocated leaving the position
vacant as long as Long and Eastland blocked Wright's
appointment. See "Standing by Wright," New Republic.
June 12, 1961, p. 7.
W e w York Times. December 16, 1961, p. 18; TimesPicavune. December 16, 1961, P* 1; Washington Post.
December 16, 1961, p. 1.
Washington Post. December 16, 1961, p. 1.
W r i g h t himself has referred to his having been
"kicked upstairs" in "Federal Courts and the Nature and
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A friendly subcommittee composed of Senators John A.
Carroll of Colorado and Philip Hart of Michigan was
assigned to conduct the hearing.

Senator Carroll, who

presided, noted that the Standing Committee on the Federal
Judiciary of the American Bar Association had given Wright
a rating of "exceptionally well qualified."'*'

The

Louisiana Bar Association and the New Orleans Bar Associ2
ation did not take official positions on the nomination,
nor did Louisiana's Senators.

Leander Perez, arch

segregationist from Plaquemines Parish, later criticized
Senator Long for not trying to block Wright's elevation to
the District of Columbia court.^

No one voiced opposition

to the nomination, but members of the District of Columbia
Quality of State Law," Wayne Law Review. XIII (Winter,
1967), p. 32^.
"Hj.S. Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on the
Judiciary, "Hearing, Nomination of J. Skelly Wright to be
United States Circuit Judge for the District of Columbia,"
(February 28, 1962), p. 2.
(Stenographic transcript in
files of Senate Judiciary Committee.) Although Wright
received the highest rating given by the ABA, that organi
zation has generally had a conservative influence on the
judicial selection process. See Grossman, Lawyers and
Judges. The role of the ABA has been criticized in Walter
Dean Burnham, "Kennedy's Court Appointments," Commonweal.
September 7, 1962, pp. ^ 88-^91.
2
This led Judge Wright's younger brother to resign
his membership in the New Orleans Bar Association. He
could not resign from the Louisiana Bar Association
because all Louisiana lawyers are members.
Interview:
James E. Wright, Jr.
•^Times-Picavune. April 11, 1962, p. 11.
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bar did speak in support of it .1

None was more compli

mentary to Wright than the Subcommittee Chairman himself.
He observed that Wright's "quiet courage" in carrying out
his duties as District Judge had "won the respect of
2
lawyers from all c o m e r s of this country."
Senator
Carroll indicated that he had read some of the Judge's
opinions, as well as one of his articles on pretrial
conferences, and he commended Wright’s legal scholarship.-^
, k
Senate confirmation came on March 28, 1962. It was the
same day that Wright rendered his decision in the Tulane
University case.
Before taking up his new post, he received congrat
ulations and praise from some quarters.

At a testimonial

in his honor held by the New Orleans chapter of the Fed
eral Bar Association, Wright said, "I leave with no
regrets.

I wouldn’t change a line of it."^

A few days

^"Senate Judiciary Subcommittee, "Hearing, Wright
Nomination to D. C. Circuit," pp. 4-10.

2Ibid., p. 16.
^Ibid. Wright's articles on pretrial conferences
are "Pre-trial on Trial," Louisiana Law Review, XIV
(February, 1954), 391-400; "The Pretrial Conference,"
Federal Rules Decisions. XXVIII (September-October, 1961),
141-158. See also "Open Forum* Evaluation of a Personal
Injury Case for Settlement Purposes* Opening Remarks,"
Insurance Counsel Journal. XXIII (July, 1956), 267-269.
4
U.S., Congressional Record. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess.,
1962, CVIII, Part 4, p. 5294.
Grimes-Picayune. April 3 , 1962, p. 14.
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later, the Co-ordinating Council of Greater New Orleans,
a civil rights group, presented the Judge with a plaque
describing him as "a distinguished jurist" and a "cham
pion of d e m o c r a c y . O n e of the most eloquent testimo
nials to Wright's service as a District Judge appeared in
the Negro press during Easter week.

In the words of the

editorial entitled "Judge Wright No Pontius Pilate":
The Christian world, significantly, can this
week compare Judge Wright with a public official
who lived some 1900 years ago but who in the most
critical decision of his career bowed to shouting
bloodthirsty mob. That official was the "fearless"
Roman procurator, Pontius Pilate, whose "handwashing"
episode is being related this week.
In modern times, numerous judges have used the
"Pilate" approach (political expediency) in hand
ling civil fights"cases. But not so with Judge
Wright .2
Recognition of his contribution to the cause of black
civil rights continued in Washington.

About a month after

Wright's arrival in the District of Columbia, Clarence
Clyde Ferguson, Jr. was sworn in as General Counsel to the
United States Commission on Civil Rights, and it was
Wright who administered the oath.

According to Ferguson,

"The reason for Judge Wright's presence was the fact that
he had been the most imaginative and innovative Judge

^Ibid. . April 12, 1962, p. 20; Louisiana Weekly
(New Orleans, La.), April 21, 1962, p. 3 .
o
Louisiana Weekly, April 21, 1962, Sec. 2, p. 6.
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sitting in the South during the critical years following
the decision in Brown vs. Board of Education."'*'
Off-the-Bench Activity
With the move to Washington, there was the possibil
ity of an abatement in Wright's interest in civil rights.
While he was a District Judge, he reacted against racial
discrimination in his official capacity.

During the New

Orleans school desegregation crisis, it was suggested
that perhaps his actions as District Judge did not repre
sent his personal convictions at all, but that he was
simply fulfilling the demands placed upon him by his
p
office, as he understood it.
That the Judge's interest in black civil rights did
not abate after his move to Washington indicates that he
is personally committed to racial equality.

When his

role as judge did not involve him in racial discrimination
cases, he focused his off-the-bench activity in that
direction.

Off-the-bench activity is, of course, assumed

to be a better indicator of personal conviction than judi
cial opinions.
■*Hon. Clarence Clyde Ferguson, Jr. , United States
Ambassador to Uganda, Letter of February 2^, 1971 to the
author.
2
See the biographical sketch of Judge Wright
entitled "Jurist in Racial Dispute," in the New York
Times. November 16 , I960, p. 23 . The sketch contains
factual errors.

116

After the move to Washington, Wright's off-the-bench
activity turned from the more technical aspects of law,
such as pretrial conferences and jurisdictional matters,1
to matters of broader public interest.

He defended the

Supreme Court's activist approach in various kinds of
civil rights cases, including those involving race.

He

described the activist approach as on in which the Court
attempts to act as the people's collective conscience,
calling upon them to live up to the principles which they
profess.

3

He defended Supreme Court decisions in the

field of racial equality as attempts by the Court to
secure freedom for all Americans:

freedom from experi

encing discrimination for blacks and freedom for whites
from having to live in a society in which discrimination
k
exists.
Wright denied that the Court's activism in
regard to civil rights posed any danger to democratic gov
ernment.

"Even some thinking men," he said,

^ e e his "Jurisdiction in the Tidelands," Tulane
Law Review. XXXII (February, 1958), 175-206; "Act 85-55^
of 1958 and the Disposal of the Judicial Power of the
United States," Louisiana Bar Journal. VI (August, 1958),
1^7-15^, also printed in Phi Delta Delta. XXXVII
(December, 1958), *1— 13.
^Wright, "The Role of the Courts: Conscience of a
Sovereign People," The Reporter. September 26, 1963* pp.
27-30. A^later and more thorough defense of judicial
activismis Wright, "The Role of the Supreme Court in a
Democratic Society— Judicial Activism or Restraint?"
Cornell Law Review. LIV (November, 1968), 1-28.
3

-^Reporter. September 26, 1963, p. 27.
^Ibid., p. 30 .

llfj
men of good will whose roots in the fight for
human freedom go very deep, deplore the leader
ship the current Supreme Court has given in the
fight for social and political justice. They
say they fear the role of judges. I say their
fears are foolish fancies. In expanding human
freedom, the judges have nothing to enforce their
rule but the conscience of America. And as long
as we are ruled by the informed and challenged ,
conscience of America, we have nothing to fear.
Wright believes that an important function of the
courts is to influence the normative content of law, and
he denied that the courts are obliged to be neutral in
relation to competing values.

He thinks the courts

should foster the best inspiration of the time and help
it to win general acceptance, with emphasis upon the
highest ideals of the community rather than the ideals
of the judges.

He assumes that decisions which reflect

only the values of the judges will fail to generate
support.

The pre-1937 Supreme Court performed badly

not because it was activist, but because it was inac
curate in its identification of community values.

Wright

has identified political equality as the most important
of comtemporary community ideals.

"The accuracy of this

perception gives the Court's equal protection pronouncep
ments their legitimacy," he has said.
In his off-the-bench activity, Judge Wright extended
the Supreme Court's equal protection pronouncements to
1I M d .
2"The Role of the Supreme Court," Cornell Law Review.
LIV (November, 1968), 1^.
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reach not merely de .jure segregation but also de facto
segregation.

On February 17, 1 965, he delivered the

sixth annual James Madison Lecture at New York University
Law School and was the first James Madison Lecturer who
was not a Supreme Court Justice.
"Public School Desegregation:

His lecture, entitled

Legal Remedies for De

Facto Segregation," was published in the New York Univer
sity Law Review.^and a similar article bearing the same
title appeared in the Western Reserve Law Review.

In

the lecture and articles, Wright argued for the end of
segregation even when it was not directly imposed by law.
He considered "the interdiction of all state statutes
compelling racial segregation . . . but a short first
step on the road to desegregation."-^

In attacking de

facto segregation, he made it clear that he considers
segregation a national, not solely a Southern, problem.
It is appropriate to examine Wright's off-the-bench
views on de facto segregation because he was soon faced
with the problem in his official capacity.

An important

part of his approach to de facto segregation was the
assumption that education is essentially a state function.
He had first expressed this view in the Tulane University
1XL (April, 1965). 285-309.
2XVI (May, 1965)1 ^78-501.
% e w York University Law Review. XL (April, 1965),
289.
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case (see pp. 97-100), and he continued to hold that
opinion.

Wright expressed his agreement with a Federal

District Judge in Massachusetts that
Education is tax supported and compulsory, and
public school educators, therefore, must deal
with inadequacies within the educational system
as they arise, and it matters not that the
inadequacies are not of their making. This is
not to imply that the neighborhood school policy
per se is unconstitutional, but that it must be
abandoned or modified when it results in segre
gation in fact.1
Wright contended that the states had a hand in cre
ating most situations in which de facto segregation
exists.

The states' housing policies encouraged private

discrimination and created segregated neighborhoods, or
the states' permitting job discrimination depressed the
socio-economic status of blacks, driving them into the
ghettos.

The neighborhood school and the historical

gerrymandering of school attendance districts then re
sulted in de facto segregation.2

"Thus," said Wright, "in

most of the school cases arising from the metropolitan
areas, it should not be necessary to reach the issue of
whether adventitious de facto segregation, without more,
is unconstitutional.
•^Barksdale v. Springfield School Comm.. 237 F.Supp.
53^» 5^6 (D. Mass. 19^5), quoted in Western Reserve Law
Review. XVI (May, 1965)» ^95.
2Ibid., ^ 83-W .
•^Ibid., ^85; New York University Law Review. XL
(April, 1965), 293.
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According to Wright, the extent to which judges find
unconstitutional state action behind de facto segregation
usually depends upon whether the judge is satisfied with
the status quo.

If he is satisfied, he ascribes the

de facto segregation to neutral causes.

"As I read

these de facto segregation cases from the North and West,"
commented Wright,
I must confess to a little amusement. After
watching, from close range, some of my judicial
brethren in the South twisting and turning and
reaching for a result in race cases that will
not upset the status quo or the local power
structure, it seems that now I may be treated
to what appear to be similar performances by my
brethren in other parts of the country.i
Wright was himself capable of doing a bit of reaching
in order to bring the Fourteenth Amendment into play.

He

indicated that a de facto segregated slum school coupled
with a compulsory school attendance law was enough to
constitute denial of equal protection of the laws.

His

reasoning was that the slum dweller is unable to afford a
private school; therefore, the law which merely requires
him to send his child to school, in reality requires him
o
to send his child to a segregated slum school.
Wright’s position was that whenever an otherwise
legitimate state educational policy, such as neighborhood

29^.

“h^ew York University Law Review. XL (April, 1965 ),

2
Ibid., 296: Western Reserve Law Review. XVI (Mav.
1965) .“T O .

1231

schools and compulsory school attendance laws, results in
segregated schools, the policy cannot he constitutionally
justified as long as basically the same educational goals
could have been accomplished by another method which
would not result in segregation.1

He went so far as to

suggest that the courts are not helpless to deal with de
facto segregation even when political boundaries separat
ing central cities from suburbs are involved.

Said

Wright, "The political thicket, having been pierced to
protect the vote, can likewise be pierced to protect the
education of children."

While admitting that the final

word on de facto segregation would have to come from the
Supreme Court, he pointed out that the first words would
come from lower courts.

"Before the Supreme Court acts,"

he said, "some other federal courts no doubt will take a
harder look at de facto segregation and will be less
inclined to accept the suggestion that the state and its
^ e w York University Law Review, XL (April, 1965),
297.
^Western Reserve Law Review. XVI (May, 19&5)* ^98.
Some years later, Judge Robert J. Merhige, Jr., attempted
to pierce the political thicket and ordered into effect a
desegregation plan which merged the school systems of
suburban Henrico and Chesterfield Counties with the school
system of the City of Richmond, Virginia. Bradley v.
School Board of the City of Richmond. 338 F.Supp. 67
(E.D. Va. 1972). Judge Merhige was reversed by the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, ^62 F.2d 1058 (1972),
and the reversal stood when the Supreme Court divided
evenly (Justice Powell did not participate) on the issue,
k l Z U.S. 92 (1973).
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agencies are not, in some degree at least, responsible
for it and helpless to correct it."'1'
De Facto Segregation in the
District of Columbia
Through an unusual set of circumstances, only a
year after the James Madison Lecture and the law review
articles on de facto segregation, Judge Wright himself
became one of the lower court judges to take a harder look
<1® facto segregation, this time in his official capa
city.

Suit was brought by Julius Hobson, a black civil

rights activist, charging the District of Columbia Board
of Education and Superintendent of Schools, Carl F.
Hansen, with racial discrimination in the administration
of District of Columbia public schools, including failure
2
to comply with the requirements of Bolling v. Sharpe,
the case in which the Supreme Court banned legally
imposed segregation in the District of Columbia.

The

alleged means of discrimination were the "track system"
(to be discussed below), gerrymandering of school atten
dance districts, and preferential treatment for predomi
nantly white schools in the use of funds.

Hobson also

charged discrimination against black teachers and admin
istrative personnel.
^New York University Law Review. XL (April,
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Under normal circumstances, a Federal District Judge
would have presided.

The District Judges, however, were

involved in the suit, since it was they who, according
to law, appointed the members of the Board of Education.^
Because of the involvement of the District Judges, Wright
was designated to sit as a District Judge pursuant to
2
federal law.
The law requiring the District Judges to appoint
school board members was itself under constitutional
challenge in a separate case.

Wright decided that because

neither side's arguments on the constitutionality of the
law were frivolous, a three-judge court should be con
vened to decide the matter.-^
As a member of that three-judge court, Wright's
initial action against the educational status quo in the
District of Columbia was aimed at the method of selecting
school board members.

Unlike the majority, who saw no

conflict with the separation of powers doctrine, Judge
Wright considered the appointment of school board members
Amendment was inapplicable because it applies only to
states.
X31 D.C. Code, Sec. 101 (a) (1961).
228 U.S.C., Sec. 291 (c). The law provides that
"The chief judge of a circuit or the circuit justice may,
in the public interest, designate and assign temporarily
any^circuit judge within the circuit, including a judge
designated and assigned to temporary duty therein, to hold
a district court in any district within the circuit."
% o b s o n v. Hansen. 252 F.Supp. ^ (D.D.C. 1966).

clearly an executive function.

He noted that interest

groups made recommendations on appointees, and the
District Court had been commended and rebuked in the
press for its choices.^

"If selection of the Board of

Education is to be a responsible act," he observed, "the
agency charged with appointment must inform itself of the
positions of the many candidates on the various questions
of educational policy and at least begin to make its own
decisions on where educational wisdom lies."

Ironically,

the Judge has himself been criticized for basing judicial
decisions on his conception of where educational wisdom
lies.^
It was not long, however, before Judge Wright's dis
sent bore fruit, although not the constitutional variety.
His brethren apparently found some merit in his argument
that even when there is no denial of due process, it is
"incongruous with the integrity of the judicial process"
when judges decide controversies involving their own
appointees, since there should be the appearance of jusL
tice as well as the fact.
In 196? the Judicial Conference
^Hobson v. Hansen. 265 F.Supp. 902, 923-92*1(D.D.C. 1967).
2Ibid. , 92*1-.
^See comments of Senator Sam Ervin on February 10 and
March 25» 1970. U.S., Congressional Record. 91st Cong.,
2nd Sess., CXVI, 3107. 928*1-.
^265 F.Supp. 902, 931.
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petitioned Congress to remove the appointing power from
the District Court,^and Congress responded by making the
2
Board of Education elective.
Regardless of how the Board of Education was chosen,
there were still the discrimination issues to be decided.
Chief Judge David Bazelon denied Hobson's motion that the
discrimination issues be decided by a three-judge court
and left the matter to Wright sitting alone as a District
Judge.^
The trial to decide the discrimination issues was
a lengthy one.

It began in mid-July of 1966 and Wright

did not render his decision until mid-June of the follow
ing year.

In the intervening period, a tremendous amount

of testimony and data became a part of the record.

Much

of it came from Carl Hansen, Superintendent of Schools in
the District of Columbia, and one of the defendants in the
suit.

Hansen was called "the architect of the track

system," the system of ability grouping used in the public
schools of the District.

He had once described the

objectives of the track system as twofold:
education and quality education.

equality of

Hansen explained:

^See Appendix I of Judge Danaher's dissent in
Smuck v. Hobson. ^08 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
282 Stat. 101 (1968).
^Hobson v. Hansen. 256 F.Supp. 18 (I966).
h,

Washington Post. July 20, 1966, p. C 2.
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Equality of educational opportunity and
quality education are relative rather than absolute
concepts. They have meaning only in relation to
the characteristics of the learner and the educa
tional content he needs to become capable of quality
performance at his level of ability .1
While no one questioned the theoretical justification
for ability grouping, Julius Hobson argued that the track
system of Washington was in practice a device for insuring
the physical separation of blacks and whites, since most
of the children in the lower tracks were black.

Elimina

tion of the track system and optional zones, districts
which provided students with alternative schools to
2
attend, would be a way of eliminating de facto segregatioa
It might also result in an exodus of whites from the pub
lic schools of the District of Columbia, since Hansen
expressed the belief that there is a tendency for whites
to flee to the suburbs when black enrollment reaches forty
or fifty per cent.

Harold Howe, United States Commission

er of Education, testified that he believed Hansen correct.^

In the midst of the trial, the defense moved that

Wright disqualify himself on grounds that his New York
■^Carl F. Hansen, The Four-Track Curriculum in Today's
High Schools (Englewood Cliffs, N.J . t
Prentice-Hall,
1 # ) , p. 50.
2
For trial testimony on optional zones, see
Washington Post. October, 7, 1966, p. A 12, and
October 11, 1966, p. B 1.
-^Ibid.. August 5» 1966, p. A 1.

University Law Review article was evidence of prejudice.
He denied the motion, and the Court of Appeals sustained
his decision.^
The trial ended on October 25, 1966, and Wright
2
took the discrimination issues under advisement.
Before
he rendered his decision, even before the conclusion of
the trial, Julius Hobson's suit had begun to bear politi
cal fruit.

The Board of Education, with three new mem

bers, ordered school administrators to adopt different
methods of classroom organization "with all possible
speed."

The Board called for innovative teaching methods,

as well as the bussing of entire classes from overcrowded
de facto segregated schools to underutilized schools, and
the integration of the children into other classes at the
destination schools.

How expeditiously and effectively

the new policy would be implemented depended to a consid
erable extent on the cooperation of Carl Hansen, who was
not used to having the Board tell him what to do.^

Hansen

later indicated that he considered the Board's resolution
ambiguous, and that he had no intention of dismantling the
track system until ordered to do so in clear, unmistakable
^See Smuck v. Hobson. 4-08 F.2d 175» 182-183
(D.C. Cir. 1969).
^Washington Post. October 26, 1966, p. B 2.
^Ibid., August 11, 1966, pp. A 1, F

12$
terms.

1

In any case, Julius Hobson was unwilling to rely

upon voluntary changes and indicated that he would not
drop his suit.

He wanted a legal ruling on the track

system and other alleged discriminatory practices because
of the effect that a decision in his favor might have on
de facto segregation in other areas of the country.
When the decision came on June 19, 1967* it was in
Hobson's favor.
Wright's opinion.

If the trial was lengthy, so was Judge
In it he concluded that the Superin

tendent of Schools and the Board of Education had
deprived black children and poor children generally of
equal educational opportunity with white and affluent

r>

children , J

The opinion was in many respects similar to

his James Madison Lecture and law review articles.
Wright did not say that de facto segregation was,
of itself, unconstitutional.

But he did say, "Once nearly

complete segregation is shown in a school system in which
de jure segregation had formerly been the rule, when chal
lenged the burden falls on the school board to show that
the observed segregation stems from the application of
W a r l F. Hansen, Danger in Washington: The Story
of My Twenty Years in the Public Schools in the NationKs
Capital (West Nvack. N. Y . t
Parker Publishing Co., 1968),
p . 2 04-.
Washington Post. August 16 , 1966, p. C 2.
^Hobson v. Hansen. 269 F.Supp. ^01 (D.D.C. 196?).
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racially neutral policies."'5' Superintendent Hansen and
the defendants in the suit attributed the existing segre
gation to the racially neutral neighborhood school policy,
which had been adopted for its educational value.

Al

though the plaintiffs asserted that it had been adopted
for an unconstitutional purpose, Judge Wright noted that
they had no proof of this and conceded that the neighbor
hood school policy had indeed been adopted in good faith
for its assumed educational value.
dence of another policys

But he also found evi

that whites should not be com

pelled to attend predominantly black schools.

When this

policy conflicted with the neighborhood school policy, the
latter often, although not always, yielded.
Evidence of this second policy— that whites need not
attend predominantly black neighborhood schools— was the
existence of "optional zones."

Students living in these

optional zones were permitted to attend their neighborhood
school or another specified school, often located far from
their neighborhood.

The avowed purpose of optional zones,

to give all students in such zones the opportunity for an
integrated education, left Wright completely unconvinced.
"Since 1954 the administration has carved optional zones
for race-oriented reasons," he observed, "only where
significant islands of whites are found, never in

^ b i d ., 417.
2Ibid., 417-419.
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neighborhoods which lack white enclaves, never . . .

in

the almost exclusively Negro neighborhoods . . . .1,1
It was obvious that these optional zones were not
instruments of integration as claimed, but rather were
instruments of resegregation. The remedy was to abolish
2
them.
The neighborhood school policy itself, Wright left
untouched.

"Because of the 10 to one ratio of Negro to

white children in the public schools of Washington and
because the neighborhood school policy is accepted and is
in general use throughout the United States, the court is
not barring its use here at this time," said the Judge .3
While accepting the neighborhood school policy, he
did find that there was faculty segregation in the
staffing of the neighborhood schools.

Racially homo

geneous schools had faculties that matched the racial com
position of the student bodies.

The burden of proving

that this resulted from racially neutral policies was
placed upon the defendants, but they were unable to furII

nish the requisite proof.
As for the allocation of resources among the schools,
Wright found that schools attended by blacks, particularly
poor blacks, usually received less.

To reach this conclu

sion, he simply followed the approach used by the courts
^Ibid., k l 6 .

2See the Decree at Ibid.. 517-518.

3Ibid.. 515.

^Ibid., ^ 22-^31 .

X3m
in pre-Brown segregation cases and considered the actual
distribution of quantifiable things.^

In focusing specif

ically on the availability of kindergarten, he noted that
it was dependent upon available space, and that there was
space in underutilized white schools but not in over
crowded black schools.

To remedy this, school author

ities permitted a child to go to any school in the city
with available space, but the parents had to provide
transportation.

As a result, many black children did not

get to attend kindergarten at all or, if they did, went
o
in two-hour shifts.
Wright might have excused the inequality on the
grounds that there was no deliberate racial or economic
discrimination, but he is no defender of the status quo
and considers effect a more important factor than intent.
In his words:
The causes of the inequalities are relatively
objective and impersonal. School officials can
be faulted, but for another reason: that in the
face of these inequalities they have sometimes
shown little concern. It is one thing, to be
precise, when crowded residential conditions shut
Negro children, and them alone, out of kinder
garten in the nearby schools? it is something
else when school authorities acquiesce in the
situation once it arises by standing passively
by, circulating promises of more adequate school
buildings years hence.3
The Judge's remedy was not the same as that of the school
^-Ibid.. ^ 32-^39.
3Ibid.. k k l - k k 2 .

2Ibid.. ^ 39 .
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authorities.

In order to alleviate overcrowding in black

schools and provide integrated education for those who
wanted it, he required the school system to provide
bussing for those who chose to use it.'*’
The most controversial part of Judge Wright's
lengthy opinion concerned the "track system," the system
devised by Carl Hansen for grouping students according
to ability.

Wright conceded that Superintendent Hansen

had not devised the track system as a mere subterfuge for
circumventing the requirements of the Bolling decision
but had attempted to cope with the real problem of
bringing numerous educationally retarded black children
into a unitary school system.^

Nevertheless, Wright
k
ordered the track system abolished and received strong
criticism for that decision.^
^Ibid., 514.

2Ibid.. 442-492.

3Ibid.. 442.

^See Decree at Ibid., 517-518*
^Professor Philip Kurland of the University of
Chicago asserted that the decision would only "assure
that the brighter students receive no better education
within the system than the other students." "Equal
Educational Opportunity: The Limits of Constitutional
Jurisprudence Undefined," University of Chicago Law
Review. XXXIV (1968), 583* quoted in Burger dissent,
Smuck v. Hobson. 408 F.2d 175. 197 (1968). Similarly,
Senator Sam Ervin of North Carolina criticized Wright
for reading into the Constitution a prohibition on
school boards offering to teach bright and diligent
students more than they teach dull and lazy students.
See U.S., Congressional Record. 91st Cong., 2nd Sess.,
CXVI, 3107, 928*1-.
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The criticism would have been well taken had Judge
Wright held all systems of ability grouping unconstitu
tional; however, he did not do so.

He merely held uncon

stitutional systems of ability grouping which do not pro
vide compensatory education to disadvanteged children and
thus deny them equal educational opportunity.^
He specifically attacked the track system of
Washington because it was weighted against poor blacks.
Placement tests were administered to children in the first
grade, yet many poor blacks had never had an opportunity
to attend kindergarten, which put them at a distinct
disadvantage.

Even if a black child scored high, many

black elementary schools had no "honors track."

As a

result, the bright black child might be denied an education equal to that of the gifted white child.

"Conse

quently," said Wright, "the court is persuaded that the
prevalence of disadvantaged Negroes in the lower tracks
and the prevalence of the white and more affluent students
in the upper tracks is to a significant extent linked to
these disparities in course offerings ."3

One of the

Judge's major objections to the track system was that once
children were placed in the lower tracks they ordinarily
did not receive the remedial education that they should
It
have received.
1269 F.Supp. 401, 514.

2Ibid., 469.

3Ibid.,

^Ibid., 469-470.
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Judge Wright considered that the track system of
Washington denied poor blacks equal protection of the
laws, binding in the District of Columbia through the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.

In eluci

dating the requirements of equal protection, Wright said*
Orthodox equal protection doctrine can be encap
sulated in a single rule* government action which
without justification imposes unequal burdens or
awards unequal benefits is unconstitutional. The
complaint that analytically no violation of equal
protection vests unless the inequalities stem from
a deliberately discriminatory plan is simply false.
Whatever the law was once, it is a testament to our
maturing concept of equality that, with the help of
Supreme Court decisions in the last decade, we now
firmly recognize that the arbitrary quality of
thoughtlessness can be as disastrous and unfair to
private rights and the public interest as the
perversity of a willful scheme.1
A possible effect of Wright's equal protection
interpretation was the flight of white students to private
schools.

The Judge did not overlook that possibility, but

he denied that discriminatory treatment was an acceptable
means of keeping them in the public school system.

His

position received some support from within the civil
rights movement.^
^Tbid., 4-9?.

2Ibid.. 501.

^Robert L. Carter, General Counsel of the NAACP,
agreed that an exodus of whites did not justify refusal
to apply the law. Carter said, "In practical terms, the
presence of white students in the system in isolated
enclaves of educational affluence does nothing to further
the educational advantages of Negro children." "The Law
and Racial Equality in Education," Journal of Negro
Education. XXXVII (Summer, 1968), 208.
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In addition to commentary on the abolition of the
track system, Judge Wright was criticized in more general
terms for treading beyond the bounds of judicial compe
tence by usurping the function of school officials and
making a decision which courts lacked the resources to
enforce.^

But as Justice Robert Jackson pointed out long

before Hobson's case, judges act in these matters not by
virtue of their educational competence but by virtue of
their commissions.

Nor was it necessary for the court

to have resources for implementing the decision alone.
As one political scientist has observed, the courts are
not alone as they once were.

Other agencies of govern

ment have shown a willingness to cooperate with the courts
in desegregation cases.^
See Alexander M. Bickel, "Skelly Wright's Sweeping
Decision," New Republic. July 8 , 1967, pp. 11-12, Sim
ilar to Bickel's article and relying heavily on it is that
of Aaron Cohodes, "Who Can Perform What the Courts
Promise?" Nation's Schools. LXXX (August, 1967)* 31* For
the position of the American Association of School Admin
istrators, see "The Courts: Appeal of De Facto Segrega
tion Decision," School & Society. XCV (November 11, 1967),
40 6 , 1408.
2
See Robert J. Steamer, "The Role of Federal District
Courts in the Segregation Controversy," Journal of
Politics, XXII (August, i 960), 14-38.

3

-'See Clement Vose, "School Desegregation: A Politi
cal Scientist’s View," Affirmative Desegregation: Efforts
to Overcome De Facto Segregation in Urban Schools, eds.
Roscoe Hill and Malcolm Feeley (Beverly Hills, Calif.:
Sage Publications, 1968), p. 147.
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While Judge Wright's decision was unquestionably con
troversial, ^he did not stand alone.

Since the school

board had begun to make changes even before he rendered
his decision, he knew that he would not be facing a recal
citrant school board.

Far from being recalcitrant, the

Board of Education registered its acceptance of the
decision by voting not to appeal and ordering Superintendent Hansen not to appeal in his official capacity.
Even though the school board did not appeal the con
troversial decision, Judge Wright made no attempt to avoid
review, with the possibility of reversal.

He permitted

Carl Hansen, after his resignation as Superintendent df
Schools, to intervene in the suit along with a dissenting
member of the school board and a number of parents.

He

did this although he denied that either Hansen or the
school board member as individuals had a strong enough
interest in the decision to warrant intervention, and even
the parents did not show how their interests were affected.
He permitted them to intervene in order to give the Court
of Appeals an opportunity for review.3

Subsequently, a

^Besides being criticized for what he did, he was
also criticized for what he did not do. One law review
faulted him for failing to order the abolition of the
neighborhood school policy. Comment, "Constitutional
Law— Equal Protection— Discrimination in Public School
Education," Iowa Law Review. LIII (August, I968), 1184—

H88.
2See Hobson v. Hansen. 4-4- F.R.D. 18 (D.D.C. 1968).
3Ibid.

closely divided Court of Appeals left Judge Wright's
decree intact."*'

By that time, Julius Hobson was an

elected member of the Board of Education, and from that
position he worked to correct deficiencies in the District
2
of Columbia school system.
The Gaston County Case
As Judge Wright interpreted the Constitution to
require equal educational opportunity, so he interpreted
the Voting Rights Act of 1965-^as prohibiting literacy
tests when equal educational opportunity had been denied.
The occasion was a case entitled Gaston County v. United
States.

It

It arose when Gaston County, North Carolina,

sought to have the Voting Rights Act's ban on literacy
tests lifted by securing a declaratory judgment from the
District Court for the District of Columbia that no "test
or device" within the meaning of the Act had been used
during the previous five years for the purpose or with the
effect of denying the right to vote because of race.
The three-judge District Court refused to lift the
ban, and Wright, for the majority, reasoned that blacks
1Smuck v. Hobson, 4-08 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969). One
of the dissenters was Judge Burger, later to become Chief
Justice of the United States.
^Washington Post. May 28, 1969, p. C 2; May 29, 1969,
p. A 1; May 31» 1969* p. E 1.
% 2 U.S.C., Secs. 1973 ©"t seq.

^288 F.Supp. 678 (D.D.C. I 968).
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in the county were educationally disadvantaged.

Under

the circumstances, even without discriminatory intent,
the Judge considered that literacy tests would have a
discriminatory effect.^

The legislative history of the

Voting Rights Act revealed that Attorney General Nicholas
Katzenbach had advocated suspension of literacy tests
because to do otherwise "would produce a real constitu
tional irony— that years of violation of the l^th Amend
ment right to equal protection through equal education
would become the excuse for continuing violation of the
p
15th Amendment right to vote."
Judge Gasch, in a concurring opinion, argued that
the Government had merely shown the potentially discrimin
atory effect of unequal education and literacy tests but
had not shown that the actual effect of the relatively
simple literacy test of Gaston County would be discrim
inatory.^

Judge Wright’s answer was that the Government

had met its obligation by showing even a potentially
discriminatory effect.

The burden of proving that the

potential effect was not actual rested on Gaston County,
which did not meet its obligation.1'*'
^ b i d .. 686-687.
2
U.S., House of Representatives, Hearings Before
Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary
89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), P. 16, quoted at Ibid., 686.
3Ibid., 692.
^Ibid.. 688, n. 16.
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Although the Gaston County case did not receive as
much notice as Hobson v. Hansen, it did not completely
escape criticism.

The Greensboro (North Carolina) Daily

News criticized Wright's "far-fetched reasoning."

He was

also accused of being "result-oriented" and willing to
bend the law to reach a desired result.

Senator Sam

Ervin had the Greensboro newspaper's editorial reprinted
in the Congressional Record.1
But to many judges, Supreme Court approval outweighs
the disapproval of a newspaper or even of a United States
Senator.

The Supreme Court approved of Judge Wright's

opinion and affirmed it by an eight to one vote.

That

Justice Harlan, one of the leading proponents of judicial
restraint, was spokesman for the Supreme Court majority
attests to the persuaveness of Wright's opinion.

Harlan's

reasons for affirmance were "substantially the reasons
given by the majority of the District Court."3

He looked

to the legislative history of the Voting Rights Act,
k
quoting Katzenbach as Wright had done.
Harlan also took
notice of substantial evidence of the inequality of edu
cational opportunity afforded blacks in Gaston County.-*
■‘■U.S., Congressional Record. 91st Cong., 1st Sess.,
CXV, Part 13, (June 30, 19^9), 17,705.
2Gaston County v. United States. 395 U.S. 285 (1969).

3Ibid.. 288.
-*Ibid., 291.

^Ibid.

The language of Harlan's opinion was said to be "as
sweeping as the Constitution itself."*
was virtually a paraphrase of Wright's.

But his language
In spite of

the blocked promotion to the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, Judge Wright was still able to influence
the direction of the law in regard to racial equality.
He promoted equal access to the ballot and was in the
vanguard of the judicial attack on de facto segregation.
However, the bulk of his work in the District of Columbia
pointed in other directions.

^Washington Post. June 3, 1 969, p. A 1.

CHAPTER V
COURT OF APPEALS:

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

After Judge Wright cleared the political hurdles
obstructing his promotion, he found that the nature of
his work was considerably changed.

Besides assuming a

new function— that of appeals court judge— he found the
change reflected in the nature of the cases which required
his attention.

An increased amount of his time and energy

had to be channeled in the direction of criminal pro
cedure.

He had had experience with criminal procedure as

a District Judge, but after his promotion, it became the
major part of his work.
One of the reasons for the heavy criminal case load
of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia is
that the court and the courts which it supervises are not
located within a state.

In other circuits, most criminal

offenses are violations of state laws.

Trials for those

offenses take place within state judicial systems, and
appeals are directly to the United States Supreme Court,
thus bypassing the lower federal courts.

In most circuits,

criminal cases are confined to habeas corpus proceedings
and violations of federal laws.

1*U
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However, since the national government is responsible
for governing the District of Columbia, all criminal
trials in the District take place within the federal judi
cial system.

Besides performing the normal functions of a

Court of Appeals, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia also performs functions which in other circuits
are performed by the highest court of a state.

In this

respect, Wright's position on the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit may be compared with that of
an associate justice on a state supreme court.

It is a

position which has required him to devote himself to crim
inal law and procedure to a greater extent than in the past.
In addition to the unusual jurisdiction of the court
on which Judge Wright sits, the heavy criminal case load
has also reflected the high crime rate.

Judge Wright has

viewed the high crime rate as a product of poverty com
pounded by discrimination— conditions which have bred dis
respect for law.

In his off-the-bench writing, he has

exposed bias against the poor within the legal system
which has contributed to this disrespect.

Slumlords are

usually permitted to take long periods to make repairs to
their property but do not spend as much as a day in jail
for violating building codes.1

Yet the poor are arrested

on such charges as public drunkeness and vagrancy and
1J. Skelly Wright, "The Courts Have Failed the Poor,"
New York Times Magazine (March 9* 19^9)» P*

1^3
experience the assembly-line justice of police courts, but
are denied adequate police protection for their neighbor
hoods.

"This is why the criminal law is perceived by the

poor," says Judge Wright, "not as protection for life and
property, but as the establishment's tool of oppres
sion . . . ."■*■ He points out that even Supreme Court
decisions securing the rights of indigents in criminal
proceedings provide no help for individuals who are
harassed by illegal searches and arrests unless actually
tried for a crime and found guilty.
If the crime rate is to take a downward turn, Wright
believes that wide-ranging social reforms are necessary.
He calls for nothing less than the elimination of slums.^
That, of course, is beyond his power.

In his role as

appellate judge, however, he can and has attempted to pro
tect the constitutional rights of all persons accused of
crime.

As he put it in another of his many off-the-bench

writings:
The Bill of Rights protects all of us or
none of us. There is no middle ground. And the
sooner the "nice people" realize this, the sooner
the police will also, since they merely reflect
1I M d . , p. 100.
2Ibid.. p. 26 .
Ibid. Also see his "Crime in the Streets and the
New McCarthyism," New Republic. CLIII (October 9, I965),
10-11; "Poverty, Minorities, and Respect for Law," Duke
Law Journal. CMLXX (June, 1970), ^25-^51.
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the community consensus. When the community
wants law enforcement according to law, it will
have it.1
The Fourth Amendment
Judge Wright believes that one of the functions of
2
the appellate process is to curb official lawlessness;
therefore, it is hardly surprising that he has vigorously
enforced the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against unrea
sonable search and seizure and has used the exclusionary
rule to that end.

The normal method for protecting

against unconstitutional intrusions is for law enforce
ment officials to secure a search warrant by convincing
a judicial officer that the contemplated search is
reasonable.

Under the terms of the Fourth Amendment, the

warrant is to describe "the place to be searched, and the
person or things to be seized."

To Judge Wright, devia

tion from this procedure is not necessarily unconstitu
tional but is highly suspect.
Although Wright has participated in decisions sus
taining the admission at trial of evidence obtained with
out a search warrant but incident to lawful arrests,-^he
^■"Criminal Law and the Bill or Rights," The Reporter.
June 3, 1965» p. 24.
^J.Skelly Wright, "Judge's Views The News Media
and Criminal Justice," American Bar Association Journal.
L (December, 1964), 1129.

3

^See for example Staples v. United States. 327 F.2d
860 (D.D. Cir. 1963) cert, denied, 376 U.S. 957 (1963);
United States v. Cunningham. 424 F.2d 942 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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at a different time and place than the arrest of its occu
pants was prohibited.

In Harris v. United States,^he

relied on Preston to reject a government argument that a
car used in a robbery was a instrument of the crime and
could be treated like any other evidence seized at the
time of the arrest; that is, it could be examined later.
Wright's counter argument was
If an automobile used as an instrumentality
of crime can be subjected to a general search
without a warrant at the pleasure of the police,
a home said to be so used could be subjected to
the same treatment. The automobile, like the home,
is a repository of the "papers and effects" of
"the people" as contemplated in the Fourth Amend
ment. Both may be used as instrumentalities of
crime, but both may be searched only after
obtaining a search warrant or at the time2and
place of a lawful arrest of the occupant.
The Harris case represented one of the rare occasions
when Wright was reversed.

On rehearing, the Court of

Appeals en banc avoided the government's instrumentality
theory and merely decided that there had been no search,
only an inventory.-^

Since the rehearing had been granted

^ V O F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1966).

2Ibid., 483.
% h e situation was that the appellant's car was
identified as the getaway car in a robbery. Some hours
after the robbery, the car was found in front of the
appellant's home, and he was arrested as he was getting
into the car. He was taken to the police station, and
his car was towed there. After its arrival at the sta
tion, the arresting officer, pursuant to a police regula
tion, went out to inventory the car for valuables and to
roll up the windows because it had begun to rain. When
he opened one of the doors, he found a registration card
belonging to the robbery victim on the door jamb. It was
later used in evidence.

1^7
because of the government’s instrumentality theory, Wright
protested the court’s disposal of the case without taking
it up.

When the issue was not considered, he thought

that the order granting the rehearing should have been
vacated as improvidently granted and the panel opinion—
his opinion— reinstated.'1' Like other judges, he obviously
dislikes being reversed, and to Wright, it does not happen
often.
But reversal is an essential part of the judicial
process, and Judge Wright's trenchant dissents were aimed
at having his brethren reversed when he thought they
failed to protect the privacy which the Fourth Amendment
was intended to safeguard.

While he objected to the

search of an automobile without a warrant, he objected to
the search of a home even with a warrant, if the warrant
were issued without probable cause.

When police deviated

from the usual procedure of establishing the presence
of narcotics and relied upon the unsubstantiated word of
an informer, Wright took the position that the United
States Commissioner had erred in issuing the warrant.
Although his brethren would not "second-guess” the
1370 F.2d 477, ^79.
2
The procedure is outlined in Jones v. United States.
353 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (per curiam). It consists
of the police searching the cooperating informant for
money or narcotics. After establishing that he has neither
on his person, he is goven money to make a purchase. When
he returns with the narcotics, he is again searched to be
sure that the money is not still on his person.
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Commissioner, "For me," said Wright,
there is not here the kind of trustworthy showing
which should he made before a home is invaded.
The protective wall around the home erected by
the Fourth Amendment may not so easily be breached.
The temptation to relax constitutional safeguards
when dealing with sordid dope offenders is great.
But, in my judgment, it is a temptation that must
be resisted lest the Fourth Amendment become a
rubber yardstick in the hands of the police.1
The Fourth Amendment relates to the seizure of
persons as well as of things, and many arrests are made
without warrants but with probable cause.

On numerous

occasions, Judge Wright has voted to affirm convictions
following arrests without warrant either because the issue
o
was not raised in the court below, or because there had
been probable cause for arrest . J
Although Wright has been willing to sanction arrests
without a warrant, it is clear that he would prefer to
have arresting officers secure an arrest warrant when it
is practical for them to do so, even if the law does not
require it.

A warrant is necessary to search a building,

but an arrest on probable cause may be made without a war
rant, even if there is time to get one.

In Ford v.

United States, Wright expressed his disapproval of this
~*~Irbv v. United States, 314 F.2d 253t 256 (D.C. Cir.

1963) (dissent’H
2Gray v. United States. 311 F.2d 126 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
-^Williams v. United States. 308 F.2d 327 (1962)?
Ford v. United States. 352 F.2d 927 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
Hagan v. United States. 364 F.2d 669 (D.C. Cir. 1966)5
Bailev v. United States. 389 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1967);

149
dichotomy between search and arrest.

It was his view

that the law was in flux and might very well change, thus
discouraging a practice which he considers both disrepu
table and unconstitutional— making arrests simply for
investigative and interrogative purposes.'*'

He was opti

mistic that "before too long personal liberty will be
accorded the same protection under the Fourth Amendment as
the ownership and possession of property now enjoy."

The

year after the Ford decision, Wright silently joined an
opinion by Chief Judge Bazelon reaffirming the constitu
tionality of arrests without a warrant, but discouraging
such arrests when there is opportunity to secure an arrest
3
warrant . J
While accepting the constitutionality of probable
cause arrests without a warrant, Judge Wright, true to his
liberal principles, has demanded that there actually be
probable cause.

4

After his appointment to the Court of

United States v. Curtis. 427 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir. 1970).

1352 F .2d 927# 934-935 (concurring).
2Ibid.. 936.
•^Hagan v. United States. 364 F.2d 669 (D.C. Cir.

1966).
4
His msistance on a judicial determination of prob
able cause has extended to both adult and juvenile
arrests. Jackson v. United States. 336 F.2d 57 9 (D.C.
Cir. 1964) (per curiam): Cooley v. Stone. 414 F.2d 1213
(D.C. Cir. 1969) (per curiam).
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Appeals, it did not take him long to develop stringent
standards.1

An investigative arrest made solely as a pre

text for a search of the person fell far short of his
p
standards, even if the search turned up evidence.
Wright's insistence that arrests be made only upon
probable cause extended to arrests in extradition pro
ceedings, and in that he was not alone.^

As spokesman

for a unanimous panel, he explained that the Supreme Court
had made the whole of the Fourth Amendment, including the
federal standard of probable cause, binding on the states
h,
through the Fourteenth Amendment.
In extradition pro
ceedings, the jurisdiction in which an individual is
apprehended is to make its own determination of probable
cause.

"For it would be highhanded," he thought

to compel that jurisdiction to lend its coercive
authority, and the processes of its law, against
even its own citizens in aid of an enterprise the
key details of which remain in the dark. If as
here, it turns out that the prosecution against
the fugitive is unfounded, the asylum state will
have expended its resources and given the
Cf. T indie v. United States. 325 F.2d 223 (D.C.
Cir. 1963), in which he participated in a unanimous
decision that information gained from the unlawful
arrest of another did provide probable cause for an
arrest, and Oliver v. United States. 335 F.2d 724
(D.C. Cir. 1964), in which he took the opposite position
in dissent.
2
See Jackson v. United States. 353 F.2d 862
(D.C. Cir. 1965).
^Kirkland v. Preston. 385 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. I967).
In an earlier case he had been alone. See his dissent in
Moncrief v. Anderson. 353 F.2d 460 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
^385 F. 2d 670, 674.
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Wright, from his very first year on the Court of
Appeals, showed that he would vigorously apply the Mallory
Rule that evidence obtained in violation of Rule 5 (a) was
inadmissible at trial.

He wrote the majority opinion for

a divided panel that held that a confession and weapon
found with the help of the accused during a twenty-four
hour period of unnecessary delay were inadmissible.^

But

during the same year, both Burger and Wright agreed that
Mallory did not exclude a confession given within thirty
2
minutes after arrival at the police station.
Initially, Wright did not question the judicial rule
that violation of Rule 5 (a) could not be raised on appeal
if it had not been raised at trial.^

By 196*1-, however,

Wright was suggesting a way to circumvent that rule.
h
the case of Leigh v. United States, a panel on which

In

Burger and Wright both sat affirmed a conviction over
claim of double jeopardy, with Wright concurring only in
the result.

In his concurring opinion, he noted that the

police had violated Rule 5 (a) but that the Mallory Rule
had not been invoked below.

He agreed that under the

^Jones v. United States, 307 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir.
1962). Burger was not on the panel.
hu g h e s v. United States. 306 F.2d 287
(D.C. Cir. 1962).
^Williams v. United States. 308 F.2d 652
(D.C. Cir. 1962) (per curiam).
^329 F.2d 883.

circumstances, the court was not required to consider
application of the Mallory Rule.

Then, however, Wright

used the discretion of his office in a conscious attempt
to influence the development of the law.

He introduced

the possibility that failure to raise the Mallory issue
below could have been the result of ineffective assis
tance of counsel.1

While he admitted that the court

could not consider the question of ineffective counsel
because it had not been raised or briefed, his very
introduction of the issue can only be read as an invita
tion.

Judge Burger, on the other hand, was silent.
The Killough case3afforded both Burger and Wright

opportunity to explore the contours of the Mallory Rule
and to exercise their own brands of activism.

Because

Wright has considered the Mallory Rule a way of elimina
ting the "unequal contest of oaths between policemen and
lonely defendant,"^he joined the majority in holding a
confession inadmissible.

Burger wrote a dissent for

himself and two other judges.
^ e cited a case in which the California Supreme
Court had held that failure to invoke the exclusionary
rule amounted to ineffective counsel. The case was
People v. Inbarra. J>k Cal.Reptr. 863, 386 P.2d U-87 (1963)
2329 F. 2d 883, 885.
3Killough v. United States. 315 F.2d 2^1 (D.C. Cir.

1962) (en banc).
L
Wright, "Criminal Law and the Bill of Rights,"
Reporter. (June 3» 1965)* 2k.
He also refers to the
Unequal swearing contest in Leigh v. United States.
329 F.2d 883, 885, n. 3.
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been a failure in checking police misconduct and, as an
alternative, suggested that a copy of the trial transcript
be sent to the superior of every officer whose conduct re
sults in a motion to suppress evidence.^

He concluded by

accusing the court of rewriting a statute rather than
interpreting it.

"But," said Burger, "if Congress permits

judges to distort by 'interpretation' and to rewrite its
2
statutes, it should not be heard to complain."
The majority did not let what it termed Judge
Burger's "unusual dissenting opinion" go unanswered.
majority rebutted his arguments in nine points.'*

The

The

ninth point was a retort to Burger's plea for congres
sional action.

According to the majority, Congress could

reverse the decision only by taking matters of evidence
away from the judiciary or by positively granting the
police the power to isolate suspects and interrogate them
until they get a confession.

The latter, they said, would
h,

not meet Bill of Rights standards.
While Wright concurred in the majority's expanded
interpretation of the Mallory Rule, he chose to deal more
thoroughly with the problem of the voluntariness of con
fessions following suppressed confessions.

He rejected

what he considered the two extreme positions on second
1Ibid.. 257- 258, n. 5 -

2Ibid.. 260.

3Ibid., 2^5-248.

^Ibid.. 2^7.
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confessions:

(1 ) after a magistrate advises an accused

of his rights, any confession is valid, or (2 ) once there
has been one inadmissible confession, no subsequent con
fession may be untainted by it .1

"Thus," he said,

no one suggests that because a suspect has been
illegally detained and has confessed, he must be
let free, immune from all further prosecution for
the offense. Doubtless, this would be a most
effective deterrent to illegal interrogations,
but the cost to the public is too great .2
Wright suggested that after a confession is suppressed,
the court presume that a second confession is involuntary.
Judge Burger's position was that after presentation before
a United States Commissioner, the statement of rights is
fresh in a defendant's mind .3

While indicating no attempt

to belittle the Commissioner or his advice of rights,
Wright took the position the presumption of involun
tariness should remain because Rule 5 (a) assumes a
freshly arrested defendant, not one whose mechanisms of
resistance have been weakened by a prior confession.

1Ibid. , 24-8-2^9 •
p
Ibid., 2^9. In fashioning police deterrents, Wright
has never been unmindful of cost to the public. In a
later case, he suggested that the responsible administra
tion of justice might require reversals when there had
been police brutality at the time of arrest, but, in the
case before him, there was overwhelming proof of guilt,
and he considered it an inappropriate time to break new
round. See Gilliam v. United States. 323 F.2d 615,
16 (D.C. Cir. 1963)» cert, denied 375 U.S. 850 (1963).

f

3315 F.2d 2*H, 25*K
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The Judge gave no rule for determining the kind of evi
dence necessary to rebut the presumption of involuntar
iness, but suggested that it might at least be necessary
to show that the defendant had sufficient time, while free
of police control, to absorb the information about his
rights and to have the advice of counsel who knew about
the first confession.

Even if this should not be required

by the Mallory Rule, Wright pointed out that the court had
power to fashion rules of evidence for the District of
Columbia.
One of the best examples of Wright's activism in
support of the Mallory Rule came in a case, Veney v.
2
United States, in which he voted not to reverse but to
affirm a conviction.

His reason for affirmance was that

the defendant had been identified by four witnesses.

But

Wright also noted that the defendant was alleged to have
made a "spontaneous apology" to his robbery victim during
an in-custody confrontation.

The Judge admitted to some

•^Ibid. , 2^9-251. The Killough case did not end
there. In a later proceeding, the same defendant sought
to suppress damaging statements made to a graduate student
who was a part-time employee at the jail. The defendant
did not have assistance of counsel, and the interview in
which the statements were made took place before the first
appeal, so Killough did not know that his first confession
could not be used against him. In Judge Wright's opinion,
these statements too were inadmissible as fruit of the
first confession. See Killough v. United States.
336 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 19 6 k ) .

23^

F.2d 5^2 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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curiosity about reports of spontaneous apologies, since
he doubted that the word "apologize" was a part of the
vocabulary of the poorly educated defendants or, if it
was, that they would express contrition so soon.
His curiosity, and the research it stimulated, led
him to Frederickson v. United States.^a case decided some
years earlier, in which an appeals panel unanimously held
that a damaging statement was properly admitted over a
Mallory objection because it was spontaneous and not
elicited by police.

After that, the "spontaneous apology"

became a recurring phenomenon.

Together, the Frederickson

decision and the trial transcript of the case before
Wright solved the mystery.

The testimony of an identify

ing witness left no doubt that the "apologies" were the
result of police "coaching."

Wright used his concurring

opinion to expose and condemn the practice, even while
voting to affirm the conviction.

He considered it time

"for some soul searching in the prosecutor's office before
p
it offers any more 'spontaneous' spologies in evidence.

1266 F.2d ^ 63 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
23 ^ F.2d 5^2, 5^3. Wright does not, however, oppose
the admission of damaging statements that are truly spon
taneous. Although he wrote no opinion, he joined an
opinion by Judge MacKinnon affirming the admissibility of
a damaging statement made by a defendant immediately after
police informed him that he was under arrest and the
charge against him, but before they had a chance to give
him the Miranda warning. Bosley v. United States.
UrZ6 F.2d 1957 (D.C. Cir. 1970).

The constitutional guarantee against self incrimina
tion which the Mallory Rule supported was further streng
thened by the Supreme Court decision in Miranda v.
Arizona .1

According to Chief Justice Warren’s opinion in

that case, prior to any in-custody interrogation the
police must advise the accused of his right to remain
silent, of his right to have counsel (appointed, if neces
sary) present during interrogation should he choose to
answer questions, and that anything he says may be used
against him at trial.

If the accused begins to answer

questions, he may reassert his right to silence at any
time.

The individual may waive his Miranda rights, but
2
he must waive voluntarily and intelligently.
Wright con
sidered that Miranda, like Mallory before it, attempted
to insure that the real trial took place in the courtroom,
not in a police interrogation room.^
applied Miranda

Consequently, he

A
as vigorously as he had the Mallory Rule.

Judge Wright did not simply apply Miranda, he exten
ded it even to statements elicited by the police but not
as a part of interrogation about the crime itself.

When a

u.s. 1+36 (1966).
2
The procedures required by Miranda are briefly sum
marized at Ibid.,
•^See Wright, "The New Role of Defense Counsel Under
Escobedo and Miranda." American Bar Association Journal.
LII (December, 1966), 1118.
^See Blair v. United States, ^01 F.2d 387 (D.C. Cir.

1968).
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defendant testified at trial regarding his employment
status, Wright considered that Miranda "barred the
arresting officer from testifying against him regarding
contrary information given during the routine filling out
of forms following arrest.

Wright's rationale was that

Even innocent questions asked of a suspect in the
inherently coercive atmosphere of the police sta
tion may create in him the impression that he must
answer them. His answers then cannot be considered
voluntary in the sense required by Miranda. Where
such answers turn out to be damaging to the suspect,
they cannot be used against him at trial, absent a
valid waiver of the Miranda rights.
Wright's colleague, Judge Tamm, rightly objected
that such.an interpretation of Miranda

would free the

defendant from the threat of a perjury prosecution if
he testified falsely, thus placing upon "an overburdened
Providence the sole responsibility for insuring the
2
credibility of a witness."
Judge Wright's answer was
that Miranda explicitly states that no distinction could
be made between inculpatory and exculpatory statements.-*
He saw no reason for treating differently a statement
which was intended to be neither inculpatory nor exculpatory.

But there is reason for treating it differently.

Miranda was intended to enforce the Fifth Amendment guar
antee against self-incrimination.

There is no way that a

•^Proctor v. United States. ^0^ F.2d 819, 821
(D.C. Cir. 1968).
2Ibid., 823 (dissent).
F. 2d 819, 821.

338^ U.S. 436 , ^ 77.
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truthful answer to a question unrelated to the crime can
incriminate one.

Undoubtedly the real problem for Wright

was that the defendant denied the police version of the
form-filling episode, thus producing another "uneven
swearing contest."
The problem of self-incrimination does not arise if
the defendant is extended immunity from prosecution.

That

a congressional grant of immunity is not in conflict with
the Fifth Amendment guarantee against self-incrimination
has long been established by the Supreme Court.^

It also

specifically upheld the constitutionality of the Immunity
Act of 1954.

p

That, however, has not prevented Judge

Wright from disliking immunity statutes.

He has referred

to the Immunity Act of 19543as more properly called the
"Compulsory Testimony Act."

k

He dislikes immunity legis

lation because it protects solely against criminal prose
cution while leaving the individual vulnerable to civil
and economic disabilities.

Consequently, in attacking

the Immunity Act of 1954, Wright became a strict construc
tionist.

Through his narrow interpretation of the

1B£own v. Walker. 161 U.S. 591 (I896).
2Ullmann v. United States. 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
318 U.S.C., Sec. 3486.
**In re Bart. 304 F.2d 631 , 633 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
5Ibid.. 635.
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statutory language, an order to testify and a contempt
commitment for refusal to testify were both vacated.
Wright did not limit himself to a narrow construc
tion of the statute as he might have done.

He partici

pated in the continuing dialogue between courts and
suggested a way to protect individuals who are compelled
to testify from some non-criminal sanctions, such as
prohibitions on granting government employment to admitted
Communists.

He raised the question of whether the due

process clause of the Fifth Amendment might insulate
persons compelled to testify from such sanctions, even if
the self-incrimination clause did not.

Although he

framed the issue in terms of an admission that it was
premature for the court to consider that question, he had
planted there a possible course of action for the future.
One of the judges who joined the opinion was Judge Burger,
who often disagreed with Wright in other kinds of cases.
His dislike of immunity statutes, without more, was
not enough to induce Wright to vote for reversal of a
judgment of contempt when an individual refused to testify
in spite of a grant of immunity from prosecution .3
when he had some flexibility, he made use of it.

But

He par

ticipated in a decision by a divided panel holding that
h l a i d .. 636.

2Ibid. . 63^.

3In re Flanagan. 350 F.2d 7^6 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(per curiam).
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when an individual was compelled to testify regarding a
crime for which he was already convicted, but before his
appeal was decided, the grant of immunity shielded him
from the penalty if his conviction were affirmed.

If the

conviction were reversed, immunity prevented retrial.'*'
Wright's dislike of compelled testimony led him to

p

an extreme position in Ellis v. United States.

In that

case, a witness waived his Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination and voluntarily testified
before a grand jury.

At the trial, at which he was not a

defendant, he attempted to reassert his Fifth Amendment
privilege.

The trial judge agreed that he had a right to

do so, but granted immunity and compelled him to testify.
At the conclusion of the trial, the defendants were
convicted.
On appeal, each member of the court had a different
view of the witness' rights, but a majority agreed that
justice did not require a reversal of the convictions.
Judge Wright, in dissent, argued that the witness' consti
tutional rights had been violated.

"I believe the Fifth

Amendment not only protects against the risk of prosecu
tion on evidence extorted from the defendant," he asserted,
"but also establishes a right to abstain from the
^Frank v. United States. 3^7 F.2d ^86 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
2

k l 6 F.2d 791 (D.C. Cir. 1969).

demeaning ritual of public self-accusation.""*"

There was,

however, a glaring omission in his brief but spirited dis
sent.

He failed to explain why the defendants were enti

tled to have their convictions reversed when it was a
witness, not the defendants, who was forced to testify.
He simply ignored the problem in his defense of Fifth
Amendment rights.
The Sixth Amendment
The most effective way of safeguarding Fifth Amend
ment rights, or any other constitutional rights, particu
larly in the context of adversary criminal proceedings,
is through the assistance of counsel guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment.

To Judge Wright that has always meant

more than just the right to have a lawyer present at a
trial.

The right to counsel exists before trial and means

the right not to be secretly questioned during a contin2
uance granted for the purpose of securing counsel.
It
also means the right to counsel at arraignment and pre
liminary hearing, although the absence of counsel at
those proceedings results in reversal of conviction only
if the trial is prejudicially affected.-*
1Ibid.. 808.
20ueen v. United States. 335 F.2d 297 (D.C. Cir.

196*0 (per curiam).
^Shelton v. United States, 3*1-3 F.2d 3*1-7 (D.C. Cir.

1965) (per curiam)s Anderson~v. United States. 352 F.2d
9*J'5 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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To Wright, the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel
extends even into the grand jury room.

In Jones v. United

1

States. the Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, reversed a
criminal conviction because, among other things, the
defendant, who had only a third grade education and could
not read, did not have the assistance of counsel when he
appeared before the grand jury and confirmed an earlier
confession.

But not all members of the majority agreed

that there was a constitutional right to counsel before
the grand jury.

Judges Washington and McGowan would have

disposed of the matter on the basis of the court's supero
visory power.
Since there could be no majority for
reversal without Washington and McGowan, Wright and the
other three who would have based the decision the the Con
stitution were forced to compromise and rely on the super
visory power.

If one assumes, however, that Wright is a

policy-oriented judge, then he was giving up little.

Even

if the decision had been based on the Constitution, it
would not have been binding on other circuits absent a
decision of the Supreme Court.

By agreeing to base the

decision on the supervisory power in spite of his belief
that the Constitution required reversal, he got the
desired result— the right to counsel at a critical stage
in the proceedings— for the area under the court’s
jurisdiction.

13^2 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1964-).

2Ibid. , 873.
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To Judge Wright, it is extremely important that the
defendant have the assistance of counsel as soon after
arrest as possible.

This is particularly true in the

case of poor and uneducated defendants.

In such cases,

defense counsel can require the prosecution to prove
probable cause and can seek out defense witnesses and run
down leads while they are fresh.

In Wright's opinion,

defense counsel can also perform the therapeutic function
of convincing the defendant that his side of the story is
being heard and that he is being treated fairly.

If legal

defense is not likely to be successful, the defendant's
lawyer can assist him in plea-bargaining.

Wright sees no

impropriety in this as long as it is voluntary.

In fact,

when an indigent has no adequate defense, Wright believes
that defense counsel should try to keep him out of court.
Even a fair trial often serves only to encourage false
hopes and perjured defenses.

Convictions result in sen

tences longer than if there had been a guilty plea, and
the defendant becomes even more anti-social, whereas
voluntary plea-bargaining is more likely to convince the
^See his concurring opinion in Scott v. United
States. 419 P.2d 264 (D.C. Cir. 1969) in which he assigns
the judge the role of overseeing the fairness and volun
tariness of the process.
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defendant that he is being treated fairly and induce him
to cooperate with rehabilitative programs .1
If the defendant choses not to plead guilty, he
p
unquestionably has the right to counsel at trial.
Of
course, the Constitution is not satisfied unless there is
effective representation of counsel, nor is Judge Wright
satisfied with anything less.-^

He has high regard for

lawyers who conscientiously defend their clients’ interest
and has rejected claims of ineffective counsel when not
h,
supported by the record.
But he has also suggested that
an appellant raise the issue of ineffective counsel
because the Mallory Rule had not been invoked although
See Wright, "The New Role of Defense Counsel Under
Escobedo and Miranda." American Bar Association Journal.
LII (December, 1966), 1117-1121} "The Need for Education
in the Law of Criminal Correction," Valparaiso University
Law Review. II (Fall, I967), 84— 93; "Criminal Correction
and the Law," Trial. V (February-March, 1969), 28, 4-6.
2
To Wright, this includes the right to have counsel
present during the resolution of questions raised during
a poll of the jury, since that is a critical stage in
the proceedings. See United States v. McCoy. 4-29 F.2d 739
(D.C. Cir. 1970) (per curiam).

3

^He has expressed his regret that law schools devote
such little time to teaching trial advocacy and has whole
heartedly endorsed legal internship programs that would
give law students and recent graduates needed experience
in^trial advocacy. See his "Law School Training in
Criminal Laws A Judge's Viewpoint," American Criminal
Law Quarterly. Ill (Summer, I 966), 166-172.
4.
Smith v. United States. 304- F.2d 4*03 (D.C. Cir.
1962) (per curiam); Harried v. United States. 389 F.2d 281
(D.C. Cir. 1967).
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Rule 5 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
had been violated.1
The problem of the effectiveness of counsel can arise
when two defendants share a lawyer.

It is the respon

sibility of the trial judge to see that the decision to
proceed with one lawyer is an informed one.

To Judge

Wright, the economic status of the defendants was irrel
evant to the trial judge's responsibility.

He saidj

Z-toT7e see no reason why in assigned counsel cases
the responsibility to advise defendants of their
rights and the potential problems of joint repre
sentation should be any less than where counsel is
retained. Not only does the Criminal Justice Act
indicate otherwise, but the indigent is entitled
to assume that the court, in actively aiding him
in obtaining counsel, will advise him of all
rights and matters relevant to appointment of
counsel.3
Because of the seriousness of a criminal prosecution,
Wright has insisted upon extending the indigent's right
to counsel to its fullest extent.
A relatively new aspect of the right to counsel was
engrafted onto the Constitution in 1967 by bhe Warren
Court.

At that time, the Court decided that the Sixth

and Fourteenth Amendments guaranteed the right to counsel
1Leigh v. United States. 329 F.2d 883
(D.C. Cir. 1964-) (concurring).
^Campbell v. United States. 352 F.2d 359
(D.C. Cir. 1965).
^Dollar v. United States. 376 F.2d
See also Ford v. United States.
(D.C. Cir. 1967) in which Wright, under
supervisory power, announced guidelines

1967).

2^3
379
the
for

(D.C. Cir.
F.2d 123
court's
District

at confrontations, such as lineups, for the purpose of
identification.**" Since Wright believes that the individ
ual should have the assistance of counsel at the earliest
possible time, he obviously approved of this interpreta
tion of Sixth Amendment rights, and a unanimous panel on
which he sat decided that effective assistance required
that defense counsel be informed of the description of
the suspect given to the police.

As might be expected,

convicted criminals, in the hope of having their convic
tions reversed, attempted to stretch the Wade decision
to the ridiculous length of requiring a reversal because
counsel had not been present at an identification at the
scene of the crime.

Judge Wright would not be led down

that path.
Yet he did approve of the new development is the con
stitutional law of the Sixth Amendment, interpreted it
h.
liberally, and even displayed an inclination to go beyond
Judges in regard to joint representation.
U n i t e d States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218; Gilbert v.
California. 388 U.S. 263.
2Snriggs v. Wilson. 419 F.2d 759 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
(per curiam).
^Solomon v. United States. 408 F.2d 1306
(D.C. Cir. 1969).
United States v. York. 426 F.2d 1191 (D.C. Cir.
1969) (per curiam), Wright was a member of a panel major
ity that remanded the case for a hearing to determine
whether an in-court identification was tainted by pre
trial identification techniques in violation of the
Supreme Court’s Wade decision. Judge Robb, the dissenter
accused the majority of stretching Wade too far.
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it.

In Stovall v. Denno.^the Supreme Court decided that

its holdings regarding the right to counsel at identifi
cations would not he retroactive.

When Rule 5 (a) of

the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure had been violated,
Judge Wright would have circumvented the nonretroactivity
holding in Stovall by using the Mallory Rule to suppress
identifications at which counsel had not been present.
But the majority of the Court of Appeals, sitting en banc,
decided that it had never before applied the Mallory Rule
to lineup identifications and, since the right to
counsel at lineups was not retroactive, it would not use
the Mallory Rule to make it so.

Wright had to be content

with writing a dissent for himself and two of his likeminded brethren.

2

1388 U.S. 293 (1967).
^Williams v. United States, *H9 F.2d 7^0 (D.C. Cir.
1969). When ore-Stovall identifications were attacked on
due process grounds, Wright was no more inclined than his
colleagues to reverse convictions. He participated in
many unanimous decisions rejecting claims that the circum
stances surrounding identification required reversal.
Cunningham v. United States. 391 F.2d ^57 (D.C. Cir. 1967)
(per curiam); Macklin v. United States, 409 F.2d 17^ (D.C.
Cir. 1969); Gregory v. United States, 4l0 F.2d 1016 (D.C.
Cir. 1969)? Jackson v. United States. k l 2 F.2d l k 9 (1969);
Tavlor v. United States, 4l4 F.2d 11^2 (D.C. Cir. 1969);
Stewart v. United States, A-18 F.2d 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1969)j
United States v. Hamilton, 4-20 F.2d 1292 (D. C. Cir.
1969); United States v. Williams. ^21 F.2d 1166 (D.C. Cir.
1969). In two cases, Mendoza-Acosta v. United States,
408 F.2d 129^ (D.C. Cir. 1969) (per curiam), and
Clemons v. United States. 408 F.2d 1230 (D.C. Cir. I968)
(en banc), he would have required the lower court to con
duct a hearing to determine whether circumstances sur
rounding identification were so suggestive as to require a
new trial, but only in Clemons was he not with the major
ity.
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Because of his expansive view of the right to coun
sel, one may speculate that Judge Wright will resist the
Burger Court's interpretation of Wade and Gilbert as
requiring counsel only at confrontations which take place
after the indictment which initiates adversary proceed
ings.'*’ Before that case was decided, Wright considered
that Wade extended the right to counsel to identification
confrontations even when there had been no formal arrest.

p

Since the Supreme Court has authoritatively interpreted
Wade and Gilbert in a contrary manner, Wright is left with
the alternatives of passive acquiescence or of attempting
to convince his fellow members of the Court of Appeals to
exercise their supervisory power to require more than the
Burger Court's interpretation of the constitutional right
to counsel.

As a policy oriented judge, one might expect

him to opt for the latter alternative.
The Sixth Amendment, of course, embraces more than
the right to counsel.
speedy trial.

It also guarantees the accused a

But how speedy must a trial be in order

to comply with the constitutional demand?

There is no

1Kirbv v. Illinois. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
2United States v. Greene, ^29 F.2d 193 (D.C. Cir.
1970). Wright did not write an opinion of his own but
joined the majority opinion. Attesting to the reasonable
ness of their interpretation of Wade is the fact that even
Judge Robb, a conservative member of the court, wrote a
separate opinion in which he reluctantly concurred in that
interpretation.
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easy answer to the question, nor has Judge Wright attemp
ted to provide one.

Nevertheless, he has attempted to

give some meaning to the constitutional guarantee— more
meaning than some of his brethren would give it.
Only a month after the Senate confirmed Wright's nom
ination to the Court of Appeals, he was a member of the
panel that heard arguments in the case of Mann v. United
States.^

In the Mann case, Wright did not think that

there had been a denial of speedy trial, but he gave a
clear indication that he would not be unresponsive to such
a claim in other circumstances.

While admitting that

there was some case law to the contrary, he used a foot
note to express the opinion that even if formal trial
should be held promptly after indictment, the Constitution
could still be violated if there should be a purposeful
and oppressive delay between the offense and the bringing
2
of formal charges.
Judge Burger specifically rejected that position in
Nickens v. United States.3

Wright, who was also on the

panel, agreed that there had been no denial of the Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial, but he concurred only
in the result, not in Judge Burger's opinion.

He wrote

130^ F.2d 39^ (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert, denied
371 U.S. 896 (1962).
2Ibid., 396-397, n. 4.
3323 F.2d 808, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
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a separate concurrance in which he expanded on the view
expressed in his Mann footnote.

"Indeed," he said,

a suspect may be at a special disadvantage when
complaint or indictment, or arrest, is purposefully
delayed. With no knowledge that criminal charges
are to be brought against him, an innocent man has
no reason to fix in his memory the happenings on
the day of the alleged crime. Memory grows dim
with the passage of time. Witnesses disappear.
With each day, the accused becomes less able to make
out his defense. If, during the delay, the Govern
ment's case is already in its hands, the balance of
advantage shifts more in favor of the Government the
more the Government lags. Under our constitutional
system such a tactic is not available to police and
prosecutors .1
Judge Wright has refused to break criminal prosecu
tions down into artificial segments.

He considers that

any unreasonable delay in governmental action which is
prejudicial to the defendant or denies him his liberty
constitutes a denial of constitutional rights.
considered each case on its merits.

He has

In a complex mail

fraud case, he conceded the possibility that a delay of
four years between the original indictment and the trial
might not have been unreasonable and remanded the case
for further proceedings.

On another occasion, he dissen

ted from the full Court of Appeals' affirmance of the
Ibid., 813. Judge David Bazelon, Chief Judge of
the Circuit, agrees with Wright. He quoted from Wright's
Nickens opinion.when he dissented from the court's denial
of a rehearing in Wilson v. United States. 335 F.2d 982
(D.C. Cir. 19&I0.
^Hanrahan v. United States. 3^8 F.2d 363 (D.C. Cir.
1965).
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conviction of an individual who could not raise bail and
spent six months in jail awaiting trial, with all of the
delay at the Government's request.

In justification of

his dissent, Wright said:
Some may think the Sixth Amendment "right to
a speedy and public trial" is a legal term of art
which does not mean what it seems to say. I find
no basis in either the terms or the history of the
Sixth Amendment for any such conclusion. There is
no indication that the Framers of the Amendment
used the word "speedy" in other than its dictionary
meaning.^
Reasonably enough, he agrees with the other judges that
there is no constitutional violation when the delay is at
the defendant's request.

But when delay comes between

offense and arrest and is due solely to lack of a diligent
effort to make the arrest, the conviction must be
reversed . J
Judge Wright concedes that the Government may some
times have a valid reason for delaying an arrest when it
is necessary to prevent the exposure of an undercover
Smith v. United States. 331 F.2d 78^, 793
(D.C. Cir. 196^7^ The Judge was particularly irate
because the defendant spent the period of delay in jail
due to his inability to make bail. Elsewhere, he has
referred to bail as "a barnacle on the back of the crim
inal law." Wright, "Renaissance of the Criminal Law: The
Responsibility of the Trial Lawyer," Duauesne University
Law Review. IV (Winter, 1965), 215.
^edffeneth v. United States. 36** F.2d 68^
(D.C. CTr. 1956). ------------^Godfrey v. United States. 358 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir.
1966)} Jones v. United States. ^02 F.2d 639 (D.C. Cir.

1968).
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agent or informer.

He has taken the position that when

the defendant has made no plausible claim that he was
prejudiced by the delay, the conviction must be affirmed.^
He has not, however, been consistent in that position.
When a narcotics arrest was delayed five months to pro
tect an undercover agent, the Judge noted that persons
from a slum subculture have no "desk pads and social cal
endars" to remind them where they were several months
before.

After a long delay, the police may make mistakes

and the "mistakes would very likely wind up in the Lorton
Reformatory serving five-, ten- or fifteen-year sentences.
This spectre apparently does not disturb the majority of
2
this panel. I find it frightening," he declared.
Yet
the defendant himself made no plausible claim that his
trial was prejudiced by the delay.

In fact, he attempted

to establish his whereabouts at the time of the offense
through the testimony of a defense witness whom the jury
apparently disbelieved.^
^Jackson v. United States. 351 F.2d 821
(D.C. Cir. 1965).
2Powell v. United States. 352 F.2d 705, 711
(D.C. Cir. 1965).
^Ibid., 709. Acting as a District Judge, Wright
presided over a trial in which the issue of delay in
prosecution was raised. The trial resulted in a convic
tion, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. See
Hardv v. United States. 3^3 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 196*0,
cert, denied 38O U.S. 984 (1965). Also see Hardy v.
United States. 38I F.2d 9*H (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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Most trials, in fact, are by jury, and this too is a
guarantee of the Sixth Amendment.

Everett v. United

States,1a case which involved the right to trial by jury,
gave Judges Burger and Wright another opportunity to
exhibit their conflicting approaches to criminal justice.
The crux of the dispute was whether Everett could withdraw
a guilty plea and go to trial even though he continued to
admit having performed the robbery for which he was
charged.

The District Judge would not permit him to with

draw his plea and imposed a nine-year sentence.

Judge

Burger, writing for the majority of the appeals panel,
agreed with the District Judge and would "not encourage
accused persons to 'play games'" with the already over2
burdened courts.
Judge Burger appealed to the head; Judge Wright
appealed to the heart— with supporting legal citations
and historical material, to be sure.

Wright found that

the poverty of the accused provided a fair and just
reason for permitting withdrawal of the guilty plea.
he put it:
On allocution, he stated that he stole because he
was poor, in order to provide necessary medical
care for his pregnant wife. The defendant is not
articulate, but his claim seems to make him out as
1336 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 196*0.
2Ibid., 98*1-.

As
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a modern Jean Valjean, who was convicted of burglary
for stealing bread for his starving children .1
Judge Wright did not even consider the problem of court
congestion.

He thought Everett ought to be permitted to

take his case to a jury for a determination of culpa
bility.

"The mitigating circumstances the defendant here

claims may not be enough to convince the jury that his
crime is excusable, but to my mind his desire to raise
the issue of culpability for jury decision may be suf
ficient cause to allow him to withdraw his plea of guilty
and go to trial," said Wright .2
The Eighth Amendment
If he was moved by the plight of an admitted robber,
one might expect him to be similarly responsive to claims
of cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment, especially since Wright had himself advanced
a cruel and unusual punishment argument in the first of
his two appearances before the Supreme Court as a lawyer.-^
He has indeed been responsive to such claims, as have his
Zl

colleagues.

In such cases, it was not unusual for Judges

Burger and Wright to vote together, since most cruel and
unusual punishment cases were decided by unanimous vote.
2Ibid., 987.

1Ibid.
•'See Ch. 1

pp. 10-15 above.

^See Smith v. Anderson. 317 F.2d 172 (1963), in which
Burger wrote the opinion. For a similar case in which
Wright, but not Burger, participated, see Hudson v. Hardv.
412 F.2d 1091 (1968) (per curiam).
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But whenever there was more than one opinion written,
Judge Wright was always less restrained than Judge
Burger.^
o
In Castle v. United States, a panel on which they
both participated unanimously affirmed a conviction for
purchasing narcotics without a tax stamp.

Assigned coun

sel for the indigent defendant argued that since
Robinson v. Calif o m i a ^held it was cruel and unusual
punishment to make the condition of drug addiction a
crime, then it was also cruel and unusual punishment to
make the addict’s purchase, possession or concealment of
his daily dosage a crime.

Wright considered that the

"argument, although neither remote nor insubstantial, is
one which, in the light of the great weight of the cases
which have imposed punishment, is more properly to be
A
made to the Supreme Court."
While Judge Burger con
curred in the result, he objected to implications by the
majority that addiction could be equated with insanity.-*
lrrhis was true even when they themselves did not
write opinions. See Easter v. District of Columbia.
361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1 9 6 6 ) (en banc).
23^7 F.2d ^92 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert, denied
381 U.S. 929 (1965).

3370 U.S. 660 (1962).
**3^7 F.2d ^92, ^95.

-*Ibid.
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But the criticism of another judge hardly deterred
Wright in his approach to the Constitution.

His liberal

reading of Bill of Rights protections relating to criminal
procedure did, of course, reflect his own values, but it
was largely made possible by changes in the state of the
law since he left the District bench.

As a District

Judge, he had regretted that a defendant had not received
"all the constitutional protection a court sworn to uphold
the Constitution would have liked him to have received,"
but he dismissed the petition for habeas corpus because
the defendant had had due process as it was then being
interpreted.

When the Supreme Court liberalized its

interpretation of Bill of Rights protections relating to
criminal procedure, it changed Judge Wright from a reluc
tant follower and sometime critic into an avid supporter
of Supreme Court policy.

Moreover, he attempted to

influence the further liberalization of the law, either
directly or by planting in his opinions suggestions for
future action.

CHAPTER VI
COURT OF APPEALS:

FIRST AND FIFTH AMENDMENT

AND THE LANDLORD-TENANT CONFLICT
Less numerous than his judicial ventures into the
realm of criminal law and procedure, "but no less impor
tant, are Wright's attempts at solving First Amendment
problems.

The First Amendment stakes out a number of

spheres in which government is not free to roam at will.
The Amendment guarantees that
Congress shall make no law respecting an establish
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the government for a
redress of grievances.
As its language clearly indicates, the First Amendment
may be invoked in a wide variety of situations.
In some situations, the First Amendment provides an
independent source of protection.

In other situations,

particularly (although not exclusively) those arising
out of congressional investigations, First Amendment
rights are often bolstered by strict enforcement of pro
cedural rules.

Failure by a congressional committee or

subcommittee to adhere to proper procedure when inquiring
180
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into a witness' group memberships may constitute a denial
of due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.
Although the First and Fifth Amendments are often
intertwined, the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of due
process of law may also stand-independently.

It is fre

quently the basis of constitutional attacks on adminis
trative actions deemed by some to be arbitrary, unreason
able, or unfair.

While Wright's approach to the due

process clause has often been characterized by consider
able deference to administrative agencies, he has shown
less respect for them than for the rights of their
employees.
This chapter examines Judge Wright's approach to the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of religion, speech,
press, and "association;" the extent of his deference to
administrative agencies; and his approach to the legal
relationship between landlord and tenant.

The latter is

treated separately because, although the Constitution
plays only a minor role, this area of law provides an
excellent illustration of Judge Wright's liberal ideo
logical bent.
The First Amendment and Religion
The First Amendment assumes that religious practices
are a matter of conscience and commands that Congress
shall make no law prohibiting the individual's free
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exercise of his religion.

In spite of the absolute

language of the First Amendment's denial of governmental
power over religious practices, the courts have not
interpreted the words to mean that in the name of
religion anything goes.

The problem for Judge Wright,

and for courts in general, has been to give broad judicial
protection to religious freedom without denying govern
ment the power to protect society from injuries that
might result if the exercise of religion were absolutely
unfettered.
A statement of the problem is not difficult, but the
solution of cases often is.

In a particularly difficult

case^especially in view of his liberal values, Judge
Wright issued an emergency order authorizing blood trans
fusions for a hospital patient who, on religious grounds,
would not consent to the needed transfusions.

Wright's

order was intended to maintain the status quo and prevent
legal questions from becoming moot through the patient's
death.

In explaining his decision, he said:

The final, and compelling, reason for granting the
emergency writ was that a life hung in the balance.
There was no time for research and reflection.
Death could have mooted the cause in a matter of
minutes, if action were not taken to preserve the
status quo. To refuse to act, only to find later
^Application of the President and Directors of
Georgetown College. Inc.. 331 F.2d 1000 (196^). The case
was particularly difficult because Wright was the only Circuit Judge at court that evening and had to act alone.

183
that the law required action, was a risk I was unwill
ing to accept. I determined to act on the side of
life.1
When not faced with the specter of imminent death,
Wright has required that government exercise extreme care
in the application of even general legislation, when it
has the effect of interfering with the free exercise of
religion.

He has taken the approach usually, but not

always, followed by the Supreme Court.

It is an approach

that accords to freedom of religion, like freedom of
speech, a preferred position.

When general laws interfere

with religious liberty, the former must yield, unless com
pelling considerations of public policy require their
2
enforcement.
In Wright's opinion, proper care had not been exer
cised in the condemnation of electrical devices called
"E-Meters," which, according to the Founding Church of
Scientology, could confer spiritual benefits, as well as
cure a number of physical ills, some quite serious.

In

establishing a case of false labeling, the Government had
relied upon a mass of Scientological literature without
^Ibid.. 1009-1010. The Court of Appeals, en banc.
denied rehearing without giving reasons, but there were
some dissents.
331 F.2d 1010 (196*0, cert, denied
377 U.S. 978 (196£).
2
See Paul G. Kauper, Religion and the Constitution
(Baton Rouge* Louisiana State University Press, 1964),
pp. 37-^.
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distinguishing the religious and the purely secular.
Wright found that much of the literature upon which the
government had relied was not labeling within the meaning
of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic A c t ^ w h e n considered in
the light of the First Amendment.
trial became necessary.

p

Consequently, a new

At the subsequent trial, at which

the Government did distinguish false scientific claims
from religious teachings, the "E-Meters" were again con
demned.

Because the devices were not in themselves harm

ful, the District Court authorized their return to the
Founding Church upon execution of a bond guaranteeing that
they would be properly and prominently

labeled.^

Thus

religious liberty was protected to the extent that it was
not inconsistent with public health and safety.
The First Amendment and "Pure Speech"
To a liberal such as Wright, "pure speech," that is,
the spoken word when not linked with action, is beyond
the legislative pale.

4

However, in the case of a Vietnam

121 U.S.C., Sec. 301 et seq. (1964).
2
Founding Church of Scientology v. United States.
409 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
^United States v. An Article or Device. 333 F.Supp.
357 (D.D.C. 1971).
4
Wright was a member of a Court of Appeals majority
that saved the constitutionality of a District of Columbia
ordinance prohibiting cursing and profane language in pub
lic places by reading into it a requirement that the pro
scribed language be linked to action in order to be punish
able. Williams v. District of Columbia. 419 F.2d 638
(D.C. Cir. 1969).

war critic named Watts, it was not the constitutionality
of a statute, hut rather the application of a statute,
that Wright attacked.

Watts said, "If they ever make me

carry a rifle, the first person I want in my sights is
L.B.J."

For making that statement, Watts was convicted

of violating a 1917 statute prohibiting knowing and will
ful threats against the life of the President.

The con

viction was affirmed, with Judge Wright dissenting.

He

considered the application of the 1917 statute to Watts an
unreasonable limitation on speech and inconsistent with
congressional intent, since the statute was aimed at real
threats and not crude rhetorical devices.^

Wright was vin

dicated when the Supreme Court, reversing the Court of
Appeals, decided that the 1917 statute must be interpreted
in the light of a national commitment to free speech.
The First Amendment and the
Communications Media
While Judge Wright's approach to the First Amendment
has been clearly libertarian in that he has promoted the
free and open dissemination of controversial opinion, it
has also been non-absolutist in that he has not inter
preted the words "Congress shall make no law . . . "
literally.

For example, Congress has charged the Federal

■Htfatts v. United States. ^02 F.2d 676 , 686-693
(D.C. Cir. I 968T
2Watts v. United States. 39^ U.S. 705 (1969).
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Communications Commission (F.C.C.) to regulate the air
waves in the "public interest, convenience, or neces
sity, '^and the judges, including Judge Wright, have generally given the Commission a free hand in the grant and
denial-^of licenses, even in the face of First Amendment
challenges.
Wright's handling of challenged F.C.C. decisions
could have been as much the result of judicial deference
to an administrative agency engaged in technical regula
tion as to his approach to the First Amendment.

His

thoughts on defamation and related problems, however,
clearly establish that he has taken a non-absolutist
approach to the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of
speech and press.

Far from interpreting the First Amend

ment as an absolute ban on congressional regulation of the
media, Wright has argued that "we need a national law of
defamation— a law that goes beyond establishing limita
tions on state actions for defamation and extends to the
elements of the tort itself."

k

Since newspapers and

^The Supreme Court has held that the F.C.C.'s "public
interest" standard is not unconstitutionally vague.
National Broadcasting C o . v. United States. 319 U.S. 190
(19^3).
2
Anti-Defamation League v. F.C.C.. ^03 F.2d 169
(D.C. Cir. 1968), cert, denied 39^ U.S. 930 (1969).
•^Blumenthal v. F.C.C., 318 F.2d 276 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
k
Wright, "Defamation, Privacy, and the Public's Right
to Knowi A National Problem and a New Approach," Texas
Law Review. XLVI (April, 1968), 6^ 3 .
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magazines are constantly crossing state lines, he has no
doubt that Congress has adequate constitutional power to
enact such legislation.

He finds this power in the com

merce clause and thinks that congressional legislation
would be preferable to the case by case approach of the
courts.1
It was, however, the Supreme Court rather than
Congress that took the first step in the direction of a
national standard of defamation.

That first step occurred

in 1964, when the Court held in New York times v.
Sullivan, that a public official could not collect damages
by showing that statements about his official conduct were
false, even if the publisher had been negligent in check
ing the facts.

He could not recover unless he could show

that the false statement was "made with 'actual malice'—
that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not."-^
Although he has expressed some reservations about
the application of the New York Times rule in other kinds
of situations, Wright has been quite willing to apply it
to situations involving published criticisms of public
officials and their official conduct. In Washington
k
Post C o . v. Keogh, writing for the majority of a divided
•^Ibid.. 6^3-6^6.

2376 U.S. 25^.

3Ibid., 279-280.
^365 F. 2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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panel, he extended the New York Times rule to summary
judgments.

The case originated when the Washington Post

published a Drew Pearson column containing allegations
that a New York Congressman had accepted bribes.

In the

resulting libel suit, the District Judge denied the
newspaper's motion for summary judgment, even though the
Congressman was unable to make even a preliminary showing
of malice.

In reversing the lower court, Wright noted

that summary judgments play an important part in prevent
ing harassment by long and costly litigation where there
is no real issue.

He found it especially important when

the First Amendment is involved because the ability to
harass inhibits free debate.

He explained:

The threat of being put to the defense of a lawsuit
by a popular public official may be as chilling to
the exercise of First Amendment freedoms as fear of
the outcome of the lawsuit itself, especially to
advocates of unpopular causes. All persons who
desire to exercise their right to criticize public
officials are not as well equipped financially as
the Post to defend against a trial on the merits.1
But this application of the New York Times rule does not
imply that the Judge would use it in other kinds of cases.
In arguing for a national standard of defamation, he
has suggested that such a standard should distinguish
classes of cases based upon the subject matter of pub
lished statements and the person who is the plaintiff.
Based upon subject matter, there could be three categories
1Ibid., 968.
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of statements*

(1 ) political; that is, directly related

to elections or government;

(2 ) public interest, a broad

category including anything that would contribute to the
development of understanding and sensitivity; and (3 )
private matters; that is, matters affecting only one
person or a small group and in which there is no general
interest until the publication itself creates curiosity.
Based upon the plaintiff in the defamation suit, there
could also be a threefold categorizations

(1 ) public

officials; (2 ) public figures; that is, persons who are
by choice in the public spotlight and have access to the
media to rebut statements about them; and (3 ) private
individuals who do not voluntarily attract publicity and
lack access to the media.

The news media’s First Amend

ment protection would be greatest when publication con
cerns political matters and the plaintiff is a public
official or a public figure .1
Although in real situations there may be disagreement as to which category is applicable, a case that
would fit easily into the political matter-public figure
bright, "Defamation . . . New Approach," Texas Law
Review, XLVI (April, 1968), 636-637.
2
A case which illustrates this is Afro-American
Publishing C o . v. Jaffe. 366 F.2d 6^9 (D.C. Cir. 1966)
(en b a n c ) . T h e case involved a white man who operated
a drugstore in a black neighborhood. He sold the Afro
in his store until he decided that the paper had become
too inflamatory and cancelled his subscription. The
editor of the Afro published an article on the cancel
lation, in which he called the druggist a bigot with
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category did come before a panel on which Wright sat.

The

case involved a public relations man who had taken active
part in the District of Columbia presidential primary.

He

filed a libel suit against the Evening Star newspaper for
calling him the "chief local spokesman of Malcolm X and
his Black Muslim Mosque" and for accusing him of appealing
to racist prejudice.

The District Court granted summary

judgment for the newspaper on grounds that the plaintiff,
a public figure, had failed to show any fact from which
malice could be inferred.

The appeals panel on which

Judge Wright sat unanimously affirmed the lower court's
decision.1
Judge Wright has not had occasion to participate in
a public figure-public interest case, but he has indica
ted that he would not favor applying the rule of New York
Times v. Sullivan to such a case.

He agrees with Justice

Harlan's opinion in Curtis Publishing C o . v. Butts that
a low opinion of the intelligence of black people. The
druggist won a libel and invasion of privacy suit, which
the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court considered the
druggist a private individual and the cancellation a pri
vate matter. But to Judge Bazelon, it was a matter of
public interest— a white man determining how militant
Negroes should be. Apparently Judge Wright's thoughts on
the problem of defamation had not yet crystallized, for
he expressed no opinion on the merits. He noted that the
case had been tried before New York Times v. Sullivan and
would have reversed and remanded for a new trial in the
light of that decision.
1Thomnson v. Evening Star Newspaper C o .,
39^ F.2d 77^ (D.C. Cir. 1968).
2388 U.S. 130 (1967).
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the plaintiff should be able to recover damages if he can
shows "highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme
departure from the standards of investigation and report
ing ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers."3'
From the plaintiff's standpoint, this would be somewhat
less stringent than the New York Times rule, since he
would not have to prove malice, only extreme negligence.
Judge Wright's behavior on the bench, however, has
not been entirely consistent with the preferences he has
expressed off the bench in relation to defamation and to
the right of privacy.

He participated in a per curiam

decision reversing and remanding a summary judgment in
favor of Time magazine in a libel suit.

The suit was

brought by an attorney who appeared in a Time photograph,
seated at a restaurant table with six other men.

The

accompanying article referred to them as having a delayed
lunch due to an earlier interruption when the District
Attorney attempted to bring them before a grand jury in
connection with an investigation of organized crime.

But

the attorney was not one of the people called before the
grand jury.

Time admitted to that knowledge but made an

editorial decision that the attorney's attendance at the
luncheon put him in the same category with the others.
1Ibid., 155» quoted at Wright, "Defamation . . . New
Approach," Texas Law Review. XLVI (April, 1968), 64l.
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Based upon these facts, the Court of Appeals reversed
the summary judgment and remanded the case for trial on
the issue of malice .1
Although Judge Wright has indicated a preference for
Justice Harlan's position, which would permit a private
individual to collect damages if a publisher printed
false statements through extreme negligence, even without
malice, he wrote a concurring opinion in which he set
forth his view of the proper procedure for handling the
malice issue under New York Times v. Sullivan.

Since the

Supreme Court had extended the New York Times rule to
o
private individuals, it might appear that Wright was sim
ply applying the law as it then existed, even though it
conflicted with his own preferences.

But that explanation

is not satisfactory because Wright not only applied the
New York Times rule, he applied it with a vengeance.

He

indicated that he would institute a two-step procedure in
which the trial judge would have to find actual malice
before the issue could go to a jury.

If the judge finds

actual malice, the issue would then be decided by the
jury, and the jury would not be informed of the judge's
prior decision.

"This two-step procedure in which both

Vasserman v. Time. Inc., ^24 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir.
1970), cert, denied 398 U.S. 9^0 (1970). Justices Black
and Douglas, the First Amendment absolutists, would have
granted certiorari.

2Time. Inc. v. Hill. 385 U.S. 37^ (1967).
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the trial judge and the jury must find actual malice
before there can be a judgment for the plaintiff provides
the protection of the First Amendment freedom that Times
sought to make secure in areas of public concern," said
Wright.'1' He was speaking dnly for himself? therefore, the
other two judges on the panel did not think Times required
this two-step procedure.

Since the two-step procedure

would make it more difficult for the attorney to win a
judgment, it is difficult to reconcile with Wright's
stated preference for lowering the constitutional barriers somewhat where private individuals are concerned.
The problem for Wright, or for anyone who values
both freedom of the press and the right to privacy, is
that the two often come into conflict.
course, recognizes this.

The Judge, of

In dealing with the conflict of

values in the abstract, he has recommended the balancing
test.

One should balance the society's right to know,

not against the individual's interest in privacy, but
against the society's interest in the privacy of its
members.-^

In concrete cases, however, Wright has usually

found freedom of the press to weigh heavier on the scale.
F.2d 920, 923.
2
It might be reconciled if Wright did not consider
the attorney to be a private individual, but he did not
discuss that issue.
-'"Defamation . . . New Approach," Texas Law Review.
XLVI, 633-63^.
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This has been true not only when the substance of printed
matter has been challenged, as in defamation cases, but
also in cases involving the manner in which the press
gained its information.
Neither Wright nor the judges with whom he sat were
willing to inhibit columnist Drew Pearson, in spite of
his questionable methods.

When Liberty Lobby, an ultra

conservative group, sought to enjoin publication of
material from its files, copied without the organization's
consent, Judge Burger pronounced the words of the bal
ancing test but added that "the balance is always in
favor of free expression . . . ,"1

Judge Wright agreed

and noted that lobbying, also a First Amendment right,
usually promotes special interests.

For that reason, it

is "imperative that the freedom of speech and the press
provisions of the First Amendment are not paralyzed while
the right to petition by lobbying is being exercised."
Except for being aware of how the material was
obtained, Pearson apparently was not involved in the
invasion of Liberty Lobby's files.

However, in a similar

case, two members of Pearson's staff secretly copied
material in the private files of Senator Thomas Dodd.
When Pearson used the material for articles on Dodd, the
^Liberty Lobby v. Pearson. 390 F.2d ^ 89 , ^91
(D.C. Cir. 1968).

2Ibid.
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Senator countered with a suit, not for libel, but for
invasion of privacy.
curb the press.

Again the court was reluctant to

According to Judge Wright's majority

opinion, the published material "clearly bore on appel
lee's qualifications as a United States Senator, and as
such amounted to a paradigm example of published speech
not subject to suit for invasion of privacy.
Judge Tamm, one of Wright's colleagues on the panel,
raised the very valid point that there should be some
legal recourse against such invasions of privacy.

Judge

Wright's opinion, however, does not foreclose the possi
bility of recourse.

His opinion, in fact, approvingly

recognizes development of the common law in some juris
dictions to protect citizen against citizen, just as the
Fourth Amendment protects citizen against government.3
His opinion is completely devoid of any approbation of
newsgathering techniques that include breaking into a
person's home or office in order to gain access to papers.
The First Amendment guarantee of freedom of the press
guarantees the right to publish information, but it does
not immunize against all sanctions the actions by which
the information is gained.
1Pearson v. Dodd. *U0 F.2d 701, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1969),
cert, denied 395 U.S. 9^7 (1969).
2Ibid., 709.
3Ibid., 70^- 705.
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Peace Demonstrations and the First
And Fifth Amendments
There is a clear distinction between what Drew
Pearson published and the actions which secured his
information.

But peace demonstrators protesting United

States involvement in Vietnam often used their actions as
a means of communicating their message.

They sometimes

attempted to blur the distinction between speech and
action.

However, even First Amendment absolutists have

not said that the First Amendment protects all actions
associated with speech.
Judge Wright, who is not a First Amendment absolu
tist, has participated in cases involving the prosecution
of peace demonstrators for breach of the peace.

The dem

onstrators engaged in such activities as singing and
speech-making, while blocking walkways on the Capitol
grounds and corridors in the Capitol itself.

Since they

were never informed which of several possible breach of
the peace statutes they were supposed to have violated,
they could not properly make out their defense, and the
Court of Appeals would not permit the convictions to
stand.*1" Judge Wright subscribed to Judge Prettyman's
opinion that the demonstrators
N e e l e y v. District of Columbia. 387 F.2d 216 (1967);
Jalbert v. District of Columbia. 387 F.2d 233 (1967);
Smith v. District of Columbia. 387 F.2d 233 (1967).
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were entitled to a definite reference to the law
which they allegedly violated. In view of the
confusion apparent in the enforcement of these
and related statutes, we commend to executive and
legislative authorities a review of this entire
area of law.l
When peace demonstrators raised what was clearly a
First Amendment issue, Judge Wright made no attempt to
circumvent it and would have gone beyond the other members
of the panel.

He would have required the National Park

Service immediately to permit an organization called
Women Strike for Peace to erect a large visual display on
the Ellipse, an area near the White House.

While he would

not compromise his opinion, the practicalities of the
situation required him to compromise his vote.
All three members of the appeals panel would have
disposed of the matter differently.

At one extreme was

Judge Robb, who simply denied that the First Amendment
gave people the right to clutter public parks with bill2
boards.
At the other extreme was Judge Wright, who would
have ordered issuance of a permit immediately.

Wright

noted that government may enact regulations on conduct
that incidentally restrict speech, but only if there is a
Smith v. District of Columbia. 387 F.2d 233, 237
(D.C. Cir. 196771 Later, Judge Wright authored a similar
opinion in a case involving not anti-war demonstrators but
an attorney involved in a disturbance before the House UnAmerican Activities Committee. Kinnoy v. District of
Columbia. ^00 F.2d 761 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
^Women Strike for Peace v. Hickel. ^20 F.2d 597,

606 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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compelling government interest, and the burden of proving
a compelling interest rests on the government.

"In this

case," he said, "the Park Service has not only failed to
meet this burden, it has been unable to articulate any
policy in support of its action beyond its general judg
ment that appellant's display is not 'appropriate.'
Judge Leventhal took a position between the extremes, but
closer to Judge Wright.

Leventhal noted that a private

group customarily erected a visual display on the Ellipse
in conjunction with the annual Christmas pageant.

In

refusing to permit the anti-war display, the Park Service
had not made it clear whether the refusal was due to the
size of the display or its theme.

While the former might

pass constitutional muster, the latter was constitutionrally forbidden.

Leventhal thought the matter should be

remanded, so the National Park Service could draft a clear
set of guidelines.
Had the judges voted as their opinions indicated
they were inclined, the panel would have been deadlocked,
and the National Park Service’s order would have stood.
That, to Judge Wright, would have been an unacceptable
result.

Although he did not think that the anti-war group

should be subjected to a delay in expressing its views,

1Ibid., 605.
2Ibid., 599-60^.
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he cast his vote with Judge Leventhal in order to get the
least objectionable decision.

The liberal rhetoric of

Wright's opinion did not stand in the way of an opportu
nity to influence the result.
Freedom of Association and Congressional
Investigations
Not everyone is as eager as the anti-war activists to
publicize his political beliefs.

This is particularly

true if one’s political beliefs induce him to join unpopu
lar groups, such as the Communist Party or the Ku Klux
Klan.

In investigating organizations of this type, con

gressional committees have compelled persons to appear at
hearings and have sought to compell testimony regarding
their organizations and activities.

The task of protec

ting the constitutional rights of such persons against
violation by investigating committees has fallen to the
courts.
As in controversies involving anti-war demonstrators,
procedural irregularities have sometimes been more impor
tant than the application of the First Amendment in the
disposition of appeals from the actions of congressional
committees and subcommittees.

Two cases involving dif

ferent men named Robert Shelton indicate that Wright is
willing to protect the right of freedom of association on
either procedural or constitutional grounds.

The first

Robert Shelton, an employee of the New York Times, refused
to answer certain questions put to him by a Senate
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subcommittee investigating Communist infiltration of the
press.

In writing for the majority of a divided panel,

Judge Wright observed that the court was being asked to
balance the right of Congress to know against the rights
of individuals to be let alone.

"We shrink from this

awesome task," he said, "and adopt a narrower disposition
of this case which will not require resolution of the
constitutional problem presented."'*'

The contempt convic

tion was reversed because of a procedural irregularity.
Wright was quite willing to avoid a constitutional def
inition of the relationship between the First Amendment
and Congress' investigatory power if he could reach the
desired result on procedural grounds.
In the case of the second Robert Shelton, who was
the Imperial Wizard of the Ku Klux Klan, Wright did indi
cate that certain limitations on Congress' investigatory
power emanates directly from the First Amendment.

Since

S h e l t o n v. United States. 327 F.2d 601, 605
(D.C. Cir. 1963).
2
For a similar case which Wright decided on pro
cedural grounds, see Liveright v. United States. 3^7 F.2d
M-73 (D.C. Cir. 1965). Judge Burger, also on the panel,
was much more the constitutional activist. He thought "it
would make more sense to face the constitutional questions
than to indulge in the strained rationalizations which
underlie much of the law in this field." Ibid., ^77. For
a justification, from a libertarian viewpoint, of judicial
activism in this field of law, see Martin Shapiro, Law and
Politics in the Supreme Court: New Approaches to
Political Jurisprudence (New Yorkt The Free iPress of
Glencoe, 19^*0 » pp* <39-70•
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Shelton denied the committee all cooperation whatsoever,
Wright concurred in the court's affirmance of his contempt
conviction.

The Judge did, however, write a concurring

opinion indicating that he was as willing to protect
privacy in the association of Klansmen as he was to pro
tect N.A.A.C.P. members' rights to privacy in their asso
ciations when he was a District Judge.1

He explicitly

disavowed any implication that the House Un-American
Activities Committee had power to subpoena the membership
lists of any political organization.

Although congres

sional committees have legitimate authority to seek infor
mation on which to base legislation, "few objects of
investigation are more useful for purposes of exposure
and punishment, while having less relevance as a factual
background for legislative deliberation, than membership
lists of unpopular groups," he said.
Thus has Judge Wright defended the exercise of free
dom of speech and freedom of association.

He has defended

these rights through direct application of the First
Amendment, as well as through insistance on procedural
regularities.

He has not said that the First Amendment

exempts mass demonstrators from the consequences of ille
gal behavior, but he has supported their right to due
Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. N.A.A.C.P.,
181 F.Supp. 37 (E.D. La. I960).
Zk0b F.2d 1292, 1307.
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process of law.

He has not denied that congressional com

mittees and subcommittees have the power to subpoena
witnesses and records, other than membership lists, but
he has insisted that such committees comply with their own
rules.
Due Process and Administrative Agencies
In addition to its use as a buttress for First Amend
ment rights, the Fifth Amendment's guarantee that no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law has often been used in a non
criminal context to challenge actions of administrative
agencies.

When these actions have involved technological

regulation or the regulation of economic interests, Judge
Wright and the courts in general have shown reluctance to
second-guess the decisions of administrators who must
apply the law to situations in which statutory words
often provide no firm guidance.

Judge Wright and his

brethren have not abdicated their power of judicial review
over administrative agencies and have sometimes cautioned
administrators while sustaining their decisions.
■^In some situations, the law is clear, yet adminis
trators are blamed for enforcing it. A panel on which
Judge Wright sat had no difficulty supporting the Com
missioner of Patents against a due process challenge by
an individual who was given proper notice but forfeited
a patent because, through a clerical error on his part,
he did not pay a fee on time. Brenner v. Ebbert,
398 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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Exercising the restraint of a typical post-New Deal
liberal in such matters, Wright has been unwilling to
void administrative orders simply because they were not
preceded by an administrative hearing.^

But he has warned

that in some situations a hearing is required.

In his

words, "It is implicit in the concept of due process that
where government action, which directly affects protected
private interests, depends on findings of fact, the person
whose interests are affected must be given an opportunity
p
to disprove the evidence relied on by government."
In effect, he gave clear notice of procedure which
the courts would not be likely to tolerate.

Other warn

ings, however, have been so vague as to leave the adminis
trative agency completely unfettered.

In the anonymity of

a per curiam opinion, Wright joined in sustaining a Fed
eral Communications Commission decision, made without a
hearing, that political candidates were only entitled to
equal opportunity to answer other announced candidates.
The court cautioned against a mechanical application of
the rule that could result in constitutional difficulties,
but it offered no guidelines as to what would constitute
^See Railway Express Agency v. Civil Aeronautics
Board, 3^5 F.2d kb5 (D.C. Cir. 1965)5 Lawrence Typograph
ical Union v. McCulloch. 3^9 F.2d 70^ (D.C. Cir. 1965).
23^9 F.2d 70^, 709 (concurring).
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"mechanical" application of the rule or what kind of
constitutional difficulties might arise.^
Procedure is not the only grounds on which the due
process clause is invoked in relation to administrative
actions.

While an agency's procedures may not he ques

tioned j the substance of specific decisions are sometimes
challenged on grounds that they are arbitrary and unrea
sonable , and thus in violation of the due process clause
of the Fifth Amendment.

It is a rare occasion when such

a challenge results in the revocation of an administrative
decision.

When a bus company challenged the reasonable

ness of a Department of the Interior regulation, Judge
Wright advised the company to "seek a political, rather
than a judicial, solution to its problem."
As a result of the Supreme Court's broadening of the
concept of standing,-^administrative decisions have become
increasingly subject to challenge in the courts.

Follow

ing the Supreme Court, a panel on which Judge Wright par
ticipated unanimously reversed a District Court decision
that poor people lacked standing to challenge a figure
computed by the Department of Agriculture and which played
1McCarthv v. F.C.C.. 390 F.2d 471 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
2
Udall v. Washington. Virginia and Maryland Coach
Co., 398 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1968)7
3Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
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an important part in the distribution of food stamps.

The

Court of Appeals noted that there was sufficient nexus
between poor people and the claim the raised to give
them standing.'*'

But this decision and the Supreme Court

decision from which it flowed have only provided easier
access to a judicial forum.

While administrators may be

required to justify publicly more of their decisions,
courts will not reject administrative economic decisions
as long as they can be shown to have some reasonable
basis.
The Court of Appeals has been somewhat more demand
ing in its review of administrative decisions with civil
rights overtones, but even then it has tread lightly.
Judge Wright was spokesman for a unanimous panel which
acknowledged that an alleged racketeer had a right to
judicial review of his deportation by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service.

Shortly after taking office,

Attorney General Kennedy announced a drive to convict or
deport one hundred persons said to be underworld figures,
and the appellant's name was on the list.

Consequently,

he argued that Immigration and Naturalization Service
officials had not exercised any discretion in his case
but had simply tried to please the Attorney General.
Through Judge Wright, the court unanimously agreed that
1Peonles v. United States Department of Agriculture.
F.2d 5^1 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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there should he an opportunity to prove prejudgment, hut
it also observed that prejudgment would be difficult to
prove .1
In recent years, protesters of the Vietnam war have
been instrumental in narrowing the administrative discre
tion of local draft boards.

Through Judge Wright, a

unanimous panel asserted that a local draft board had no
power to deny a protester the fatherhood deferment to
which he was entitled under a presidential regulation.
Even so, the court did not lightly abandon its customary
role of restraint in relation to administrative agencies.
It cautiously withheld decision pending Supreme Court
disposition of a number of similar cases, and then simply
followed the path of the Supreme Court .^
In defending the rights of civil servants, Judge
Wright has remained a thoroughgoing libertarian.

He has

not always been alone in his libertarian stance and wrote
^Bufalino v. Kennedy. 322 F.2d 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
While the decision acknowledged that some activity of the
Attorney General might be within judicial reach, neither
Wright nor the other judges have considered inactivity by
the Attorney General to be within the purview of the
courts. They acknowledged that whether or when to prose
cute is solely within the discretion of the Attorney Gen
eral. Powell v. Katzenbach, 359 F.2d 235 (D.C. Cir. I 965)
2Shea v. Mitchell. ^21 F.2d 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1970).

3

-'The Supreme Court decisions cited by Judge Wright
were Oestereich v. Selective Service System. 393 U.S. 233
(1968)} Gutknecht v. United States. 396 uTs~. 295 (1970);
Breen v. Selective Service System. 396 U.S. 460 (1970).

for a unanimous panel that the government could not base
the discharge of a civilian Air Force employee on evi
dence gained through a general search conducted by
Japanese officials but initiated by United States offi
cials.

Wright indicated that evidence submitted at dis

charge proceedings must be "evidence submitted without
violating the Constitution of the United States."3' Judge
Wright's opinion was later quoted by the Court of Claims
when it awarded back pay to a civilian employee whose
discharge had been based upon unlawfully seized evidence.
Wright has sometimes been more venturesome than his
brethren in attacking the arbitrary discharge of civil
servants from their jobs.

In Dew v. Halabv ,3the majority

of an appeals panel sustained the dismissal of a Civil
Aeronautics Authority employee who had previously been
employed by the Central Intelligence Agency.

While with

the C.I.A., he had taken a lie detector test during a se
curity clearance and admitted to having performed homo
sexual acts while in his teens and to having smoked
marijuana on at least five occasions prior to 1952.
was given an opportunity to resign and did so.

He

Later,

after working for the Civil Aeronautics Authority for
^Towell v. Zuckert. 366 F.2d 63^, 6^0 (D.C. Cir.

1966).
2Savlor v. United States. 37^ F.2d 89^, 898 (1967).
3317 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1963).

p
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almost two years, he was discharged from that job because
of the incidents he had admitted to the C.I.A.
Service Commission upheld the action.

The Civil

When Dew appealed

to the judiciary, the Court of Appeals deferred to the
Civil Service Commission on grounds that the court lacked
the background and experience to say that Dew’s discharge
would not contribute to the efficiency of the service.
Although the majority used the language of judicial
restraint, Judge Wright accused it of improper activism.
His point was that there had been no administrative find
ing of a connection between Dew's past conduct and his job
performance.

At one of the administrative hearings, a

personnel officer had, in fact, admitted that there was no
evidence of incompetence.

In rejecting the majority's

acceptance of the possibility that Dew's past conduct
could affect the efficiency of the civil service, Wright
said i
This court's rationalization on the subject can
hardly serve in the absence of findings. Under
the law, the court’s responsibility is to review
administrative findings, not to make them.l
Several years later, in 1969* Wright had the satis
faction of participating in a decision that required
administrative agencies to justify an employee's dismissal
with more than evidence of homosexuality.

Chief Judge

David Bazelon required the agency to show that the
1Ibid., 591
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dismissal would contribute to the efficiency of the civil
service.

He specifically alluded to the Dew decision and

noted that it was over strong dissent.’1' But this decision
too was over strong dissent.

Bazelon and Wright were

accused of rushing out, "robes flying, into the forbidden
area of administrative discretion to give kind assistance
to the subjects of what it /the majority/ feels to be
highwayman tactics at the hands of the Civil Service Commission.

„2

But Wright would deny that he has entered a forbid
den area.

His opinions indicate that when the rights of

civil servants are at issue, he considers federal admin
istrative agencies as vulnerable to judicial intervention
as local school boards or policemen.
N o r t o n v. Macy, ^17 F.2d ll 6l. In this case there
were no security problems because of the nature of the
work, the appellant's superior had testified to his com
petence , his fellow workers were unaware of his homosex
uality, and his job did not bring him into contact with
the public.
2
Ibid., 1168. The acrimonious debate continued in
Adams v, Laird. ^20 F.2d 230 (D.C. Cir. 1969) cert,
denied, 397 U.S. 1039 (1970). The facts were somewhat
different in that the challenged action was the termina
tion of a security clearance. The composition of the
appeals panel was also different, which pushed Wright back
into a dissenter's position, but he continued to argue
that an individual is entitled to "a decision in which
there is a rational nexus between the facts and the con
clusions drawn therefrom."
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Landlord-Tenant Relations
In lawsuits in which one of the adversaries is a lone
individual facing a governmental agency or even the
"United States" itself, the inequality of the contestants
is magnified.

However, lawsuits involving landlord-

tenant relations have, for the most part, involved private
litigants.

This does not mean that the litigants have

been economic or political equals.

In the battle of con

flicting interests between landlords and tenants waged in
the courts of the District of Columbia, Wright's liberal
ideology led him to espouse the tenants' cause.

In doing

so, he participated in the alteration of legal relation
ships.

This venture in social engineering required a va

riety of legal tools*

the Constitution, the District of

Columbia Housing Code, the intent of the District of
Columbia Commissioners, and judicial rules of contract
law.
Wright entered the fray during his second year as an
appellate judge, when he wrote a majority opinion denying
claims by rooming house and apartment operators that the
fire safety provisions of the housing code denied them
due process of law .1

But the existance of a housing code

containing safety and sanitary provisions is no assurance
that the code will be observed.
1Jones v. District of Columbia, 323 P. 2d 306
(D.C. Cir. 196371
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The First Amendment was injected into the landlordtenant conflict when a tenant complained to the housing
authority that the sanitary conditions in her rented
house did not meet housing code requirements.

The land

lord attempted to evict her, and she argued that the
eviction was in retaliation for having reported the
housing code violations, although she had also withheld
rent.

At the preliminary hearing, Judge Harold Greene1

found that her allegations were substantiated, but a dif
ferent judge presided at the trial.

The trial judge

accepted the landlord's contention that eviction was for
non-payment of rent and did not let the tenant's defense
go to the jury.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia issued a per curiam order staying the eviction
until the tenant's allegations could be determined in
court, provided the rent was paid.

In addition to

joining the per curiam stay order, Judge Wright wrote a
separate opinion in which he expressed his agreement with
Judge Greene that a landlord may evict for any legal rea
son, but cannot evict for the illegal reason of punishing
^ e had previously served in the Civil Rights Divi
sion of the Department of Justice and had appeared in
Judge Wright's court during the desegregation controversy
in Louisiana. See Times-Picavune. August 5» 1961, pp. 1,
3? Hall v. St. Helena Parish School Board, 197 F.Supp. 64 9
(E.D. La. l9£iT
^Edwards v. Habib. 366 F.2d 628 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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a tenant for exercising the constitutional right to report
violations of law.

If the tenant can prove that the evic

tion was in retaliation, "then a court may not participate
with the landlord in the implementation of his illegal
purpose."1

Wright also expressed the belief that the

tenant would prevail on the merits and that the landlord
would not be harmed by the stay, since it was conditioned
2
upon payment of rent.
Judge Danaher, in dissent,
defended the landlord.

He noted that the tenant admitted

withholding rent and knew the condition of the house when
she moved in.

"It would seem that the landlord, too, has

constitutional rights," protested Danaher, "for the Fifth
Amendment provides that he shall not be deprived of his
property without due process of law."3
In the court below, Judge Danaher's position pre
vailed.

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals (a

part of the municipal court system and not to be con
fused with the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit on which Judge Wright sits) decided that
the tenant had a right to report violations of the hous
ing code, but, since no specific legislation protected the
right, the courts had no authority to intervene in the
legal relationship between landlord and tenant.
decision, however, did not withstand appeal.
1Ibid., 630.

2Ibid.

3Ibid.

The
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The same panel that granted the stay reversed the
lower court and held that when the District of Columbia
Commissioners, at the direction of Congress, promulgated
the housing code, there was an implied change in the
rights of landlords and tenants.

As a matter of statu

tory construction, a majority of the panel decided that
proof of a retaliatory motive on the part of the landlord
was a defense against eviction, otherwise the purpose of
the housing code would be defeated.

Whether the land

lord's motive was or was not retaliatory was to be decided
by the court or the jury .1
The majority opinion was only part of a longer
opinion by Judge Wright.

In parts I and II of the opin

ion, he spoke only for himself and discussed the question
of retaliatory evictions in constitutional terms.

He

explored a number of constitutional paths, all leading to
the same end— judicial protection for the tenant.

Because

the First Amendment limits government, not individuals
such as landlords, Wright examined the concept of "state
action."

In Fourteenth Amendment cases, it was determined

that the states could not act through their courts to give
effect to private discrimination.

He saw no reason for

giving the concept of "state action" a more restricted
meaning in relation to the First Amendment right to peti
tion government.

If the First Amendment alone was not

Edwards v. Habib. 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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sufficient, the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment
provided considerable flexibility.

He noted that courts

might also utilize the balancing test or the test of rea
sonableness.

If the balancing test is used, the land

lord's rights are balanced against the tenant's First
Amendment rights, and the latter wins because of the First
Amendment's preferred position.

If the test of reason

ableness is used, the tenant's First Amendment rights are
protected because the purpose of the housing code is to
protect tenants.^
In the second part of the opinion, Wright considered
Judge Greene’s less orthodox approach to the question of
retaliatory evictions and made a number of approving
references to Greene's "thoughtful opinion."

Rather than

rely on specific constitutional provisions, Wright agreed
that one can make a persuasive argument that "the right
to petition government for redress of grievances and the
right to inform the government of violations of law
/are 7 rights of federal citizenship arising from our con
stitutional system as a whole, not just from the First
Amendment or from any other particular constitutional
clause or provision."

But he concluded that it was not

^ b i d . , 690-696.
p
Ibid., 697. Constitutional lawyer Charles L. Black
has advocated this type of approach in Structure and
Relationship in Constitutional Law (Baton Rouges
Louisiana State University Press, 1969).
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necessary to decide any of these constitutional argu
ments, since a majority of the court was able to resolve
the controversy by statutory construction.1
Why, then, the lengthy opinion, if more than half of
it was not necessary to decide the case?

For a policy-

oriented judge like Wright, it was more than an intellec
tual exercise in constitutional manipulation.

He was

apparently laying groundwork for the idea that irrespec
tive of legislative intent, there were still ample
constitutional grounds on which courts could protect
tenants from retaliatory evictions.

Moreover, judges in

other jurisdictions could use his constitutional argu
ments should they be so inclined.

A handbook for poverty

lawyers has, in fact, urged that lawyers representing
tenants in retaliatory eviction cases raise all of the
theories and analysis contained in Judge Wright’s Edwards

. .

opinion.

2

The opinion has indeed been influential.

One

Federal District Court accepted the "state action" argu
ment and denied that state courts could constitutionally
aid a landlord in evicting a tenant for exercising his
right to report housing code violations, even if state
1397 F. 2d 687, 698.
2
National Institute for Education in Law and Poverty,
Handbook on Housing Law. II (2 vols.; Chicagot
Northwestern University School of Law, 1969), p. L-T
Ch.Ill-4.
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law rejected the retaliatory eviction defense.^

State

courts in Florida, Michigan, and New York followed
Edwards without deciding the constitutional questions
raised.

They considered that retaliatory evictions

would defeat the public policy to be furthered by the
housing code.

Further indication of the influence of

Judge Wright's Edwards opinion is that it is being
included in casebooks and taught in the law schools.-*
Although less influential than his Edwards opinion,
Judge Wright authored another opinion on landlord-tenant
relations that was a model of creative jurisprudence.
The case was Javins v. First National Realty Corporation,^
and it arose when some tenants in the District of Columbia
withheld rent as a means of pressuring their landlord into
correcting existing housing code violations.

The landlord

attempted to evict for non-payment of rent, and the ten
ants sought to defeat the landlord's action.
In deciding the controversy, Judge Wright turned not
to the Constitution but to the law of leases and con
tracts.

He observed that the rules governing leases

originated during feudal times when society was
'hiosey v. Club Van Courtlandt, 299 F.Supp. 501
(S.D.N.Y. 1969) cited in Ibid.. p. L-T Ch.III-6.
2See Ibid., pp. L-T Ch.III- 6-7 .
^See Curtis J. Berger (ed.), Cases and Materials on
Housing (St. Pauls West Publishing Co., 1969), p. 636.
S 28 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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predominantly agrarian.
an interest in land.

In those days, a lease conveyed

In most instances, this was no

longer true, and Wright considered that the courts had
"a duty to reappraise old doctrines in the light of the
facts and values of contemporary life— particularly old
common law doctrines which the courts themselves created
and developed."^

In our predominantly urban, industrial

society, the land beneath an apartment building is not of
prime concern to the apartment lesee.

"When American city

dwellers, both rich and poor, seek 'shelter' today," said
Wright, "they seek a well known package of goods and ser
vices— a package which includes not merely walls and
ceilings, but also adequate heat, light, and ventilation,
serviceable plumbing facilities, secure windows and doors,
proper sanitation, and proper maintenance."
Since the rules governing leases were not appropriate
in this context, Wright would treat leases of urban dwel
ling units like other contracts.

Into the contract, he

read a warranty of habitability, just as courts have come
to place responsibility in sellers that goods are fit for
the purpose for which they are sold .3

In any event, he

considered that the District of Columbia housing code
required a warranty of habitability or the purpose of the
code would be defeated.
1Ibid. , 107*1-.

He assumed that a warranty of
2Ibid.

3Ibid. , 1075-1076.
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habitability was not explicitly included in the contract
because both parties took it for granted.'1’
Once it was established that the leases in question
were to be treated like other contracts, it became pos
sible to protect the tenant from eviction for non-payment
of rent, since the landlord was entitled to collect rent
only if he fulfilled his part of the contract.

Wright

concluded that the tenant must have an opportunity to show
that the landlord did not live up to his contractual obli
gations.

This could be done by proving housing code

violations at trial.

Only if the landlord wins the case

can he evict for non-payment.

If the trial result is that

the tenants are only partly released from their rent, the
landlord cannot evict as long as the tenant pays what is
2
due.
The Judge suggested that rent be paid to the court
pending a decision.-*

Although the landlord sought to have

the matter reviewed by the Supreme Court, the Court denied
certiorari.^
Wright's Javins opinion was influential in the
District of Columbia.

Other panels, on which he did not

participate, carried the principles of the decision even

1Ibid.. 1080-1081.
3Ibid., 1083, n. 67 .

\oo

u.s. 925 (1971 ).

2Ibid.» 1082-1083.
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further.^

Outside the District of Columbia, however, a

tenant's right to withhold rent because of housing code
violations depends upon state law.

Against a constitu

tional challenge on due process grounds, the Supreme
Court has upheld an Oregon law which denies tenants the
right to offer the landlord's failure to comply with the
housing code as a defense for nonpayment of rent in evic
tion proceedings.

According to the Court, "The Constitu

tion has not federalized the substantive law of landlordtenant relations . . . and we see nothing to forbid Oregon
from treating the undertakings of the tenant and those of
the landlord as independent rather than dependent
p
covenants."
It was in Justice Douglas' dissenting opin
ion that Wright's ideas were most prominent.

Douglas

thought the problem began with Wright's statement in the
Javins case regarding the expectations of American city
dwellers when they seek shelter.-^

He also approved of

Wright's suggestion that withheld rent be paid to the
“4ciine v. Massachusetts Ave. Ant. Corp.. 439 F.2d

699 (1970) made the landlord, under certain circumstances,
liable for damages resulting from criminal attacks on
tenants in the common hallways of an apartment building.
In Cooks v. Fowler, 437 F.2d 669 (1971)» "the court
required a tenant to pay less than full rent to the court
pending appeal after an initial decision that the landlord
was in violation of the housing code.
^Lindsay v. Normet, 92 S.Ct. 862, 87I (1972).

3Ibid.. 880.

220
court pending settlement of the dispute.'1' Dissents, how
ever, have no immediate effect on public policy; therefore,
there is small satisfaction to be gained by winning the
approval of a dissenter, and Judge Wright admits that he
was unhappy with the Lindsay decision.
Although the Supreme Court has not read the prin
ciples of Wright's Javins opinion into the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court has not affected the validity of that
decision in the District of Columbia because it did not
rest on constitutional grounds.

Neither was Edwards v.

Habib decided on constitutional grounds.

In that case,

however, Wright did provide an extensive discussion of the
constitutional issues involved in retaliatory evictions.
Should the proper case reach the Supreme Court, it may yet
protect tenants from retaliatory evictions, even though
the Court has not legitimized rent strikes.-^

Certainly,

Judge Wright has provided a choice of constitutional
routes to that end.
•*T b i d . , 882.

interview:

Hon. J. Skelly Wright.

•^There is some indication that the Chief Justice
might be unsympathetic to a landlord’s use of his power
of eviction to penalize the tenant's exercise of the
First Amendment right to petition government for a redress
of grievances. While still a member of the Court of
Appeals, Judge Burger, as well as Judge Wright, joined an
opinion in which a panel denied that government could
exercise even its lawful power government employees'
organizations in a manner that clashed with constitutional
rights. National Assoc, of Gov't Employees v. White,
k l 8 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1969). There remains, of course,
the possibility that Burger would not find a private
individual's actions as restricted as government's.
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In the landlord-tenant controversy, as in controver
sies involving the First and Fifth Amendments, Judge
Wright has used the discretion of his office to further
the volues of political liberalism.

This has meant

defending individual liberty against governmental
restraint and, in the case of private litigation, being in
sympathy with the traditionally disadvantaged party or
group.

One significant deviation from this approach was

his emergency order permitting blood transfusions over
the religious objections of a critically ill hospital
patient.

His order, however, decided no constitutional

questions; it merely maintained the status quo.

In other

circumstances, with time for the usual research and
reflection, he might very well decide that the free exer
cise of religion clause permits a person to accept death
rather than violate religious principles.

CHAPTER VII
JUDGE J. SKELLY WRIGHT*

RETROSPECT~

PROS PECT--EVALUATION
The public career of Judge J. Skelly Wright has
spanned thirty-seven years, beginning in 1937 on the
staff of the United States Attorney for the Eastern
District of Louisiana, before even the most senior member
of the present Supreme Court was appointed to that high
tribunal.

Although this study of Judge Wright's career

and constitutional approach does not yield generalizations
about lower federal judges as a whole, it does permit one
to examine and evaluate one judge's approach to the
Constitution and his place in the American constitutional
scheme.

Such a study also provides certain insights which

may be useful to an understanding of the judicial process.
Although federal district judges usually come from
the district in which they serve and have strong local
ties, Judge Wright's case suggests that local values may
be weaker in judges whose most significant pre-judicial
career experiences took place outside the local political
system than in an individual who has had an active role
in the local political system.
222

Wright unquestionably had
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strong local ties.

He was born, grew up, and was edu

cated in the Eastern District of Louisiana, and his
connection with the local political system, through his
family, made his appointment as Assistant United States
Attorney possible.

At no time was he active in state

and local politics, and after his appointment to the
United States Attorney's staff, his position required him
to represent the interests of the United States, as
opposed to state or local interests.
Wright's appointment as Assistant United States
Attorney was apparently the beginning of a growing attach
ment to the values of contemporary political liberalism.
He entered the United States Attorney's office during
the Great Depression, a time when most people were looking
to Washington for help, as evidenced by the 193& election
returns.

Only months before he joined Rene Viosca's

staff, the Supreme Court had made its well known "switch
in time"1and began to uphold New Deal legislation.

The

legal, political, and economic atmosphere was hardly con
ducive to sentiments of state sovereignty.

Wright himself

contributed to the decline of state sovereignty when he
1The reference is, of course, to the change in
voting position by Justice Roberts and Chief Justice
Hughes, which resulted in upholding New Deal legislation
and saving the Supreme Court from Roosevelt's "packing"
plan. The first important decision reflecting the
realignment was N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1 (193 I T -
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assisted in the prosecution of the Classic case, which
resulted in greater power for the national government in
the regulation of congressional elections.
Wright's liberal tendencies were further stimulated
when his experiences during the war years led him to
question some of the values of the society in which he
lived.

After the war, his private law practice in

Washington provided the opportunity to appear before the
Supreme Court, a significant experience for any lawyer,
and for Wright the experience was in defense of civil
rights.

As United States Attorney, he was made aware of

attacks on the voting rights of blacks.

All these experi

ences affected his political outlook.
Wright's liberal tendencies came to fruition when he
put on the judicial robe and was freed from political
pressures.

He expressed his new sense of freedom by

assuming the role of a liberal, policy-oriented judge.
Like other post-New Deal liberals, he has not obstructed
governmental economic regulation by either state or
federal agencies, but even in economic matters, his policy
orientation has been obvious.

When he objected to econ

omic policy adopted by state government, such as pricefixing, he upheld its constitutionality, but he used the
discretion of his office to write an opinion that was
highly critical of price-fixing and urged the Supreme
Court to reconsider the issue.

The unorganized consumer
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bore the burden of price-fixing, so it was repugnant to
his liberal policy preferences.

Ordinarily, however,

Wright has accepted economic regulation by all levels of
government.

When federal administrative agencies met

opposition from Wright, it was not over their economic
decisions, but over decisions with civil rights overtones,
such as the arbitrary dismissal of civil servants.
It is, in fact, in the field of civil rights that
liberal judges have most sought to influence public
policy, and Judge Wright has clearly defined his role as
that of protector of civil rights.

During his years as a

judge, he has responded favorably and with increasing
force to demands for racial equality.

He began modestly

during the era of "separate but equal," applying that doc
trine without hint of disapproval, but always finding that
the facilities in question were separate but unequal and
ordering a previously segregated facility to admit the
complaining black.

After the Brown decisions, Wright

used all the powers of his office to enforce them in his
District, criticizing segregation in moral, as well as
legal, terms.
The resistance of state authorities to desegregation
and Wright's response to their opposition attracted
national attention and ultimately resulted in Wright’s
elevation to the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit.

Had he not been a policy

oriented judge, he might have enjoyed his "moment in the
sun," picked up his honory degrees— he received them from
Yale, Notre Dame, and Howard Universities— and gradually
lapsed into relative obscurity.

Instead, Judge Wright

grasped every opportunity to influence opinion of public
policy and used his national reputation to increase his
off-the-bench activity.

In his first major effort after

his promotion, he used his James Madison Lecture at New
York University to attack de facto segregation.

The

unusual circumstances of the Hobson v. Hansen controversy
gave him the opportunity to extend the law in the direc
tion of the values he promoted off the bench, and he held
that de facto segregation in the District of Columbia
denied equal educational opportunity to poor blacks.

The

demographic characteristics of the District of Columbia
prevented any real integration of the public schools, but
Wright's order prodded school officials to make greater
efforts at providing equal educational opportunity for the
black children who comprise the majority of the public
school population of the District.

He brought this con

cept of equal educational opportunity even into the area
of voting rights and refused to lift the literacy test
ban of the 19^5 Voting Rights Act when blacks were educa
tionally disadvantaged.
Wright’s tendency to use all the resources of his
office to promote his liberal policy preferences has been
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as evident in the area of criminal procedure as in the
area of racial equality.

As a District Judge, he com

plained that the Supreme Court had not gone far enough
in protecting the rights of the accused.

During the

I960's, however, the Court would give him little grounds
for complaint, as it actively broadened the rights of
persons accused of crime and handed down a number of
landmark decisions.’1' As a Circuit Judge, Wright was very
much in agreement with the policies of the Warren Court,
as was a sizeable bloc of judges of the court on which
he sits.

Because of this favorable legal environment

during most of his years as a Circuit Judge, and because
he is rule-oriented as well as policy-oriented, he has
not been a frequent dissenter.-*

Consequently, he has

often relied on concurring opinions to influence policy.
He has voted to affirm convictions on grounds that the
For example, see Mapx? v. Ohio, 36? U.S. 64-3 (1961);
Gideon v. Wainwright. 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. *+78 (196*0; Miranda v. Arizona,
38*1 U.S. *+36 (1966).
2
See Sheldon Goldman, "Politics, Judges, and the
Administration of Justices The Backgrounds, Recruitment,
and Decisional Tendencies of the Judges on the United
States Courts of Appeals, 1961-*+" (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Harvard University, 1965), p. I 87 . See
also, "Rigging of Judicial Panels in Court of Appeals
Denied— Attorneys Suspicious of System," Washington
Post, June 15, 19&9, printed in U.S., Congressional
Record, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., CXV, Part 12, p. 160*1-3.
3

-'The Watts free speech case, however, indicates that
he can be effective in that role. See pp. 183-18*+ above.
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Mallory Rule may not be raised for the first time on
appeal.

Yet, he has used his concurring opinion to sug

gest that failure to invoke the Mallory Rule below may
have been due to ineffective counsel, which would not
satisfy the Sixth Amendment.1

For all practical purposes,

he was inviting defense lawyers to test the theory.

In

the "spontaneous apology" case, he agreed that affirmance
of the conviction was proper, but he used his concurring
opinion to expose improper criminal procedure and warn
against its continuance.

The very frequency of his

concurring opinions testifies to his efforts to influence
the development of law even when he agrees that the court
has decided correctly according to existing law.
Judge Wright's policy orientation toward liberal
values is particularly evident in his willingness to
compromise his vote in order to get the least objection
able result, without compromising his opinions.

He voted

to give the National Park Service opportunity to draw
guidelines on permissible displays on national park land,
but, at the same time, he aired his objections to requir
ing anti-war demonstrators to delay the exercise of their
constitutional rights.-^

When it boiled down to a choice

1Leigh v. United States. 329 F.2d 883 (196*0.
2Venev v. United States, 3*^ F.2d 5^2 (1965).
% o m e n Strike for Peace v. Hickel, 1+20 F.2d 597
(1969).
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between voting against a right to counsel in the grand
jury room or voting to base the right on the court's
supervisory power over the Circuit, he had no difficulty
choosing the latter, although he would have preferred to
base the right on the Constitution.1
Judge Wright's liberal interpretation of constitu
tional rights often brought him in conflict with his
colleague, Judge Burger, particularly in the area of
criminal law and procedure.

One of the major points of

conflict was the application of the Mallory Rule,
fashioned by the Supreme Court to enforce the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Fifth Amendment's
guarantee against self-incrimination. In the Killough
2
case, the Court of Appeals, en banc, ratified Wright's
preference for an expanded interpretation of the Mallory
Rule and rejected Burger's attempt to confine it within
narrow limits.
Burger now sits in the Chief Justice's chair, and,
as a result of President Nixon’s Supreme Court appoint
ments, Burger's policy preferences are now ascendant.

In

a 5-^ decision, the Court extracted the teeth from the
Warren Court's Miranda decision.

The Chief Justice wrote

the majority opinion holding that a confession obtained
1Jones v. United States. 3^2 F.2d 863 (196^).
2315 F.2d 2 k l (1962).
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in violation of the Miranda rules could he used to im
peach the credibility of the defendant.

Burger took

the opportunity to insert a footnote rejecting extrava
gant extensions of the Constitution, specifically citing
the Killough decision as just such an extravagant
extension.^
Criminal procedure has not been the only area of
law to feel the impact of the Burger Court.

In 1973» the

Supreme Court sanctioned a system of public school finance
whereby individual school districts might supplement the
state's contribution through local taxation, thus result
ing in greater educational expenditures in affluent dis
tricts than in poor districts.

The Court held that the

system was not in conflict with the equal protection
2
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Judge Wright's
judgment, it was "a very unfortunate result.

From the

standpoint of anyone who would be interested in equal
educational opportunity, it was a terrific setback— a
terrific setback when there was reason for great hope."-^
The California Supreme Court had already granted relief
k

in a similar situation, and the Federal District Court
^Harris v. New York. *J-01 U.S. 222, 226, n. 2.
2
San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez, foil U.S. 1.
-^Interview:

Hon. J. Skelly Wright.

^Serrano v. Priest. ^87 P.2d 12*H (1971).

in Texas had followed the decision.'*'

Judge Wright con

sidered the law ready for the next step, hut he was
disappointed when the step was in the wrong direction.
The changed legal environment obviously affects
Wright as a judge.

"Instead of trying to be creative in

the development of the law," he explains, "the effect of
present Supreme Court opinions is to make one look back
ward, to contract rather than to develop further the
principles with which I have been associated in the past.
And he admits that he finds the situation depressing.
One suspects, however, that he will not be inca
pacitated by depression but will continue to make efforts
within the limits of his discretion, to influence public
policy.

He is not lacking in professional skills, and,

as Walter Murphy has pointed out, professional skills
are a valuable aid to a policy-oriented judge.

They help

him to reach Justices who are open to persuasion on the
merits of a case.-^

The logical targets for Wright's

efforts at persuasion appear to be Justices Stewart and
White, and Justice Powell, the most flexible of the Nixon
appointees to the Supreme Court.

k

If Wright can win over

^Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School
District. 337 F.Supp. 280 (w.D. Tex. 1971).
2
Interview* Hon. J. Skelly Wright.
^Elements of Judicial Strategy, p. M>5.
kr

See Philip B. Kurland, "1971 Terms The Year of the
Stewart-White Court," Supreme Court Review (1972),
pp. 182-187.
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two of the three, his policy preferences are likely to
prevail, since three of the holdovers from the Warren
Court are, like him, attuned to the values of political
liberalism.

Although he has already experienced some

success in this regard,1the legal environment of the

1970's is such that he must also expect failure, and,
since the completion of research for this study, he has
experienced that in the form of reversal by the Supreme
Court.2
Before bringing this study of Judge Wright's
career and constitutional approach to a close, an evalu
ation of his more than twenty years of judicial service
is in order.

Has Wright been a good judge?

This question

He dissented from a Court of Appeals decision
holding that the issuance of a public document printed
under congressional authorization and containing the names
of District of Columbia school children who were disci
plinary problems, was protected from suit by the congres
sional immunity clause of the Constitution. Justices
White and Powell were among the five Justices who voted
to reverse in part. See Doe v. McMillan, ^59 F.2d 103^
(D.C. Cir. 1972) rev'd in part, IflFuTsT 306 (1973).
Radio and television stations were permitted by
F.C.C. order to refuse to sell time for all "editorial
commercials." Organizations which attempted to purchase
time for anti-war statements and were refused challenged
the F.C.C. order on First Amendment grounds. Business
Executives Move for Peace v. F.C.C. and Democratic
National Committee v. F.C.C. were consolidated and dis
posed of with a single opinion in which Judge Wright
ordered the F.C.C. to set guidelines for the acceptance
of paid, non-commercial messages by radio and television
stations, ^50 F.2d 6k2 (D.C. Cir. 1971). He was reversed
by the Supreme Court sub nom. Columbia Broadcasting
System v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94
(1973).
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can be approached from at least three directions:

his

technical competence, his interpretation of the judicial
function, the values he has promoted.
In terms of technical competence, Wright must score
high.

One can find one of Wright's economic decisions

from the Eastern District of Louisiana cited in Barron
and Holtzoff's Federal Practice and Procedure as a very
careful opinion.^

When he was elevated to the Court of

Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the American
Bar Association, generally considered a conservative
organization, gave him its highest rating, "exceptionally
well qualified."

The ability of a judge's decisions to

withstand appeals has also been considered a measure of
2
technical competence.
By this criterion, Wright has
indeed been a competent judge.

Rarely have his opinions

been reversed by a higher court.

He had been on the

bench for over twenty years before experiencing his first
Supreme Court reversal, although his opinions had often
been affirmed by that Court.

The success of his decisions

has not been entirely due to the fact that the legal
■^The case was Pan American Fire & Casualty C o . v.
Revere. 188 F .Supp. ^7^ (19^0). See p. 36 above.
2
Although more was involved, Judge G. Harrold
Carswell's extremely high reversal rate was considered
an indication of judicial incompetence and played an
important part in the Senate's rejection of his nomina
tion to the Supreme Court. See Richard Harris,
Decision (New York: Ballentine Books, 1971), pp. 107-

tof:
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environment was congenial to his values.

His decisions

include a number of reluctant ones, made because he
interpreted the law as requiring them.
When Wright was dissatisfied with the state of the
law, he used the discretion of his office to try to bring
about change.

If the constraints of his office limited

him to criticism of existing practice or suggesting new
approaches, his interpretation of the judicial function
made such tactics acceptable.

Wright believes that an

important function of the courts is to influence the
normative content of law.

He believes that courts should

foster the best inspiration of the time and help it win
general acceptance, with emphasis always upon the highest
ideals of the community rather than the ideals of the
judges.1
Is this a valid approach to the judicial function?
Obviously, it is not without problems.
faced with competing values.

Judges are always

Unless judges can identify

the community's highest ideals, they cannot determine
which of the available options best represent those ideals.
The basic problem is that the judges' own values and
beliefs will color their perception of community ideals.
One aspect of this problem is that the judges may
perceive the community's highest ideals to be identical
with their own, when in fact they may not be.
^ e e pp. 115-116 above.

Wright
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recognizes the problem and leaves its solution to the
dynamics of the American political system.

He assumes

that decisions which reflect merely the values of the
judges will fail to generate support, and the judges will
be forced to reverse themselves, just as the Supreme
Court did in 1937* when it was under attack.

Because of

the dramatic circumstances of a major depression, Wright
perhaps overestimates the significance of the Court’s

1937 "switch," since unpopular decisions ordinarily do
not evoke responses as strong as the "court-packing"
plan.
While Wright may perhaps overestimate the signifi
cance of the Court's 1937 reversal, he does not over
estimate the significance of the political process.
Judicial pronouncements are not automatically translated
into public policy, but usually experience modification
in the course of implementation, which minimizes the
threat of policy-oriented judges like Wright to democratic
government.

Moreover, judicial rules and structure limit

the freedom of even the most active lower-court judges.
Wright's professional reputation is evidence that he has
generally remained within those limits.

For him, fos

tering the best inspiration of the time has, in reality,
amounted to doing what he thinks is right, within the
bounds of his office.

One may argue that the limited freedom of the judge
and the difficulty of identifying the highest community
values make Wright's approach a valid one.

If he were

to compromise his own values out of a belief that the
community would reject them, he could quite possibly
underestimate the community, and thus contribute to a
deterioration in the normative content of the law at a
time when the community might have responded favorably
to a clear judicial pronouncement.
Finally, there is the matter of the values to which
Wright has subscribed and read into the Constitution.
Political equality, which he has identified as the most
important of contemporary community values, is obviously
central to his own values.

It permeates his approach to

the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend
ments.

Far from being a threat to democratic government,

Wright's judicial activism has promoted democratic govern
ment by defending equal access to the ballot and the free
dom to disseminate ideas and opinions, both by the press
and by less conventional means.

Democratic government

depends upon the freedom of the citizenry to hear com
peting ideas, including the unorthodox, and to register
their choice through equal access to the ballot.
Wright's commitment to equality is also evident in
his liberal reading of Bill of Rights procedural guaran
tees.

While his defense of the rights of the accused has
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occasionally led him to untenable positions, disagree
ment with particular decisions does not invalidate the
principle that persons accused of crime, persons who very
often are poor and uneducated, may not be deprived of
their liberty without being informed of what their rights
are and having those rights fully respected.

Wright

does not underestimate the seriousness of the crime
problem; he simply denies that the deprivation of consti
tutional rights is either a valid or an effective way to
solve the problem.
Wright's defense of equal educational opportunity
is perhaps more troublesome than defense of First Amend
ment rights or the procedural guarantees of the Bill of
Rights.

It is more difficult because neither judges nor

educators are certain what it takes to overcome the cul
tural disadvantages of ghetto children and provide them
with educational opportunity equal to that of their
middle class peers.

To reject the principle of equal

educational opportunity, however, is to deny that the
society has any obligation to seek solutions to this
admittedly difficult problem.

It is to Wright's credit

that he has refused to take that course.
During his years on the bench, and particularly
during his later years, Judge Wright has been an articu
late spokesman for the interests of disadvantaged
individuals and groups.

By the ways in which they have
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used the discretion of their offices and taken advantage
of the public visibility conferred by their offices,
J. Skelly Wright and judges like him have brought a
humane quality to the law.
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